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# HISTORY of MACTHAI/JUSMAG (PROVISIONAL) THAILAND 1965

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HEADQUARTERS  
 UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND THAILAND  
 APO SAN FRANCISCO 96346

MACTSJS1

16 April 1966

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TO: See Distribution

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FOR THE COMMANDER:

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 Lt Col, AGC  
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
A HISTORY OF THE  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, THAILAND  
JOINT UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP  
(PROVISIONAL)  
1965

(Unclassified Title)

Office of the Historian  
Headquarters, USMACTHAI/JUSMAG  
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"... The United States of America wishes to extend its resources, not in war, but in peaceful development. And even as we face the aggressors and adversaries on the battlefield we are prepared to extend a helping hand, and a strong and friendly hand, in peaceful development."

Statement by Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey upon his departure from Bangkok, Thailand, 15 Feb 1966.



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MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD GILES STILWELL  
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, THAILAND  
CHIEF, JOINT UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP, THAILAND

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**MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD GILES STILWELL**  
**COMMANDER, UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND THAILAND**  
**CHIEF, JOINT UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP THAILAND**

Richard Giles Stilwell was born in Buffalo, New York, on 24 February 1917. He was graduated from the United States Military Academy on 14 June 1938, standing thirteenth in General Order of Merit and commanding his cadet company. He was awarded the Bachelor of Science Degree and commissioned a second lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers.

General Stilwell's initial assignments were in Hawaii, first as a platoon leader in the 3d Engineer Regiment and subsequently as Assistant Engineer of the Hawaiian Department. At the outbreak of World War II, he was Operations Officer, 18th Engineer Regiment at Vancouver Barracks, Washington.

Early in 1942 he became Executive Officer of the 315th Combat Engineer Battalion of the 90th Infantry Division at Camp Barkeley, Texas. In June of the same year he assumed command of the battalion, holding this post and that of Division Engineer until September 1943, when he was designated Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. In this latter capacity, General Stilwell had a major role in the Division's final field training, movement to England, and planning for the Normandy invasion.

He continued to serve with the "Tough Hombres" Division as Operations Officer from initial landings through the months of combat that followed. At the conclusion of the Ardennes campaign, he was detailed as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, of the XXII Army Corps, until the end of the war and the garrisoning of Czechoslovakia.

In August 1945, General Stilwell, then a colonel, joined the G-3 Section of the Theater General Board, which was formed from the Fifteenth Army and under command of General Patton, to study the conduct of the war and draw lessons from it. He transferred to the Infantry in November.

In January 1946, General Stilwell was appointed Assistant Military Advisor to the Secretary of State in the latter's role as U.S. Member of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the quadripartite organization designed to deal with post-war problems. As an outgrowth of this assignment, in 1947 General Stilwell was named Special Military Advisor to the American Ambassador in Italy. Over the next two years, his staff responsibilities encompassed the Trieste question, finalization of the Italo-Yugoslav boundary, and Italian rearmament. Thereafter, from 1949 to 1952, he held important posts in the Central Intelligence Agency.

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In November 1952, he assumed command of the 15th Infantry Regiment of the 3d Infantry Division, leading it in combat in two Korean campaigns. He then became Senior Advisor of the I ROK Army Corps until the end of the Korean conflict.

As an instructor at the Army War College, General Stilwell organized the first National Strategy Seminar and was a member of the Advanced Studies Group. In the Summer of 1954 he was temporarily detached for duty as Chief of Staff of a Presidential mission to the Far East.


In 1956, he was assigned to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, becoming Chief of the Strategic Planning Unit in November. He left SHAPE in June 1958 to assume command of the Western Area, Germany. In January 1959, he was detailed to the President's Committee for the Study of Foreign Assistance Programs. He left that assignment to report to the United States Military Academy in July 1959.

He commanded the 2nd Regiment, U.S. Corps of Cadets, until March 1961, when he became Deputy Commandant of Cadets. He was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General, U.S. Army, on 31 May 1961, and assumed command of the United States Corps of Cadets on 1 July of that year.

In April 1963, he was transferred to Vietnam where he assumed duties as Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (J-3), United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). He was promoted to the rank of Major General in July 1963. On 9 May 1964, he became Chief of Staff U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), and on 16 August 1965 he assumed his present position as Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (MACTHAI), and Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), Thailand.

In addition to the awards he has earned from his country, which include the Distinguished Service Medal, Silver Star with one oak leaf cluster, Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters, Purple Heart, and Combat Infantryman's Badge, he has received the Order of Leopold with Palm and Croix de Guerre from Belgium, Croix de Guerre with Star from France, Croix de Guerre from Luxembourg, Croix de Guerre and Order of the White Lion from Czechoslovakia, Order of Italy, Order of Ulohi from Korea, War Cross with Crown from Greece, and the Vietnamese National Order and Cross of Gallantry with Palm.

General Stilwell and his wife Alice have five children, Ann Frazer, Richard G., Jr., William J., Barbara, and Diane S. Their permanent home address is 352 Parkridge Avenue, Buffalo, N.Y. Much of the General's time is devoted to the study of international relations and politico-military problems, on which subjects he has written articles and delivered lectures. He enjoys tennis, golf, squash, and hunting.



### FOREWORD

This, the first History of USMACTHAI/JUSMAG, depicts background information on various operations and activities as well as their status through 1965. The narrative contains the following sections:

Part I - Mission and Organization, denotes the mission organization, to include the major reorganization of USMACTHAI/JUSMAG.

Part II - Operations, describes and discusses the operations of the Command.

Part III - Support Operations, enumerates the support and logistics activities, including communications and electronics, and construction projects within Thailand.

Part IV - Security Developments, explains the status of insurgent activities in Thailand, and the efforts of the Thai Government in countering this increasing threat.

The excellent cooperation and assistance received from the Staff of USMACTHAI/JUSMAG is acknowledged and greatly appreciated by the Office of the Historian.

The research and writing of this history was expedited by the able assistance of Mr. Jose M. Matheson, Assistant Historian, 13th Air Force Headquarters, and M/Sgt Kenneth F. Reinig, Information Technician, Headquarters, PACAF. Typing contributions by S/Sgt Arthur B. Bowker deserve special recognition.

GEORGE R. MOORE  
1st Lt, AGC  
Command Historian



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
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### INTRODUCTION

#### The Turning Point

The year 1965 marked an important turning point in the history of Southeast Asia, which for decades had been a battleground for conflicting ideologies. In 1965 Thailand assumed a more vital and strategic role in this conflict.


Following Communist China's announcement in November, 1964, that Thailand was its next target for "liberation", a "Patriotic Front" was established in Thailand in January 1965. Increased guerrilla and subversive activities in remote sections of Thailand were a gloomy portent of things to come. After the United States had erased lingering doubts about its attitude toward further Communist expansion in the area with its commitment in South Vietnam, Thailand just as clearly evidenced its position by allowing United States Air Force planes to use its bases in striking North Vietnam military targets.

An alliance of two countries, dissimilar in culture but one in their defense of freedom, had its beginnings not too long after the first storm clouds appeared over the political horizons following the devastation and dislocation of World War II.

#### Historical Background

In March 1950, the service attache's at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok prepared estimates of materiel requirements essential to increase the combat effectiveness of the Thai Armed Forces. This effort was immediately followed by a survey study, and in September

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of the same year a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), headed by Colonel Warren H. McNaught, was assigned to Thailand as a part of the Embassy Staff.

A formal military assistance agreement between the U.S. and Thailand was reached on 17 October 1950. MAAG Headquarters was set up in a building on Ploenchit Road, Bangkok, with a staff consisting of nine officers and 11 enlisted men.

In January 1951, Brigadier General John Tupper Cole assumed command of the group. He held this assignment until December 1952. It was during his tenure that the MAAG Headquarters was moved to the mission's present location on Sathorn Road. Succeeding General Cole were Colonel Charles Sheldon and Colonel John W. Davis. By September 1953, requirements had increased MAAG strength to 57 officers, one warrant officer, and 53 enlisted men.

The Viet Minh invasion of Laos in the Spring of 1953 placed added emphasis on the importance of the MAAG in Thailand. Consequently, Major General William N. Gillmore, USA, was directed to study the adequacy of the MAAG. He recommended the establishment of a Joint Military Advisory Group. As a result, JUSMAG Thailand, commanded by General Gillmore, superseded the MAAG organization on 22 September 1953. JUSMAG was constituted with a strength of 165, with representatives from all services.

General Gillmore was succeeded on 30 July 1955 by Major General Richard G. Prather, USA, who commanded until 15 October 1956. During this period emphasis was placed on the training mission.

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
Eighteen Army field training detachments, as well as one Navy detachment, were established. By 1 July 1957, JUSMAG personnel strength numbered 286.

General Prather was in turn succeeded by Major General Richard C. Partridge. During General Partridge's tenure a world-wide reduction of 12 percent in MAAGs was directed. As a result, in October 1957, JUSMAG strength was reduced to 251. Roughly one-third of JUSMAG strength was maintained at "up-country" training detachments, with the remainder in and around Bangkok. Of the personnel in Bangkok, another third manned the Headquarters, JUSMAG, with the balance either in service elements or assigned in positions to accomplish the training mission in Thai units in the Bangkok area.

General Partridge departed JUSMAG on 21 November 1958 and was replaced by Major General Peter C. Hains, III. General Hains was in turn succeeded on 25 July 1959 by Major General Briard P. Johnson. Under General Johnson JUSMAG placed increased emphasis on all phases of training in all services. Modernization of weapons and equipment was programmed to keep pace with the Royal Thai Armed Forces capabilities to absorb, utilize, and maintain the more advanced military hardware.

The Laos crisis in August 1960 again directed world attention toward Southeast Asia and Thailand. During this period, as the strength of JUSMAG continued to increase, it was decided to completely rebuild the JUSMAG compound. A major portion of the compound was completed and the new JUSMAG Headquarters was formally

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dedicated on 28 September 1961. As the end of the year approached, the JUSMAG became deeply involved in the planning for the deployment of an engineer construction battalion to Thailand for the purpose of constructing a vital by-pass road from Chachoengsao to Kabinburi.


The 809th Engineer Battalion (Construction) arrived in January 1962 and, at the same time, the JUSMAG Headquarters became a dual headquarters with the title "JUSMAG Support Group A". At this time the Engineer Battalion and the U.S. Army Signal Communications Element, Thailand, (STARCOM) were assigned to the new headquarters. General Johnson was designated Commander, JUSMAG Support Group A.

In mid-May 1962, Joint Task Force 116, commanded by Lieutenant General James L. Richardson, Jr., was deployed to Thailand. The Task Force consisted of U.S. Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps combat troops. Its mission was to assist the Royal Thai Government in countering the threat of Communist aggression as the situation in Laos deteriorated. During the next several months JUSMAG, in effect, became Headquarters, United States Forces, Thailand, and the staff was responsible for coordinating the numerous details in connection with the relationships between U.S. Forces, the Royal Thai Government, and other SEATO nations.

With the arrival of Joint Task Force 116, General Paul D. Harkins was designated Commander, United States Military Assistance, Thailand, in addition to his duties as Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

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On 10 August 1962, General Johnson departed after a three year tour of duty. He was succeeded by Major General Theodore J. Conway. One of the first tasks facing the new Chief, JUSMAG was the direction and coordination of the Special Logistics Action Program for Thailand. JUSMAG in conjunction with Joint Task Force 116, developed detailed plans for improving the logistics base and infra-structure of Thailand in order to insure more responsive logistical support to U.S. contingency plans. This planning resulted in the introduction of additional U.S. construction units to build and develop depots, airfields, and road nets.

On 31 October 1962, General Conway was designated Deputy Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand, and was subsequently delegated the responsibility for the operational control of the United States logistical troops which remained in Thailand following the departure of Joint Task Force 116 in November 1962. These troops were assigned to the 9th Logistical Command in Korat.

On 8 December 1962, an Exercise and Plans Division of Headquarters, USMACTHAI was established. This staff, under the direction of Deputy COMUSMACTHAI, assumed many of the planning responsibilities previously assigned to the JUSMAG Joint Staff.

In February 1963, the President announced that Major General Conway had been nominated for promotion and reassignment to the Eighth United States Army, Korea. General Conway departed on 26 March 1963 and Major General Ernest F. Easterbrook assumed

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command of the JUSMAG and was designated Deputy COMUSMACTHAI.

In June 1964, General Paul D. Harkins returned to the United States for retirement. Lieutenant General William C. Westmoreland was then appointed Commander of the Military Assistance Commands of both Vietnam and Thailand. Shortly thereafter, General Westmoreland was promoted to the grade of General.

On 10 July 1965, after a major reorganization of the military aid mission in Thailand, General Easterbrook became both COMUSMACTHAI and CHJUSMAG Thailand. He was succeeded by Major General Richard G. Stilwell, USA, on 16 August 1965. (See Appendix A - Chiefs of JUSMAG)

#### Accomplishments


During 15 years of operation, the U.S. military aid mission in Thailand helped considerably in making the Thai Armed Forces more effective. Units were streamlined and modernized, new and standardized equipment introduced, facilities added, improved, and expanded, and the concept of inter-service cooperation better understood in actual application through realistic field exercises.

#### Royal Thai Army

In 1950, at the beginning of the Military Assistance Program (MAP), the Royal Thai Army (RTA) possessed military equipment of various foreign origins. It was impracticable and in many cases impossible to support this equipment with the necessary repair parts and ammunition.

During the period 1951 through 1956, approximately 95 percent of all foreign equipment in MAP-supported units was replaced by U.S.

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equipment of World War II vintage: individual weapons, 75 mm and 105 mm howitzers, 40 mm anti-aircraft guns, and M24 tanks. More modern equipment was placed in the MAP as the items on hand became unsupportable. In 1959, the vehicle exchange program began replacing World War II type vehicles with new Japanese manufactured vehicles. The exchange of general purpose vehicles was completed in May 1962, although scheduled to continue through FY 67. The program to replace M24 tanks with M41A1 tanks began in August 1962 and was still continuing in 1965.

Since the beginning of the MAP, efforts have been directed toward the modernization of combat elements of the Royal Thai Army. New organizations were equipped with modern materiel and well trained in its use. At the same time, both within Thailand and off-shore, a comprehensive training program was conducted to teach RTA personnel the latest tactics and techniques of modern warfare. The improvements in the tactical and combat capabilities of the RTA, which these efforts had made possible, were much in evidence in 1965. The RTA had acquired the competence and ability to work with the U.S. and other SEATO countries in the defense of Thailand and in discharging Thai obligations under SEATO.

Royal Thai Navy and Marine Corps

At the inception of the MAP the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) was a collection of obsolete craft of doubtful value except for patrolling, basic training, and ceremonial functions. These ships had been purchased either from European sources or, in a few cases, built in

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Thailand. Maintenance problems were many and varied due to obsolescence of equipment and depletion of repair part sources; personnel training for equipment repair was negligible and operational capabilities were greatly reduced. Since then, definite improvements in the defense posture of the RTN were made through better training procedures, repair techniques and capabilities, modernization, and standardization. Service personnel training continued within the various RTN schools. As a result of the training by the U.S. Navy and other countries, and the introduction of better equipment, the repair techniques were greatly improved.


Through modernization of equipment and the addition of more ships, the RTN defense capability increased. The effectiveness of this program was apparent in the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Squadron and the amphibious landing craft of the Service Squadron. The maintenance and readiness of these ships were far superior to those of other squadrons.

The Royal Thai Marine Corps (RTMC) had also become one of the best trained services of the Thai Armed Forces. The officers were young, highly competent, enthusiastic and quick to learn anything related to combat.

#### Royal Thai Air Force

Since 1950 the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) developed from a relatively ineffective combat force into one of the strongest air forces in Southeast Asia. The fighter bomber force, initially equipped with the post World War II F-8F conventional fighter, was

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transitioned into the F-84G and F-86F jet aircraft. This force was trained in all phases of tactical operations. The troop carrier and tactical support force, equipped with the C-47 aircraft, was capable of supporting the ground forces in the defense of Thailand. A flying training school was developed, capable of training all required aircrews in jet and conventional aircraft. Facilities and the logistical support structure required for this force were established.

A large number of RTAF personnel received training in U.S. schools and the Pacific Command area. Command responsibility, management procedures, and technical knowledge improved as a result of this training. Emphasis was placed on compatibility of forces and training with U.S. units in order to increase the potential of the RTAF in combined exercises or operations. Modernization of facilities and RTAF units was planned in consonance with this objective. The Military Assistance Training Program (MATP) was developed to provide personnel trained to operate and maintain future equipment.

In order to provide maximum assistance to all RTAF units at Don Muang Air Base and outside the Bangkok area, the Air Force Section of JUSMAG organized Air Base Advisory Teams (ABAT) and an Air Depot Advisory Team (ADAT). The teams provided on-site advisory service, better relations with the RTAF operating personnel, and better utilization of top level staff advisors.

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### Training

More than 3,250 Thai officers and enlisted men have undergone training in the United States under the MAP. This figure does not include observation and orientation visits and on-the-job training (OJT) by Thai military personnel to U.S. off-shore units and facilities, which in 1965 alone reached more than 300 for the three services combined. The number of Royal Thai Armed Forces personnel participating in third-country training, however, was usually too small to be significant.

RTA service schools have achieved a capability for teaching approximately 3,000 officers and 4,000 enlisted personnel annually in basic, advanced, and technical subjects. In most cases these schools received full time advice and assistance from U.S. advisors. School equipment, for the most part, has been supplied by MAP, and the curricula and teaching methods corresponded closely to those in U.S. Army service schools.

The first regular supply management course was conducted at the RTA Logistics College in 1958, with U.S. instructors presenting approximately 50 percent of the instruction. This proportion gradually decreased with the increase in proficiency among Thai instructors. The curriculum of this course was designed to develop senior logisticians, and approximately 45 officers of the Royal Thai Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police Department were trained annually in this course. Separate functional courses in requirements, procurement, storage and distribution were conducted subject to the availability of funds.

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To overcome English language deficiencies found among Thai candidates for U.S. training schools, the FY 62 MAP provided two 20 booth English Language Training Laboratories at the RTA English Language Training Center.

The RTN, meanwhile, acquired a training capacity of 2,200 men annually with the addition of two electronics schools, repair facilities, and an engineman's school building. During the same period, the RTAF service school system had five major schools in operation: the Air Academy, Air Staff and Command School, Squadron Officer's School, Flying Training School, and the Airmen's School. Except for the Flying Training School at Korat, all the RTAF schools were located at Don Muang Air Base, Bangkok.

Civilian technical representatives and special mobile training teams provided training which was beyond the capability of the regular U.S. military advisors. Such subjects as vehicle rebuild, aircraft repair, supply, communications, intelligence, counter-insurgency operations, maintenance engineering, and other specialized technical training were covered.

#### Medical Service Assistance

The MAP provided medical equipment to a total of 11 regimental medical companies, four medical battalions, three 100 bed field hospitals, and one preventive medicine company of the RTA. The RTN received medical equipment to modernize its naval hospitals at Bukalo and Sattahip, in addition to training aids and publications supplied on a continuing basis to facilitate OJT and

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keep the RTN medical personnel abreast with the advances of modern medicine.

Other recipients of MAP-supplied medical equipment included a 100 bed field hospital operated by the RTN for the RTMC, three general hospitals, and six station hospitals. A 180 bed hospital, with capabilities for general surgery and general medicine was built and placed in operation at the RTA Replacement Center at Pranburi. Other hospitals and medical facilities were built or under construction at Korat, Nakorn Sritamarat, Prachinburi, Bangkok, Lopburi, and Sattship. A five-year program for the augmentation of existing equipment and replacement of obsolete or worn out equipment was in effect during 1965. In addition, since 1962, approximately 35 outstanding Royal Thai Army medical officers have been sent to the U.S. for medical specialty residence training. MACTHAI/JUSMAG continued to advise the RTA in training TOE medical units and to encourage a program for activation of required medical units.

#### Construction

Numerous facilities have been constructed under the MAP since its inception in Thailand. These consisted of a great variety of projects, including complete air, army, and naval base facilities, roads, water and power systems, school buildings, repair shops, piers, and harbors. One of the largest and most ambitious undertakings of its kind was the installation of an entire army post, the Replacement Training Center of the RTA at Pranburi. The camp proper consisted of 370 buildings; barracks for 14,220 troops and

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BOQ's for 680 officers; 1,020 NCO family quarters and 342 officers quarters; electricity, water, and sewage systems; a 100 target known distance range; and access and interior roads.

A six-year Master Construction Plan for the RTA was completed in March, 1959. The FY 60 Refined Program was the first submitted in accordance with this plan. By 31 July 1961, family quarters for 100 officers and 720 NCO's were completed in addition to 280 BOQ spaces, 5,160 barracks spaces, 4,660 mess spaces, 615 motor maintenance shed stalls, a water and electrical system, and lesser quantities of other miscellaneous facilities.


Construction was conducted at an accelerated pace during the last few years, with emphasis placed on facilities required by U.S. units deployed in-country. These included air base and harbor projects, roads, petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) facilities, and communications systems.

#### Communications and Electronics

The activation of the 1st Signal Battalion in April 1955 provided the RTA with high level communications. This battalion had the capability to communicate from RTA forward to the field units, and had organic Forward Air Control (FAC) Teams and communications facilities for close air support.

Modernization of signal equipment began in 1959. The first equipment to be replaced was the SCR-610 by the AN/PRC-9. In 1960 the SCR-536 was replaced by the AN/PRC-6, and by the end of FY 63 the new equipment had replaced the old infantry division SCR series.

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A joint MOD-Military Telecommunication Project Office was established in the new MOD communications building in May 1960. This group was responsible for developing and planning the many facets relative to a complex country-wide civil and military telecommunications installation.

The VHF radio relay system (AN/TRC-24) and high frequency, single side band equipment was installed between radar sites and air bases during 1965. Also control towers at all RTAF air bases were equipped with modern ground-to-air, UHF and VHF direction finding radio equipment. Other facilities included Visual Omni Range (VOR), Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN), non-directional beacon and Ground Controlled Approach (GCA). Some bases had only non-directional beacons. Approach and landing charts were published for the principal air bases used by military aviation.

Construction or design was underway for heavy radar sites, Navigational Aids (NAVAIDS) facilities for additional TACAN, GCA, and control towers, and expansion of the AN/TRC-24 radio relay system to meet new requirements.

#### Thailand in 1965<sup>1</sup>

Thailand made very good overall economic progress in 1965, with an estimated six percent increase of the Gross National Product (GNP). However, certain areas of the Northeast were hard hit by a drought which reduced rice production in that area by

<sup>1</sup> From the Quarterly Economic Survey, October-December, 1965, American Embassy, Bangkok, 28 January 1966.

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about 20 percent. This emphasized the need for improved water supplies and modern farming methods in the remote areas of Thailand. Consequently, the Thai Government and the United States placed additional emphasis on rural development programs which were already underway. These programs, as well as increased road building and other construction projects, were designed to help alleviate the situation in the Northeast and stimulate economic expansion.

With increased production of crops in other areas, Thailand was able to achieve a slight gain in overall agricultural production over the previous year. The value of rubber exports was about the same as in 1964 while the value of tin exports increased. The South, which normally had a higher than average per capita income, fared well in 1965.

Although Thailand's merchandise trade deficit increased by about \$40 million in 1965, its overall balance of payments position remained strong. Prices continued to stay close to 1958 levels in Bangkok, but toward the end of the year the cost of construction outside Bangkok started to rise. With a prudent financial policy, Thailand continued to attract substantial loans and investments from abroad. It also made progress in the labor field by approving an important bill establishing procedures for settling labor disputes.

Agriculture exports stimulated progress throughout the economy. Exports leaped 27 percent in 1964, helping to push Thailand's GNP up

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
10 percent in real terms. These export gains were slightly improved in 1965. Imports also increased sharply. Thailand's total merchandise trade deficit in 1965 was estimated at about \$100 million, a rise of about \$40 million over 1964. Increased aid expenditures, a rise in tourism, and greater receipts from abroad for construction of roads and military installations for the Thai Armed Forces helped to offset the financial drain caused by increased imports. (See Appendix B- Economic Indicators, Thailand 1965)

The United States AID Program

The United States Agency for International Development (AID) program continued to be strongly oriented toward the Northeast. The expanded FY 66 program for helping rural development was approved during the last part of the year.

In 1965 AID helped the RTG create local Accelerated Rural Development (ARD) units in six provinces in the Northeast, and in-service training began for personnel working on the projects. In the second half of 1965, equipment was shipped to expand the program into five additional provinces. Thai and American authorities cooperated in providing health and other services under the ARD program. AID also provided construction equipment for Mobile Development Units (MDU) located in sensitive areas in the Northeast, North, and South. The MDU's, which were led by military officers but included civilian personnel, built small dams and roads, and promoted health and agricultural projects in rural areas.

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The U.S. Operations Mission (USOM) training program helped to expand the police force ten percent in 1965, with concentration on sensitive areas.

The engineering design for the Lomsak-Saraburi highway north of Bangkok was more than 90 percent complete by the end of 1965; an AID loan for \$20.6 million for this highway was signed in June.

#### Regional Cooperation

A major step forward in regional cooperation was achieved during the last quarter of 1965 when the charter of the Asian Development Bank was approved. In public statements Thailand encouraged the reactivation of the Association of Southeast Asia as relations improved between the Philippines and Malaysia.

#### Secondary Results

In fulfilling its primary mission, USMACTHAI/JUSMAG had achieved secondary results which, though not of direct military nature, nevertheless had an impact on the Thai nation. These "bonus" accomplishments were generally in the following areas:

1. Separation of trained personnel upon completion of their required military service appreciably improved the technological base of Thailand.

2. The medical training program considerably increased the level of medical knowledge in the country, and relieved the workload on civil medical facilities by providing medical treatment for military personnel and their dependents, as well as many civilians.

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3. The construction program had alleviated civilian housing shortages in some areas by providing family housing for officers and non-commissioned officers.

4. In-country communications, as a result of improved transportation, telephone and radio nets, and to some degree road conditions, have progressed with the advancement of the Royal Thai Armed Forces.

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PART I

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

Mission

The military assistance agreement between the United States and Thailand, signed at Bangkok on 17 October 1950, established the basic purpose of U.S. military aid to Thailand as assistance to "enable Thailand to strengthen the security forces required for the protection of her freedom and independence..."<sup>1</sup> This was amplified and analyzed in a Rand Corporation study on the problems of security and assistance in Thailand, which said:

The main purpose of U.S. assistance programs in Thailand is to help in sustaining the valuable alliance relationship between the United States and Thailand by (1) demonstrating that this relationship is in the best interest of the Royal Thai Government (RTG), and (2) preventing external and internal threats from destroying the stability and security of Thailand. Success in achieving these objectives will also depend critically on the quality of U.S. performance in Vietnam and Laos, and on the continued political stability of the RTG.<sup>2</sup>

Prior to July 1965, COMUSMACTHAI and the Chief, JUSMAG, Thailand (who was also DEPCOMUSMACTHAI) were different and distinct positions, the latter subordinate to the former. COMUSMACTHAI at that time had a primary duty as COMUSMACV with headquarters in Saigon, Republic of Vietnam. The mission and functions of MACTHAI/JUSMAG were also separate and distinct. In June 1962, CINCPAC spelled out the terms of reference for JUSMAG, Thailand:

1. Agreement Respecting Military Assistance Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Thailand, 17 Oct 50.

2. Security and Assistance in Thailand (U), Memorandum RM-4744-AID/ISA, September 1965, The Rand Corporation.

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**Mission.** The primary mission of the JUSMAG is to support COMUSMACTHAI in assisting the RTG Armed Forces and paramilitary forces to attain the capability to:

- a. Maintain internal security against Communist-inspired subversion and insurgency.
- b. Provide maximum feasible initial resistance to Communist-inspired external aggression.
- c. Make a modest contribution to the collective defense of the SEATO.<sup>3</sup>

CINCPAC Instruction 003020.2D, in April of 1963, enumerated the duties of COMUSMACTHAI:

1. Be responsible for carrying out U.S. military policy in Thailand.
2. Exercise operational control of all U.S. Forces and military agencies assigned, including JUSMAG.
3. Be responsible for U.S. military operations and assistance in Thailand. In this connection, COMUSMACTHAI should deal directly with the appropriate Thai military authorities.
4. Furnish advice to Royal Thai Government on all matters relating to security and maintaining internal security of Thailand, organization and employment of Royal Thai Armed Forces, and paramilitary forces.
5. Keep the U.S. Ambassador fully informed, especially on all high level contacts with officials of the Royal Thai Government, to include information on major military plans and pending operations.
6. Consult the U.S. Ambassador on U.S. political and basic policy matters. In case of differences of view, both representatives should report such differences to CINCPAC and to the Department of State, respectively, for decision in accordance with existing procedures.
7. Provide broad requirement guidance to CHJUSMAG as it may affect planning, programming and administration of the Military Assistance Program; keep informed on military

<sup>3</sup>. CINCPAC ltr, Subj: Terms of Reference for the JUSMAG, Thailand, dated 2 June 1962.

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assistance planning and programming, which continues under CHJUSMAG's direct supervision and CINCPAC guidance.

8. Comply with CINCPAC's directives and keep CINCPAC fully informed.

9. Plan for and be prepared to conduct military operations as directed by CINCPAC.

10. Discharge U.S. military responsibility to Royal Thai Government in accordance with CINCPAC policies and directives.

11. Assist Royal Thai Government and its Armed Forces in planning for military operations.

12. Develop coordinated U.S.-Thailand plans as directed by CINCPAC.

13. Administer and supervise joint frequency coordination in Thailand in accordance with PACOM Communications-Electronics Instructions.

14. Continue development of Royal Thai Government capabilities to provide such support for U.S. Forces as may be required under the existing agreement. (See Footnote 1)

15. Coordinate U.S. Military activities in Thailand.

On 10 July 1965, Major General Ernest F. Easterbrook, CHJUSMAG, assumed the "additional duty as COMUSMACTHAI with headquarters in Bangkok, and responsibilities as set forth in CINCPAC Instructions 003020.2D of 19 April 1963".<sup>5</sup> The final draft of the Organization and Functions Manual (MACTHAI/JUSMAG) in October 1965, stated that "the mission of the USMACTHAI/JUSMAG, a subordinate unified command under CINCPAC, is to accomplish those tasks set forth in" the three previously referred documents.<sup>6</sup> (See footnotes 3,4, and 5). However, the first draft of joint terms of reference was being staffed by

4. CINCPAC Instruction 003020.2D, dated 19 April 1963.

5. CINCPAC MSG DTG 091900Z July 1965.

6. Final Draft Organization and Functions Manual, HQ MACTHAI/JUSMAG, dated 22 Oct 65.

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CINCPAC at the end of 1965. A second draft was expected to be returned to COMUSMACTHAI for comments in March 1966.

### Mission Extension: The USAF in Thailand

One of the major continuing problems during 1965 was the sensitive issue of the employment of combat aircraft from bases in Thailand (See Figures 1-4). U.S. and Thai officials were constantly being questioned for comments on the issue. Commenting on the aircraft, General Prapass, Deputy Prime Minister, stated that Thailand had never concealed that "friends could use each other's airfield....the planes of friendly countries might have stopped over for fueling and then gone elsewhere."<sup>7</sup>

Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman said that the RTG "...has given facilities to America in Thailand under bi-lateral mutual defense arrangements, and these have nothing to do with Vietnam....bases in Thailand are exclusively for the defense of Thailand."<sup>8</sup> In addition to these statements by the Thai, U.S. publications had printed, in 14 different periodicals in 1965, 48 articles concerning U.S. military activities in Thailand.

In October 1965, COMUSMACTHAI presented to the American Ambassador, Bangkok, alternatives leading to an acknowledgement of the use of Thai facilities by the USAF, but at the end of 1965 no official acknowledgement of the operations of U.S. warplanes out of Thailand had been made either by the U.S. Embassy or the RTG. A "no comment."<sup>9</sup>

7. Article, Bangkok World (newspaper), 2 Sep 65.

8. Article, Bangkok Post (newspaper), 19 Oct 65.

9. Memorandum for the Charge d' Affaires ad interim, 8 October 1965, Subj: Public Affairs Policy Refining Use of Thai Air Bases.

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


Figure 1 Massive Bombing--Under radar control, a flight of Air Force F-4C Phantoms drop bombs in Vietnam. On radar bomb runs, the Phantoms are accompanied by a B-66 Destroyer (right center).



Figure 2 Air Force F-102 Delta Dagger--Rugged fighter-interceptor used on air defense missions in the Republic of Vietnam. Armed with Falcon missiles and 2.75-inch rockets, the better than 850 mile an hour jet also flies air strikes in the Republic.



Figure 3 The F-105 Thunderchief. A tactical fighter, able to reach speeds up to 1400 miles an hour and travel over 2000 miles without refueling. The F-105 is able to carry 4 tons of conventional weapons internally or externally--- napalm, rockets and "Bullpup" air-to-ground missiles.



Figure 4 The RB-66 Destroyer. An all-weather reconnaissance aircraft built by Douglas. It has a full range of cameras for day or night photography and can fly at speeds up to 600 mph. One version of the RB is used for electronic countermeasures.

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policy appeared to be in force backed by a ban on pictures of USAF operational personnel and aircraft, and restrictions on official press releases.

Command and Control

Aside from the questions raised by the USAF deployments into Thailand in 1965, the problem of identifying precise command and control lines in relation to the deployed units soon became apparent. (See Appendix C, USAF Units in Thailand Assigned to 13 AF)

A message from CINCPAC early in April directed Air Force component commanders to notify the American Ambassador in Bangkok, through DEPCOMUSMACTHAI, if additional units or personnel were required to provide adequate support for combat force deployments.


Shortly thereafter, Headquarters PACAF advised DEPCOMUSMACTHAI that activation orders had been issued for the 6234th Tactical Fighter Wing (Provisional), commanded by Col W.D. Ritchie, to be assigned to 13AF under the operational control of the Commander, 2AD. The wing would be stationed at Korat and provide immediate supervision for the TDY squadrons at Korat, Takhli, and Ubon. The following command relationship between 2AD, 6234th Tac Ftr Wg and 35th Tac Gp was outlined:

...6234th Tac Ftr Wg is assigned to 13AF and is under operational control of Comdr 2AD; Comdr 6234th will be responsive to Dep Comdr 2AD Thailand requirements for Laos operations as directed by Comdr 2AD. 35th Tac Gp will provide air base support to Hq 6234th Tac Ftr Wg and its assigned/attached intelligence reporting (IR) units.

10. CINCPACAF DPL 0015 APR 65, DTG 070351Z.

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...Hq 13AF and Hq 2AD have been tasked to provide total circuit requirements to satisfy communications for the 6234th Provisional Wing. The 6234th Provisional Wing will not have Air Operations Center (AOC) but will have a small command post.<sup>11</sup>

At Don Muang the 35th Tac Gp, having had responsibility for all airbases in Thailand prior to this time, would be converted to a support wing "to supervise and administer to combat support groups logistically supporting tactical operations at Thailand bases." The base support units at Udorn, Ubon, Korat, Don Muang, and Takhli would  
12  
be converted to Combat Support Groups.

The 6234th and 6235th Combat Support Groups (CSG), with support and materiel squadrons, were organized at Korat and Takhli, respectively, on 8 May 1965, and assigned to 13AF. Early reorganization of other support groups with a support and materiel squadron assigned to each CSG was anticipated. Authority had not been received to activate a support wing requested for Don Muang, but Maj Gen Joseph H. Moore, Cmdr 2AD, anticipated its ultimate approval. Each CSG would be assigned to the support wing at Don Muang, if activated, and the wing would be assigned to 13AF. The support units, which existed during this reporting period, would be discontinued and replaced by  
13  
these projected units.

Deputy Commander, 2AD Thailand

Further elucidation of 2nd Air Division command control responsibilities for USAF operations in Thailand was provided on 17 June 1965 by the Deputy Commander, 2AD Thailand in a message to the Chief,

11. CINCPACAF PAPOP/DPL 56555 APR 65 DTG 102104Z.

12. Ibid.

13. Comdr 2AD Msg, 60025 MAY, DTG 230203Z.

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JUSMAG Thailand, which quoted a 2nd Air Division message delineating the responsibilities of the Deputy Commander, 2AD Thailand, as follows:

1. As Dep Comdr 2AD Thailand you will:
  - a. Exercise operational control over the 6234th Tac Ftr Wg; for the present consider the 6234th Combat Spt Gp as being assigned to the 6234th Tac Ftr Wg.
  - b. Exercise operational control over the Tac Gp, the 6235th Combat Spt Gp at Takhli, 332 AB Sq at Ubon, 333 AB Sq at Udorn, and 6235th AB Sq at Nakhom Phanom. In event these organizations are upgraded to Combat Spt Gps the same relationships will exist.
  - c. Exercise operational control over the Tactical Air Control system in Thailand.
  - d. Exercise operational control over reconnaissance RESCAP, Water Pump and close air support for Steel Tiger operations.
  - e. Accomplish necessary coordination and liaison with DEPCOMUSMACTHAI, JUSMAG, and U.S. Ambassador to Thailand and Laos.
  - f. Be responsible for air defense of Thailand in conjunction with RTAF.<sup>14</sup>

On 2 July, DEPCOMUSMACTHAI advised the Commander, 2nd Air Division, that in dealing with the RTAF, such as on the subject of air defense of Thailand, "...it is assumed that this headquarters will be contacted first to insure proper coordination...."<sup>15</sup>


Deputy Commander 2AD/13AF Thailand

At the end of the year, a final solution to the command and control imbroglio had not been resolved but appeared imminent with the projected establishment of a new position early in January 1966, that of the Deputy Commander 2/13 Thailand, who would represent both 2AD and 13AF as the single PACAF representative in Thailand, and through whom 2AD would exercise operational control and 13AF would provide support of Thailand-based PACAF forces.

14. 2AD MSG 2DCT 11256, DTG 170930Z JUN 65.

15. DEPCOMUSMACTHAI MSG DTG 020555Z JUN 65.

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As the senior PACAF representative and coordinating authority, the Deputy Commander 2/13 Thailand would disseminate instructions on policy and administration promulgated by the U.S. Embassy or COMUSMACTHAI, and represent CINCPACAF, 2nd Air Division or Thirteenth Air Force, as appropriate, in all meetings. The office of the Deputy Commander 2/13 Thailand would be located in Udorn until appropriate facilities could be set up in Korat for its use.  
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 A small liaison office would be maintained in Bangkok.

\* The Limits of Extension

Inevitably, the influx of personnel and equipment into Thailand soon became enmeshed in problems involving clearance procedures and base accommodations. It would appear that base development had not been geared to meet all possible requirements of contingency and other plans. When the American Embassy in Bangkok asked for a less impetuous time phasing of the deployments, CINCPAC was ready to accede to such a request due to congestion of existing facilities. The Thai, moreover, were becoming sensitive about the overcrowding on their bases. In a message to both the American Embassy and COMUSMACTHAI, CINCPAC stated:

...Before addressing these problem areas it is appropriate to state that CINCPAC does not intend to approve any additional aircraft assignments to Thailand which will add to Thai concern that they are being squeezed out of their own bases. Thus any discussion or planning for increases in Thailand must consider Thai reactions and take such reactions into consideration prior CINCPAC approval.<sup>17</sup>

16. CINCPACAF MSG DPL R53381 NOV 65, DTG 202245Z.

17. CINCPAC MSG DTG 260912Z OCT 65.

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Thai concern over the U.S. use of Thai bases had permeated the Thai political power structure up to the Prime Minister and the King himself. The American Ambassador provided an insight as to the possible nature and motivation of this concern in a message to the Secretary of Defense on 27 October 1965. Describing a meeting he had with Air Chief Marshal Dawee on the subject of deploying more aircraft to Thai bases, he said:

...Dawee responded that the whole matter of any additional U.S. squadrons on Thai facilities had been discussed at great length over past few weeks within RTG and had also been subject for discussion at recent special meeting of cabinet with the King. Both King and Prime Minister deeply concerned at overcrowded conditions...and increasing tendency to crowd RTG forces off their own facilities, with no concurrent or visible benefits to those forces. The King, he noted, had specifically pointed out to cabinet that Thai had always been quick to say "yes" to U.S. requests, whereas there was little evidence of rapid U.S. action in response Thai requests.

...This condition particularly true, said Dawee, with respect to RTAF who still trying to fly obsolete F-86's and would be even more difficult to handle in light public announcement first F-5 deliveries to Philippine Air Force....

...magnitude and visibility U.S. air operations also creating some concern within RTG, according to Dawee, although RTG of course continues fully to back U.S. efforts over NVN. In this connection he inquired whether any possibility existed for introducing squadron F-105's into SVN so that it would not be so patently clear that all F-105 effort coming from Thailand.<sup>18</sup>

#### Reorganization

The growing importance of the MAP, and the increasing complexity in administering it, required greater flexibility and adaptability in organization charged with its operation. The process of

<sup>18</sup> AMEMB BKK to SECDEF, 27 OCT 65.

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reorganization, therefore, was nothing more than the normal reaction to changing situations. In this respect, the mission's success depended on the capability to provide the correct response at the right time, which, of course, could be assessed only according to the results.

The major reorganization that occurred during the last half of 1965 began on 7 July when CHJUSMAG initiated action to combine the MACTHAI/JUSMAG Joint Tables of Distribution (JTD). The resulting JTD submission included a proposed reorganization dated 30 July 1965. On 23 August, verbal orders were issued for a management survey. An Organizational Survey Board was appointed on 30 August, and by 14 September had completed its work. The Report of Organizational Survey Board on MACTHAI/JUSMAG (Provisional), 14 September 1965, included as an inclosure a Draft Organization and Functions Manual, dated 12 September 1965. This manual was intended to implement, in general, the provisional reorganization; transfer of functions and sub-elements of staff divisions was implemented through a series of numbered circulars. The Final Draft of the Organization and Functions Manual dated 22 October 1965, constituted the last development in the organizational evolution during the year.<sup>19</sup> (See Appendix D, Organizational Evolution )

The proposed reorganization recommending merger of COMUSMACTHAI and CHJUSMAGTHAI continued the existing dual-hatted COMUSMACTHAI/

<sup>19</sup>. DF, JTJ1, 27 Jan 66, Subj: Military History.

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CHJUSMAGTHAI command arrangement. It was identified as USMACTHAI/  
JUSMAGTHAI, retaining "JUSMAGTHAI" as "...the most permanent, long-  
standing and steady U.S. name/organization in Thailand." <sup>20</sup>

The staff would be composed of the following elements: a J-1 added, the J-2, J-3 and J-6 (old JUSMAGTHAI) retaining their joint staff identity. The L&A and E&P Divisions (old USMACTHAI) became the J-4 and J-5, respectively. The J-4 Division (old JUSMAGTHAI) was recast and redesignated the MAP Directorate and given joint staff status. The service advisory groups would report to COMUSMACTHAI/  
CHJUSMAGTHAI via the Chief of Staff and DEPCOMUSMACTHAI in the normal chain of command.

By adopting a normal joint staff organization, the identification and provision in the MAP functions evolved as the key issue in the reorganization. The MAP Directorate was given joint staff status "...to best ensure that the MAP function might not be subordinated to contingency planning and operational functions." It was believed that establishment of the MAP Directorate at J-staff level provided "... appropriate organizational recognition of the importance of USMACTHAI/  
JUSMAGTHAI military assistance planning and programming responsibilities." It could provide the necessary guidance and control over the activities of the remainder of the staff and service advisory groups as pertaining to military assistance matters, and improve the command's capability "...to properly plan, manage, program and

20. Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, 10 Jan 66, Subj: Organization of USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI Hq.

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 administer the MAP."

Additional advantages of the merged staff were:

1. It provided the required degree of responsiveness and adaptability required by COMUSMACTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI "...for proper discharge of military assistance programming, advisory, contingencies planning, and operational functions."
2. To provide the commander with the control necessary for accomplishment of his mission.
3. The "simplification and regularization" of working channels materially strengthened the relationship between the USMACTHAI/  
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JUSMAGTHAI staff and RTG Supreme Command Headquarters.

To summarize, the following major points of the reorganization were noted:


1. In place of the old J-1/AG, a separate J-1 was formed and AG became a special staff section under the joint staff supervision of J-1. Personnel & Manpower Branch functions were transferred from J-1/AG to J-1. The Consolidated Personnel Branch of AG was formed from service advisory group personnel.
2. Transfer of the Provost Marshal from the staff responsibility of J-1/AG to joint staff supervision of J-1.
3. From a sub-element of J-1/AG, the creation of Special Services as a special staff section under the joint staff supervision of J-1.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

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4. Creation of a Chaplain's Office as a special staff section under joint staff supervision of J-1.

5. The Surgeon's Office was placed under joint staff supervision of J-1.

6. The Headquarters Commandant was placed under joint staff supervision of J-1 and subsequently shifted to Support Activity.

7. The exercise function of Exercise & Plans (E&P) Division was assumed by J-3, and the Aviation Section was formed under joint staff supervision of J-3.

8. The old MACHTAI L&A Division was designated J-4. The old JUSMAG J-4 was designated the MAP office. The SAPOTHA function of the E&P Division was transferred to J-4.

9. Designation of the old MACHTAI E&P Division as J-5.

10. Service Sections were designated as Advisory Groups. Personnel sections were transferred to the Consolidated Personnel Branch of AG. Aviation Sections were also consolidated.

#### Manning Survey

With the reorganization, a need was recognized for an on-site appraisal of personnel utilization and requirements to staff the Headquarters USMACHTAI/JUSMAG (Provisional) and to establish staffing requirements for the headquarters to accomplish the approved mission and functions assignments.

23. DF, JTJ1, 27 Jan 66, Subj: Military History.

24. Ltr, JTJ1 to COMUSMACHTAI, 29 Oct 65, Subj: Report of Manpower Survey Board.

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Verbal orders were issued on 27 September 1965 directing a manning survey of USMACTHAI/JUSMAG (Provisional). A manning survey board was appointed on 1 October, and its work was finished with the Headquarters USMACTHAI/JUSMAG Manpower Survey Board Report dated 29 October 1965.

The survey was conducted under the assumption that the re-organization of USMACTHAI and JUSMAG into a single headquarters would be approved by CINCPAC and JCS, thus allowing consolidation and realignment of certain functions, namely, aviation, personnel, logistics, and plans. At the beginning of the survey, personnel authorization for USMACTHAI/JUSMAG was 682 spaces. Team members examined and evaluated the Headquarters USMACTHAI/JUSMAG (Provisional) Draft Organization and Functions Manual dated 12 September, correlating mission and functions contained in the document with the 30 July 1965 JTD approved by CINCPAC. This evaluation was further correlated with these functions and manning requirements submitted to the board by the chiefs of staff agencies, advisory groups and the Support Activity. The team members then interviewed chiefs of staff and service sections, reviewing and analyzing all available data and records prior to arriving at staffing recommendations.

In arriving at its findings and recommendations, the Survey Board considered the following factors:

1. The increasing level of U.S. activities in Thailand and its effect of increasing the need for USMACTHAI coordination with,

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and the supervision, support, and training of the Royal Thai Armed Forces.

2. The need for USMACTHAI to plan more closely with the Royal Thai Government on matters of force development and force objectives, and be prepared to develop and administer a MAP which would enhance the objectives of both USMACTHAI and the RTG.

One of the board's findings was the apparent inability of the joint staff to perform at the desired level of effectiveness in coping with current and accelerated U.S. activity in Thailand. This was attributed to manning limitations and, accordingly, an increase of 47 personnel spaces was recommended for the joint staff. Augmentation of 142 additional spaces was also recommended for the advisory groups for a grand total of 189.


Perhaps one of the most significant findings of the board was that deputy chiefs of joint staff sections were not required. The board argued that most of the joint staff divisions were so large or so decentralized that the branch chiefs could not act in the absence of the staff division chief.

It was found that individuals who served as deputies did so in name only; their actual responsibilities and duties were predominantly in the capacity of an executive. The elimination of the full time deputy position would streamline the decision making process by doing away with repetitive review levels and maintaining the simplest vertical structure.

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25. Ibid.

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### Other Organizational Changes During 1965

1. The Medical Branch, Logistics Division, ARSEC JUSMAG, was  
transferred to Staff Surgeon on 14 January 1965. <sup>26</sup>
2. The Procurement Branch, Support Section, was transferred to  
the 9th Logistical Command on 14 May 1965. <sup>27</sup>
3. The Commissary and Exchange came under the direct supervision  
of the Support Activity on 4 August 1965. <sup>28</sup>


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26. MACTHAI G03, 14 Jan 65.

27. MACTHAI G042, 14 May 65.

28. JCS MSG 7429 DTG 041714Z AUG 65

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### Part II

#### OPERATIONS

This chapter deals with many significant programs which played an important part in the U.S./Thai operations. Unlike the problems the U.S. inherited in RVN, the Thai Government was working with U.S. support to stop the escalation of Communism before it became a serious threat. These operations have assisted the Thai Armed Forces in building a better and more effective defense against insurgent forces.<sup>1</sup>

#### Plans and Programs

Planning and programming action, both as a headquarters function and as an advisory activity in conjunction with Thai Armed Forces counterparts, played a vital part in the implementation of the MAP during 1965.

#### Bi-lateral Planning (Project 22)

In mid-June 1964, a coordinated State Department/DOD decision was made to consult with the RTG regarding bi-lateral measures to be taken in the event of a Communist drive toward the Mekong River. Shortly thereafter, the Secretary of Defense approved the JCS recommendation that CINCPAC be authorized to conduct, on a continuing basis, such bi-lateral U.S./Thai planning for contingencies of joint interest as may be required. This resulted in CINCPAC directing that the Exercise and Plans Division, (now MACT J5) conduct the planning. A combined U.S./Thai Planning Group was organized in July 1964. The

<sup>1</sup>. Primary source, MACTHAI/JUSMAG Fact Book, 23 Feb 66 and Staff Historical Reports on file, Historical Office.

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unclassified title of the group was designated as Project 22.

It was determined that two plans would be necessary. The first would be a broad strategic plan for general direction of the effort to be promulgated by the Force Commander (Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Thailand). The second would be a detailed operational plan promulgated by the Field Force Commander. (A U.S. designated commander).

On 29 July 1964, CINCPAC advised the planning group that the terms of reference for U.S./Thai bi-lateral planning had been approved by the Secretary of Defense and further planning should proceed in accordance with the previous guidance.

### CINCUSTAF OPLAN 1/65

The Draft Force Plan (CINCUSTAF Plan 1/65) was forwarded to U.S. and Thai national authorities for review on 13 November 1964. CINCPAC had returned their recommended changes to the plan on 10 February 1965, which was prior to the JCS approval. On 18 February 1965, the CINCPAC comments and recommended changes were made available to the Thai Standing Joint Planning Group for preliminary review and discussion.

The RTA Ministry of Defense (MOD) returned their approval and recommended changes to this plan on 26 February 1965.

The U.S. National Authority changes to CINCUSTAF Plan were received from JCS on 1 June 1965, and released to the RTA MOD with the recommendation that a coordinated effort be made with U.S. planners to print the plan in final form.

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CINCUSTAF OPLAN 1/65 was promulgated by Field Marshal Thanom and dispatched to all headquarters concerned on 24 August 1965.

COMUSTAF OPLAN 1/65

In compliance with CINCPAC guidance the combined Project 22 Planning Group developed the COMUSTAFF OPLAN. The first draft of this plan was published on 3 May 1965, and was used for bilateral coordination.

Continuous planning resulted in refinement of this draft Oplan. This was indicated at the time when the CINCUSTAF plan was promulgated. General Stilwell used that occasion to point out to Field Marshal Thanom that it (referring to the COMUSTAFF Draft OPLAN) was sufficiently completed and could be implemented immediately if needed.

On 19 November 1965, Volumes I and II of the Draft COMUSTAFF OPLAN 1/65 were published and furnished to the MOD of Thailand and the JCS for review and approval. The Draft of Volume III, Unconventional Warfare Annex, was to be published during January 1966, for national authority review and approval. A major milestone in the bi-lateral planning effort should be reached with the final publication and submission of this highly important plan.

Air Defense

As early as 1963 the RTG expressed concern over the inadequate air defense capabilities in Thailand. The RTA had on several occasions requested the U.S. to provide modern air defense weapons for the defense of Bangkok and forces in the field. General Chitti,

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Deputy CINC, RTA, on his visit to Washington on 5 November 1963, made a strong plea for a Nike battalion to be used for the air defense of Bangkok.

An air defense survey conducted in April 1965, by Army Section, JUSMAG, revealed that the high cost of obtaining and maintaining air defense weapons was beyond the capability of the RTA at that time. The time involved in providing the equipment, essential back-up, and the training of highly skilled personnel, precluded any immediate solution to the air defense problem.

On 20 April 1965, General Easterbrook sent a memo to the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, in which he apprised him of the air defense situation. He pointed out that he shared the concern expressed by the RTA over the lack of an air defense system, particularly in view of the current increased U.S. operations from Thailand. As an example he cited the air bases at Udorn, Ubon and Takhli; the logistics complex and air base at Korat; and the port facilities, the air base and governmental center in the Bangkok/Don Muang area which were almost undefended from air attacks by the North Vietnamese or CHICOMS. General Easterbrook emphasized that the introduction of a modern air defense system into Thailand would not only provide an increase in the level of protection, but, more importantly, would act as a powerful deterrent against CHICOM/NVN air attacks. He indicated that he would bring the critical air defense situation of Thailand to the attention of CINCPAC and, as a solution, recommend immediate introduction of U.S. Hawk units in order to

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provide maximum air defense of the three highest priority targets:  
Korat, Bangkok/Don Muang, Takhli and Ubon.

On 4 September 1965, JCS informed CINCPAC that DA had initiated action to provide for an increased air defense capability in the U.S. Army. JCS requested that the air defense capability of all SEA, to include possible requirements for Army Hawk units in Thailand, be reviewed.

In response to the above JCS message, a message was dispatched to CINCPAC on 5 September 1965, to inform him that a MACTHAI committee would be appointed to conduct an air defense study of Thailand with an estimated completion date of 5 November 1965.

On 6 October 1965, a CINCPAC message directed COMUSMACTHAI to expedite the completion of the Air Defense Study.

On 12 November 1965, the completed MACTHAI Air Defense Study report was forwarded to CINCPAC and component commanders. The study analyzed the most logical targets against which that threat would be directed, and the then current air defense capabilities in-country. The study in essence revealed that there was no effective air defense system in Thailand. A few of the most important recommendations offered by the Air Defense Study Report are listed below:

1. Complete Southeast Asia Tactical Air Control System as soon as possible.
2. Install additional radar sites, integrated into SEATACS.
3. Place 12 F-4C aircraft on five minute alert backed up with

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24 additional F-4's which would be on a 30 minute status for air defense purposes.

4. Deploy seven Hawk battalions for the protection of principal target areas as follows: two at Udorn and one each at Korat, Bangkok, Takhli, Udon and Siracha/Sattahip.

5. Deploy two Nike Hercules battalions for the protection of the critical target area of Bangkok/Don Muang, Korat, Takhli and Siracha/Sattahip.

6. Institute a program to increase the manning and training and eventual tactical deployment of four RTA Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Automatic Weapons (AW) battalions (one each to Korat, Takhli, Bangkok and Siracha/Sattahip areas).


7. Deploy two U.S. battalions to Thailand, one each to Udon and Udorn.

In December 1965, CINCPAC approved and forwarded to JCS the requirement for the deployment of six Hawk and two U.S. ADA AW battalions to Thailand.

### Concept for Mutual Thai/U.S. Development and Improvement for the Royal Thai Armed Forces

A "Concept for Mutual Thai/U.S. Development and Improvement of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF)" was developed by USMACTHAI/JUSMAG during 1965. Described as "an imaginative, comprehensive and logical approach to the Royal Thai Forces on contingency and military assistance planning matters" by CINCPAC, it raised hopes of the early attainment of vital U.S./Thai objectives if implemented

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effectively, and was considered to hold "great promise for the future  
<sup>2</sup>  
 of the Thai Armed Forces."

The concept was designed to provide the following:

1. A point of departure leading to further bi-lateral planning and programming, utilizing Project 22 as the point of departure.
2. A potential lever for the establishment of a system to measure both deficiencies and progress within the Thai Armed Forces.
3. An opportunity for Supreme Command of the Royal Thai Armed Forces to discharge its assigned responsibilities.
4. A basis for the development of realistic force objectives.
5. A basis for the development of a "realistic, sound and  
<sup>3</sup>  
 saleable Military Assistance Program for Thailand."

The key to the concept was the use of the "bi-lateral approach," which included: (1) a statement of the threat; (2) establishment of mutual objectives and goals; (3) a ten-year Force Objectives Structure for the RTARF (to include detailed costing during the first five years, and cost estimates for the second five years); (4) a comprehensive military program to attain the force objectives consisting of supporting programs for:

- (a) military equipment
- (b) improved combat readiness and counterinsurgency
- (c) capabilities

2. Rpt, CINCPAC to COMUSMACTHAI, 23 Feb 66, Subj: Evaluation of MAP in Thailand.

3. Ibid.

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- (d) personnel management
- (e) training
- (f) an improved logistical support system
- (g) mobilization
- (h) construction
- (i) financial management
- (j) C-E

- (5) establishment of an organization; (6) setting a planning schedule;
- (7) and a plan for implementing the program.

During the latter part of the year, the concept was presented to key representatives of the Royal Thai Armed Forces in a series of briefings and conferences. Initial reaction on the part of the Thai was most favorable.

#### Advisory Group Programs

The task of completing the objectives of the MAP belonged ultimately to the advisory groups, who took over where the planners left off, translating words and figures into concrete results. This was easily the most rewarding phase of the job, where theory was tested and proven in practice, and where the bonds of friendship between two nations dedicated to a common goal were forged on a person-to-person basis through mutual cooperation. (See Figures 5-11). The units with which U.S. advisors worked are shown in Appendix E.

#### Army Advisory Group

With a mission "to advise and assist the Royal Thai Army in the development of maximum operational readiness within the resources

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Figure 5 Capt Jack Nichols, Advisor, RTA Cavalry Division Signal Company, accompanies the company commander, Capt Auem Manorat, during a weapons inspection in the unit area in Bangkok.



Figure 6 After arrival at Prachinburi, Thailand, by JUSMAG aircraft, Capt Royall T. Melville, Advisor 2nd Cav RCT, discusses advisory schedule with Hq Btry commander, 2nd Arty Bn, Capt Pradith.

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Figure 7 Lt Col Michael J Cerrone, Jr, Senior Advisor RTA Cavalry Division, discusses counterinsurgency training plans with Col Somsak Dunchammanon, Deputy Commander, RTA Cavalry Division, at the Division Hqs in Bangkok.



Figure 8 Capt Prajum Pisitbanakorn, CO, 1st Rifle Troop, 10th Cav Sqn (Pack), points out unit disposition to Capt Royall T. Melville, Advisor 2nd Cav RCT, during the Sqn ATT of the 10th Cav near Prachinburi, Thailand.

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Figure 9 Capt Donald L Pace, Advisor 1st Cav Regt, and Lt Col Boosp Komoot, the 1st Cav Regt C/S, take a coffee break and discuss the ATT of the 11th Cav Sqdn and 3rd Cav Sqdn in field near Lopburi, Thailand.



Figure 10 Lt Col Maron Jamudom, CO 10th Cav Sqdn (Pack) (C) and Col Chai Chamachote, XO, 2nd Cav RCT (Center w/armband) look on as the Sqdn S-3, Capt Prasert Panwattana, explains the tactical disposition of the unit to Advisor, Capt Royal T. Melville (kneeling). Capt Joseph L. Nagel, RTA Cavalry Division Arty Advisor (R), listens to outgoing fire mission during the ATT of the 10th Cav Sqdn near Prachinburi, Thailand.




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Figure 11 LCMDR David H. Stewart, Navy Advisory Group, conducts an annual materiel inspection aboard a RTN LST.





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available," the Army advisory group was organized with three main divisions (operations, logistics, MAP), and seven field advisory detachments.<sup>4</sup> The operations division was broken up into three branches (plans, training, operations), and logistics into six branches (plans, engineer, ordnance, quartermaster, signal, transportation). These various branches advised and assisted the RTA to build a more effective military organization.

#### M41 Tanks and M113 Armored Personnel Carriers

The FY64-69 MAP included a requirement package of tanks and armored personnel carriers (APC's) which called for the replacement of 183 M24 tanks in the RTA inventory that were expected to become logistically unsupportable by the end of FY67. Because of budget limitations and operational requirements, a combined package of 114 M41 tanks and 221 M113 APC's was considered adequate although the number of tanks was below the RTA requirements for 201 tanks authorized by existing TOE's at that time. On 24 August 1964, the RTA was officially informed of the JUSMAG position regarding the number of tanks and APC's planned in the program. JUSMAG also provided them with a recommended concept for APC distribution.

Although the RTA maintained that a TOE requirement continued to exist for 201 M41 tanks, the agreement between JUSMAG and the RTA provided the following allocation of tanks and APC's already in country and those to be delivered for the remainder of FY66: the 2nd,

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4. Final Draft, Organization and Functions Manual, 22 Oct 65, p.64

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6th, 7th, and 13th Tank Co.'s and the Cavalry and Ordnance Schools accounted for 66 M41 tanks in country; the remaining 48 M41 tanks delivered were to be allocated to the 3rd, 4th and 31st Tank Companies and to the 2nd and 3rd Reconnaissance Companies.

Seventy-one M113 APC's in country were allocated to the 5th and 6th Transportation Companies (two platoons each), and to the Cavalry, Transportation and Ordnance Schools. Seventy-three additional APC's scheduled for delivery during the third quarter of FY66, were to be allocated to the 2nd, 6th and 31st Regimental Combat Teams (RCT's) and to three division recon companies. An allocation agreement had not been reached for the remaining 77 APC's in the FY66 and FY67 programs; there were no more programmed for FY68. However, concepts agreed upon provided for the placement of all APC platoons with infantry regiments. Priority in the assignment of tanks and APC's within the RTA was given to border RCT's, the instructional base, and particularly to Project 22 units. The Cavalry Division had not yet been allocated any tanks or APC's; this requirement was under study and results were to depend upon the final agreement for the reorganization of the Cavalry Division.

In view of the situation in 1965, and particularly Project 22 requirements, Army Advisory Group (ARAG) considering the feasibility of retaining M24 tanks in country, subject to their supportability, in order to provide a tank company for each RCT. As these tanks became unsupportable, they would be cannibalized on a controlled basis to maintain the remaining fleet. During

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succeeding years, M24's would be replaced through attrition where justified by operational requirements, subject to funding limitations. Since M41 tanks would be given to Project 22 units, SEATO committed forces and the instructional base, M24 tanks, so long as they were being retained, would be allocated to lower priority units.

With regard to APC's, the RTA planned to move one armored carrier platoon each from Phitsamulok to Lampang and from Korat to Udorn, for attachment to the 4th and 13th RCT's respectively.

#### Special Operations Centers

The first four Special Operations Centers (SOC's) were deployed on 20 October 1963 at Chieng Khong, Pua, Bung Khan, and Nakhon Phanom along the Thai-Laotian border. They replaced tactical units deployed at those locations during the 1962 Laotian crisis. They were assigned the mission of gathering and reporting intelligence information, performing civic action and psychological operations, and preventing the spread of subversion. Since then, additional SOC's were established as follows: in March 1964, SOC 23 at Surin (along the Thai-Cambodian border); in July 1965, SOC 51 at Pattani (along the Thai-Malaysian border); in October 1965, SOC 61 at Pong Nam Ron (in the vicinity of Chantaburi along the Thai-Cambodian border, manned by the RTMC).

The RTA Chief of Staff in May 1964, requested JUSMAG assistance for the SOC's in the form of facilities, communications and medical supplies from MAP funds. The amount of \$100,000 was made available for construction support of SOC facilities. Blueprint drawings were

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prepared by the Officer-in-Charge of Construction (OICC) Thailand, forwarded by JUSMAG to RTA and approved by the RTA with minor changes. Construction material and other items were purchased for facilities at all sites except Pattani, for which no construction support was requested. Joint U.S./Thai site surveys were completed on 16 August 1965. OICC completed layout plans and a final OICC/RTA coordination meeting was held on 22 September 1965, to execute a Force Account Agreement authorizing the transfer of funds to the RTA Post Engineer in return for an agreement to build the facilities. During this meeting, the RTA requested some minor changes. A revised draft agreement and detailed cost estimate was provided the RTA on 24 September 1965.

The SOC's were normally organized with 85 personnel, consisting of a Headquarters and Control Group of 40 members (including a nine-man security squad and an attached four-man psychological operations team), and five Special Operations Teams (SOT's), each with one officer and eight specialists. The SOC at Pua was slightly larger because it was horse-mounted and required animal handlers and veterinary support and the SOC at Pattani was reinforced with a platoon of five M8 armored cars.

The SOC's were manned, equipped, and supported by the closest units of the RTA or RTMC and, since the beginning of the program, rotation of personnel was completed on a semi-annual basis. This procedure was found to have an adverse effect on the combat readiness posture of the sponsoring units because of the demand for

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transport, communications equipment, and critical specialists.

A study on the manning and support of the SOC's arrived at the following conclusions:

1. The SOC program was worthwhile and accomplished an active counterinsurgency role.
2. The policy of furnishing equipment and personnel from sponsoring units was seriously impairing the combat readiness of these units, most of which were Project 22 committed forces.
3. The RTA should man the SOC's with overstrength personnel in sponsoring units and the SOC's should be separately MAP equipped.

Among the accomplishments of the program were the medical treatment of over 159,000 people; the improvement of 829 kilometers of village roads; the showing of 459 movies to over 739,300 people; and wide distribution of pamphlets, reading material and pictures of the King, Queen and Buddha. A substantial amount of progress was also made in the field of public health, and the sanitary standards of remote villages were raised significantly. In addition, vast quantities of information regarding the terrain, people and their activities were collected and recorded.

Future plans included establishment of SOC's at Mai Sai, Mai Sod, and Ranong on the Burmese border and Sadow, Betong and Sungai Kaloke on the Malaysian border.

#### Military Assistance Training Program

Training provided to Royal Thai Armed Forces personnel under U.S. Army sponsorship were in the following categories:

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1. Formal schooling in CONUS and PACOM areas.
2. OJT and observer type training in CONUS and PACOM areas.
3. In-country English language supervision by contract technical services personnel (CTSP).
4. VIP orientation tours to CONUS.

The FY66 military assistance training program (MATP) was implemented on 9 June 65, costing approximately \$900,000. In addition to providing training outside of Thailand for members of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, it made available the services of two CTSP linguistic advisors and six mobile training teams (MTT).

### Preventive Maintenance of RTA Equipment

The urgent requirement for improvement in preventive maintenance of RTA equipment had long been recognized. This problem continued to warrant major emphasis by advisors and by RTA commanders and staffs at all echelons. In conference with Chief of Staff, RTA, and key members of his staff, it was pointed out that the continuation of military assistance, in the case of vehicles specifically, was to a large degree dependent especially upon the effective utilization and maintenance of equipment previously provided through MAP.

Despite repeated advisory efforts to persuade RTA personnel of the need for attaining acceptable preventive maintenance standards, little improvement was made. Lack of RTA command interest in preventive maintenance from the highest levels down through the chain of command, low manning levels of RTA units, a shortage of trained technicians and equipment operators, and of items classified as

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commercial consumables, were considered the main factors which contributed to ineffective preventive maintenance of RTA equipment.

To improve preventive maintenance within the RTA, the following recommendations were included in the ARAG portion of the Country Logistics Improvement Plan:

1. Stimulate RTA command interest at the highest levels and downward through the chain of command.
2. Establish a meaningful RTA Quarterly Equipment Maintenance Report.
3. Increase manning levels of RTA units.
4. Train additional technicians and equipment operators.
5. Resolve the problem of providing commercial consumable items for the RTA.


RTA Vehicular Deadline Rate

The trend in the wheeled vehicle deadline rate, by quarter has been:

<u>Jun 64</u>	<u>Sep 64</u>	<u>Dec 64</u>	<u>Mar 65</u>	<u>Jun 65</u>	<u>Sep 65</u>	<u>Mean</u>
25%	24%	23%	22%	27%	27%	24.7%

The lack of effective RTA command emphasis on the need for proper daily operator maintenance and scheduled organizational maintenance was considered to be an important cause of the large vehicular deadline rate. It was observed that preventive maintenance services, in many cases, were reduced to paper exercises. Batteries with dry cells, oil filters heavy with sludge, front wheel bearings with old grease, and worn brake shoes attested to this conclusion particularly when records stated that recent maintenance services were performed.

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It was found that the RTA required more than twice the anticipated replacement allowance of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  ton truck engines. This excessive engine wearout could be attributed, in part, to insufficient and dirty lubricants. The reluctance of the Thai to change oil filters was considered especially serious in view of the low (1 to 100 - oil/fuel) ratio by which engine oil was allocated. The RTA was supposed to have budgeted for sufficient oil to permit an oil/fuel ratio of 3 to 100. This low allocation ratio of Thai furnished engine oil could be partly overcome by keeping the oil clean through periodic changes of inexpensive MAP furnished oil filters.

The maintenance effort was hampered by lengthy delays in determining requirements for and requisitioning repair parts and supplies, inefficient processing of requisitions, little or no aggressive follow-up action on requisitions, failure to reconcile supply records, and the lengthy time consuming procedures involved between the issue point at the depot and the up-country mechanic.

The RTA Ordnance Depot, however, was not experiencing significant shortages of any particular category of repair parts or supplies. MAP support was considered generally good. Nevertheless, the failure to requisition oil filters and similar items resulted in unrealistically low stockage levels which could be quickly exhausted should a large demand be suddenly placed upon the depot.

All of the foregoing weaknesses were brought to the attention of the RTA commanders concerned, the appropriate Ordnance Department personnel, and JUSMAG Advisors, with recommendations for their

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correction. The advisors analysis of unit equipment maintenance reports for each quarter was furnished to the RTA Director of Logistics.

Development of a Combat Ration

The first combat type ration was developed by the Subsistence Division, Quartermaster Department in 1954. It consisted of three cans of pre-cooked rice, three cans of meat, and one can of sweets. This first ration proved to be unsatisfactory due to its weight, poor palatability of the canned rice, high production costs and short storage life.

In 1964, the RTA Military Research and Development Center with assistance from the U.S. Advance Research Projects Agency (ARPA), took a new look at the combat ration requirement. Initial emphasis was placed on the development of an individual ration. Prototype I consisted of dehydrated rice and various typical Thai food supplements, such as nam plic (fish sauces, duck eggs, and salted small fish). As the project progressed, it was expanded to include the development of 10-in-1 and a "B" type ration.

Following successful field tests of the individual ration, the ARPA Field Unit, at the request of Thai officials, obtained the TDY services of a U.S. technical team consisting of the Chief of Food Technology Department, University of Maryland, a food processing engineer, and a canning factory manager. This team produced an estimate of the mechanical and technical requirements and costs for establishing a facility to produce the ration. In addition, the team found that the Preserved Food Organization's (PFO) modern food plant

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at Ban Pong was by far the most suitable location for the installation of the proposed dehydrated ration facility.

Combat type dehydrated rations developed by the PFO's pilot food plant for use by military and para-military forces were considered satisfactory. These rations had a low production cost of approximately 50 cents each, a shelf life of at least two years, and were proven acceptable in tests by RTA units.

The combat type rations at the end of 1965 consisted of the Prototype III individual ration weighing about two pounds two ounces (800 grams) and an improved 10-in-1 ration, and were based on dehydrated rice with considerable improvement in the variety of supplements and packaging.

The lack of complete facilities for manufacturing combat type rations in quantity in Thailand required the purchase of additional machinery. In the absence of firm guidance by the Ministry of Defense on the number of rations of various types that the production facility must be capable of producing, the planning for machinery requirements was based on a plant with a production capacity of 50,000 rations per sixteen hour work day.

Some of the facilities needed to produce the rations, such as buildings and supporting machinery, were already in existence at the PFO's food plant at Ban Pong. The latest cost estimate for the additional machinery required was \$228,000.

Thailand Ammunition Manufacturing Plant

Early in 1952, the RTG requested the U.S. to provide Thailand with

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a small arms ammunition manufacturing plant. The RTG agreed to furnish the necessary buildings for the plant. Machinery to manufacture .30 caliber M2 Ball ammunition was programmed for FY56; however, funds were not provided until 1958. The initial shipment of machinery for the plant was received from CONUS in December 1958. The Thailand Ammunition Manufacturing Plant (TAMP) became operational in January 1962, with the following annual production figures:

1962	4,875,000 rounds
1963	10,326,596 "
1964	12,259,000 "
1965	13,385,632 "

In February 1961 JUSMAG proposed that scrap brass be donated to the RTA and sold for the support of TAMP. This proposal was approved. Brass was sold with proceeds made available to TAMP as follows:

15 March 1961 - 336 tons, sold for	\$166,586
4 October 1962 - 91 tons, sold for	46,551
Total	<u>\$213,137</u>

The sales resulted in the establishment of the TAMP Brass Fund, which was administered by the RTA and used for TAMP improvements and minor work at the Ordnance Arsenal. Expenditures from the fund required the joint approval of RTA (Chief of Ordnance Department) and JUSMAG (TAMP Advisor or Chief, ARAG, depending upon the amount.) The uncommitted balance, as of 31 December 1965, was \$39,856.

The primary problem at TAMP was considered to be the retention of trained personnel. Only two of the ten assigned officers had worked at TAMP since the start of production in 1962. The wages paid to civilian workers at the plant were a fraction of what was offered by local industry. As a result, the annual turnover of

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civilian workers was approximately 50 percent. This unusually high personnel turbulence hampered the efficient operation of the plant and had a detrimental effect on the quality of production.

JUSMAG advisors suggested that TAMP be reorganized as a quasi-military-civilian type facility under the control of the Ministry of Defense. As such, it could be controlled and supervised by military personnel from all services under personnel regulations appropriate for such an organization, and offer such incentives as better pay, assignment and promotion opportunities.

The Chief of the Ordnance Department stated at a meeting of his staff and U.S. advisors that he agreed with JUSMAG's analysis of the primary problem areas and indicated that he would take action to have the officers who formerly worked at TAMP returned to the plant, and attempt to have civilian apprentices sign a two or three year working agreement. He further stated that he would request that he be given the authority to initiate procurement utilizing the nonappropriated TAMP Fund without being bound by RTA procurement regulations. He also said that he would forward to the RTA Headquarters the JUSMAG recommendation for reorganization to place TAMP under the control of the Ministry of Defense as a military-civilian facility in order to improve pay, assignment, and promotion opportunities.

POL Storage Facilities for the RTA

The Master Construction Plan (MCP) for the Royal Thai Army developed in 1959 after a joint RTA-JUSMAG survey, included bulk

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POL storage facilities at nine locations: Lampang, Phitsanuloke, Udorn, Ubon, Korat, Nakorn Sawan, Saraburi, Bangkok, and Pranburi. A feasibility study, which included site recommendations and preliminary cost estimates, was completed in 1963. Construction money was requested as part of FY64 MAP but was not funded due to funding limitations.

Design and construction funds for the Lampang and Phitsanuloke facilities were made available in the amount of \$492,055 in the FY65 MAP. The plan provided for a storage capacity of 200,000 gallons at Lampang and 300,000 gallons at Phitsanuloke. On 23 August 1965, the Chief of Staff, RTA, was briefed and a series of meetings followed during September and November between the RTA and JUSMAG project coordinators. These meetings and a site reconnaissance conducted on 21 October, resulted in the following major decisions:

1. Use of site "D" at Lampang for the storage facility; if the government owned Fuel Oil Organization of Thailand (FOO) permitted, it was desirable for the RTA to use the FOO Railroad unloading spur rather than build a new spur line.

2. Use of site "A" at Phitsanuloke, if the State Railroad of Thailand (SRT) permitted it, was desirable to relocate the RR unloading spur approximately 60 meters south to remove the spur from the Phitsanuloke - Lomsak Highway bridge overpass. Two access routes to the storage site were considered. The one which passed through the camp housing area was on RTA land but it posed a traffic hazard to children and was inconvenient; the other offered direct access but

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would require the RTA to purchase a strip of land approximately 10 meters x 170 meters.

On 2 December 1965, JUSMAG wrote to the RTA Director of Logistics officially confirming the results of the meetings and reconnaissance, and requested a diagram showing what land the RTA intended to buy at Lampang site "D" and which access route would be used at Phitsanuloke. JUSMAG also requested RTA to obtain and furnish to JUSMAG the necessary certificates of land ownership, easements and statements of permission to use the FOO, the SRT, and the municipalities of Lampang and Phitsanuloke.


No formal answer was received from the RTA.

## The Replacement Training Center at Pranburi

Located on a reservation of approximately 600,000 acres of the best range complex in Thailand, the Replacement Training Center (RTC) at Pranburi (Camp Dhanarajata) was constructed during the period 1956-1959 at a cost of \$7.3 million. The Center, built to train all recruits inducted into the RTA, was designed for an annual output of 30,000 replacements, with a peak in-training capacity of 12,000 trainees. However, since recruit training was conducted only for the First Army Area and the 5th Military Circle, the average annual output was 17,300 replacements. The RTA never fully accepted the principle of centralized training and, in the Second and Third Army Areas, recruits continued to be trained in units.

In January 1965 General Prapass, Commander-in-Chief, RTA, informed CHJUSMAG that he desired to change the recruit training system by

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training all recruits in units to improve discipline and enhance esprit. On 1 October 1965 he confirmed in writing his decision to close Pranburi as a RTC. JUSMAG pressed for a reconsideration of this decision, and General Prapass, during a meeting with JUSMAG on 13 December 1965, agreed to further discussions by a bi-lateral committee. However, subsequent meetings made it clear that the RTA, at all levels, was determined to close the RTC as previously announced.

Several alternatives for the future use of the Pranburi facility were under consideration by the RTA. The most favored course of action provided for the relocation of the Infantry Center to Pranburi, with the present site of the Infantry Center to be used as a Special Warfare Center.

#### RTA Personnel Status

RTA policy since 1956 provided for the early release of conscriptees from active duty in order to conserve funds. Actual discharge of conscriptees was not accomplished until the 24-month term was completed. However, personnel were placed on leave status, without pay, two to eight months prior to completion of their obligation, dropped from the strength report of units, and sent home pending discharge. In September 1965, the RTA announced plans to terminate the early release program commencing in May 1966. Concurrently, the procedure for induction of conscriptees was revised to provide for semi-annual (rather than bi-monthly) call-ups each May and November.

At the end of calendar year 1965, the RTA personnel strength was

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85,008. It was anticipated that the personnel strength of the RTA would increase to 96,500 by the end of FY66, 103,000 by the end of FY67 where it would remain thru FY68. The strength was then projected to increase 1000 per year through FY72 where it would reach 107,000.

### Tactical Air Support System

For a number of years, attempts were made by JUSMAG to get the Thai to develop and establish a workable Tactical Air Support System (TASS). Prior to 1965, the RTA had the responsibility for such a system. A limited amount of support was furnished by MAP.


During 1964, an RTG committee was formed for the purpose of developing a suitable system; however, its efforts were inconclusive because the RTG Ministry of Defense failed to define roles and to delineate responsibilities.

In June 1965, the MACTHAI J-5 Division was informed the MOD had decided that the RTAF would assume primary responsibility for a Tactical Air Control System (TACS), incorporating U.S. principles and procedures in general. Air-ground communications equipment assigned to the RTA would be turned over to the RTAF.

On 1 July 1965, an ad hoc committee chaired by the JUSMAG Army Advisory Group was given the responsibility for clarifying roles and missions, developing a suitable TASS for the RTA, making recommendations for programming and procuring the equipment required for the system. This committee was composed of representatives of the JUSMAG Advisory Groups, J-3, and J-5.

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Committee meetings were held periodically and a plan for the required TASS was drafted. This plan envisaged the activation of an RTAF TACS of a suitable size to provide the necessary Director of Air Support Centers (DASC's), Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP's), Air Liaison Officers (ALO's), and Forward Air Controllers (FAC's) for the RTA and RTMC. A skeleton TOE for this unit was developed by RTAF. The FY66 MAP add-on included a request for \$.3 million containing initial equipment for the squadron to provide equipment at four ALO's and four FAC's.

On 13 October 1965, the RTA published a memo outlining the ground aspects of a TASS. A review of the memo revealed that the system outlined was in consonance with the TASS used by American Forces.

#### Project 009-Individual

In June 1963, the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) requested the RTG to provide specialist training in Thailand for selected Lao individuals in addition to Royal Laotian Army units. The request was initiated by the U.S. State Department through the U.S. Embassy, Vientiane, with the stipulation that the U.S. would financially support the program. In July 1963, the RTG agreed to the RLG request.

Several combined JUSMAG/RTA committee meetings were held, resulting in the "Joint Committee Report on Laotian Specialist Training," dated March 1964, which was approved by CHJUSMAG and the Chief of Staff, RTA. The project was designated "Project 007-Individual" to differentiate it from the unit training program (Project 007-Unit).

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In March 1964, DEPCHJUSMAG submitted detailed requirements to CHJUSMAG for the continuation of training of Lao individuals in Thailand during FY65. CHJUSMAG requested that the Supreme Command approve and implement the program, which called for training in various specialties in formal classes and OJT at RTA service schools and installations. In July 1964, the Supreme Command deferred decision on the request pending announcement of the RTA budget for the education and training program for FY65. The request was approved by the Supreme Command in September 1964.

In March 1965, a request for the continuation of the program was submitted by DEPCHJUSMAG. The request was forwarded to Supreme Command who deferred a decision until after the budget for education and schools was approved, subsequent to 1 October 1965.

At a joint committee meeting between JUSMAG and RTA project officers on 26 November 1965, an agreement was negotiated for the continuation of the project through 30 May 1967.

Since the beginning of this program, 649 spaces were approved. Of this total, 293 specialists completed training, 48 were attending courses and 89 programmed for training. The difference between spaces approved and specialists trained, in training or to be trained, was due to delays in the initiation of the program and the lack of available spaces in RTA schools.

Project 009 - Unit

In conjunction with the specialist training program for Lao individuals in the RTA, an associated program for Lao units was

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being undertaken. This was known, at its inception in the summer of 1963, as "Project 007-Unit." The U.S. Army Advisory Group, JUSMAG, was assigned responsibility for negotiating with the RTA and for advising, supervising, and executing the logistical and administrative support for the project.

Originally intended for Forces Armee Royale (FAR) units, the project was extended to include neutralist units by the then RTG Prime Minister Sarit. Additional training request resulted in the extension of the program. The project was designated Project 007, 008, and subsequently Project 009 in FY65.

The FY66 agreement alone called for the training of 37 units. At the end of 1965, 14 units totalling 1,113 individuals had completed training under this agreement; one infantry company, one heavy weapons company, one engineer company, and one leadership group totalling 411 individuals, were in training at that time.

#### Cholburi RCT Post

In December 1959, CHJUSMAG recommended that the 21st RCT located in Bangkok, be brought up to strength, trained and equipped as a MAP unit. In April 1960 General Chitti, Chief of Staff, RTA, concurred in these recommendations but added that the 21st RCT would remain in the Bangkok area until completion of construction of an RCT post in Cholburi. In August 1960, JUSMAG agreed to consider programming construction at Cholburi within available monetary ceilings and provided RTA with a list of facilities planned by JUSMAG for construction. In September 1960, the RTA notified JUSMAG that they

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
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planned to move an engineer combat company to Choluta to construct facilities, roads, and fencing for the cantonment area. In March 1962, after initial feasibility studies were completed by the U.S., MAP funds were allocated for the architectural and engineering (A&E) effort.

In the fall of 1962, as a result of ceasefire agreements in Laos, emphasis on improvement of Thailand's military effort was shifted to the critical North and Northeast areas. RTA agreed with the urgent operational requirement for new battalion posts in the North and Northeast, but placed them below the requirement for Choluta. Because of political implications, CHJUSMAG recommended to CINCPAC the inclusion of \$900,000 in the FY65 MAP for facilities for one battalion at Choluta. In answer, CINCPAC stated that construction could not be justified for the counterinsurgency or national defense effort under current plans and military assistance funding levels. CHJUSMAG directed termination of the A&E effort and advised the Thai that the U.S. could not support construction at Choluta. The RTA continued construction unilaterally. Currently, the engineer company and an infantry battalion have deployed to RTA constructed facilities.

On 16 July 1964, General Prapass, Deputy Prime Minister, while in Washington, expressed to Secretary McNamara the idea that the U.S. had reneged on its earlier commitment to support construction at Choluta. Secretary McNamara replied that a complete review of that matter would be made. On 14 December, 1964, during the U.S.

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Army Chief of Staff's visit to Thailand, and while accompanied by the U.S. Ambassador, General Prapass recalled that a review was promised and that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense had been instructed that if the review indicated that the U.S. had made a commitment, it should be honored. The Ambassador notified the Secretary of State on 15 December 1964, of this conversation and recommended that U.S. support construction at Cholburi. Although there appeared to be no valid military requirement for consolidation of the 21st RCT at Cholburi, it was agreed that the U.S. did in fact make a support commitment, and that this agreement must be honored.

On 24 December, 1964, the Department of State notified the American Embassy, Bangkok, that the U.S. would support RTA construction at Cholburi. On 19 March 1965, Army Advisory Group was authorized to initiate discussions with the RTA concerning U.S. support of Cholburi construction. On 24 March 1965, ARAG advised the RTA by letter that authority had been granted to discuss U.S. support, and proposed the establishment of a working group to consider the various aspects of this support. On 24 May 1965, the RTA responded favorably to the establishment of this working group. Subsequent correspondence resulted in the designation of the RTA and U.S. representatives.

The RTA-JUSMAG working group started meetings on 1 July 1965 and by the end of 1965 had confirmed the strengths and identity of RTA units to be deployed to Cholburi and determined facilities to be planned, programmed and constructed through FY69 by RTA.

The FY66 MAP submitted to CINCPAC on 14 September 1965, included

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the requirement for \$1.6 million for Choburi construction. The FY67 MAP would contain the requirement for funding in that amount for the completion of construction to which the U.S. was committed.

Battalion Posts in the North and Northeast

In 1962 JUSMAG developed a plan for the ground defense of Thailand with the objective of improving the RTA defense posture to meet either Communist-inspired subversion and insurgency, or overt aggression. The concept included the peacetime deployment of six battalion-sized combat units to critical areas in Thailand. The first three locations in priority order were Sakol Nakhon, Nan, and Tak.

Battalion locations at Nan and Sakol Nakhon would provide Regular Army units, in isolated areas on the critical Laos border, immediately available for counterinsurgency activities. Once firmly established, the battalions would be operating over familiar terrain, giving them a decided advantage over units having to be hastily deployed to these remote areas.

Location of a combat unit at Tak would provide a force astride the critical Tak-Mae Sot gap on the Burma border. The Director of Operations, RTA, expressed interest in this location, and, until the deterioration of the situation in the NE, considered it a priority requirement. The plan was approved by CINCPAC and funds were made available for construction of facilities for Sakol Nakhon and Nan. "Gold Flow" restrictions precluded approval of the complete plan. The concept was "approved in principle" by Chief of Staff, RTA, who, while agreeing with the operational necessity, placed RTA budgetary

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support for construction of the proposed redeployment as a third priority project, below construction at Choburi for the 21st RCT and maintenance of existing facilities.

Feasibility studies for both locations were completed in December 1963 and forwarded to the RTA. FY65 MAP contained \$100,000 for A&E costs. On 3 November 1964, CINCPAC advised JUSMAG that FY66 MAP ceilings would be less than FY65 and hinted that, if the trend continued, construction funds for a battalion post might drop out of the program. Faced by a probable reduction in MAP ceilings and a lack of support from the Thai, CINCPAC, in November 1964, requested that the A&E effort for Nan and Sakol Nakhon, scheduled for FY65, be deferred and that no further action be taken on this project unless raised by the Thai.

Events in 1965 pointed up the need for expedited deployment of troops to border areas. Accordingly, \$1,530,000 for the construction of Nan and Sakol Nakhon posts and \$68,000 for A&E for Tak were requested in the FY65 MAP add-on MACTHAI/JUSMAG, and funded in the FY65 MAP.

On 4 August 1965, the RTA was informed that funds were available for construction at Nan and Sakol Nakhon and a joint Thai-U.S. committee was appointed to discuss troop deployment and construction. During a discussion on 6 October 1965 General Surakij, Chief of Staff RTA, indicated that \$1,356,000 had been requested for these projects, that the Director of Logistics, RTA, had been named as the Senior Thai representative, and that the RTA was anxious to initiate meetings of the working group. On 7 October General Surakij was informed that

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the Chief of Logistics Division, ARAG, was appointed the senior JUSMAG member to initiate coordination for the first meeting.

## Pattani Battalion

In March 1965, General Prapass, Commander-in-Chief, RTA, mentioned the possibility of sending a battalion size force to Pattani in Southern Thailand. In April 1965, he made a visit to the Southern Provinces of Thailand. Upon his return, he announced to the press that he was concerned with terrorist situation in the South and would send a battalion size unit to Pattani.

In May 1965, the Directorate of Operations, RTA, announced that a SOC was being activated at Pattani as an initial troop deployment in accordance with General Prapass' wishes. The SOC, to be designated Number 51, would establish its headquarters in a police camp at Pattani. The RTA began to negotiate for the purchase of the camp from the Border Patrol Police.

A SOC school was held at Pattani from mid-June to mid-July 1965, and attended by designated personnel from the 5th RCT. SOC 51, an infantry-type SOC with one platoon of M8 armored cars attached, went into operation on 17 July 1965, with the responsibility of covering Pattani, Yala, and Narattwat.

Initial RTA plans called for the sending of a task force to Pattani to fulfill the requirement for a battalion. This task force was to be composed of elements from the Cavalry Division, Airborne Battalion and 5th RCT. A second plan was to form a new unit and a third was to send a battalion from the 1st or 11th RCT, Bangkok, on

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a rotational basis. The latter plan was encouraged by JUSMAG.

On 10 September 1965, the Directorate of Operations, RTA, informed JUSMAG of the decision regarding the Pattani battalion. It would be a new unit, consisting of a headquarters company (TOE 7-16A), two infantry companies (TOE 7-17), a cavalry troop of 17 M8 armored cars (TOE-210A) and a 75mm howitzer battery (TOE 7-117). The unit would be formed from personnel of the RCT, Pranburi, with the armored car troop provided from the cavalry division. The RTA requested MAP support for this unit.


#### Air Force Advisory Group

The Air Force Advisor Group (AFAG) was organized with a Chief, plus Administrative, Operations, Communications and Electronics, Materiel, and MAP Divisions. Their primary mission was to advise the RTAF, through training and programming, to improve their overall military posture.

#### Training

Most of the AFAG advisors were in the communication and electronics, operations, maintenance, and supply areas. The training and education functions were handled by a staff of four personnel, whose efforts were limited to advisory assistance to RTAF formal and professional schools and the development and administration of the CONUS/overseas and in-country OJT programs. This resulted in infrequent staff visits to subordinate RTAF wing and squadron levels. Numerous training problems existed with no immediate solution apparent to meet the total skill requirements of the RTAF. Without specific mission

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directives and supporting manning documents, effective training and manning programs could not be produced. It was believed that part of the problem was caused by lack of clearly worded and complete unit mission directives. These directives were needed in order to build manning document requirements in support of the unit mission.

#### OJT Program in the RTAF

An OJT training program of sorts existed in the RTAF for many years. However, the program was haphazardly conducted and any knowledge gained by personnel was through trial and error and what had "rubbed off" on them. The program was considered too lengthy and much time was wasted before an individual became productive. No training records existed. Many students had the desire to learn but most OJT supervisors jealously guarded their knowledge in order to avoid competition.

In 1964 a two man MTT trained RTAF OJT supervisors for six months. As a result, RTAF designated OJT supervisors on orders; however, once the MTT left, the program lapsed into the original ineffectual routine due to the lack of command support. Appropriate OJT packages were procured by the AFAG for the RTAF to support the program.

Two AF Section CTSP conducted OJT for the RTAF in TACAN and the Intergrated Fuel Control (IFC) system in 1965. USAF personnel at

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5. CINCPAC Rpt, 23 Feb 66, Subj: Evaluation of Military Assistance Program in Thailand. p 28.

6. Historical Report, AFSEC, JUSMAG, 15 Nov 65.

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the joint manned radar sites received instructions from the 619th Tactical Control Squadron directing that USAF personnel assist RTAF in establishing an OJT program at the sites.

RTAF had an OJT regulation written and the USAF guide translated for OJT, but both remained unpublished.

#### RTAF Professional Training


The RTAF professional training program was divided into five main school systems. Four of these -- Air Command and Staff School, Squadron Officer School, Officer Candidate School, and the NCO Academy patterned after equivalent USAF schools. The fifth school, the Air Academy, was somewhat different from the equivalent USAF Air Academy. Its curricula consisted of a five year course almost completely devoted to engineering subjects. Two other professional training systems also existed both at the RTAF hospital: an extensive nurses training school, and an internship program.

MAP support for these schools was supplied by USAF part-time English language instructors, lectures, and assistance on specific curricula areas. In addition, Detachment 6, Special Air Warfare (SAW), made an offer to help the schools up-date their counter-insurgency phase of training. (Later on, the detachment actually did furnish the support.)

#### RTAF Airman's Technical Training School

In 1962, a USAF MTT spent six months in Thailand assisting the RTAF in overhauling the technical school curriculum. This resulted in the addition of 11 new technical courses and limitation of the

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courses to one year's duration. In addition, the need for English language training was established. Subsequently, this training was scheduled in all airmen's technical courses.

In the past, the school policy of using only officers as instructors was deterrent to learning. This resulted in instructors failing to establish rapport with airman students and, in some cases, selection of instructors who did not understand the courses they were teaching. Since January 1965, NCO's were authorized to teach in the school, an innovation which was expected to alleviate some of these problems in the RTAF technical training school.

During 1965, a considerable amount of equipment, including mock-ups, training aids and motion picture film, was procured through MAP for the school.


Improvements in 1965 included:

1. Opening of a technical instructor course.
2. Operation of an F-86L mobile training unit.
3. Transfer of two H-19 Helicopters to the school for helicopter maintenance training.
4. Delivery and distribution of approximately 2,000 USAF training manuals and 250 training films.
5. Introduction of part-time USAF advisors in the security school and munitions phase of the armament school. CTSP also taught jet engine maintenance to several instructors.

#### RTAF Flying School

With the build-up of USAF forces in Thailand, Korat AB became

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highly congested. The requirement for additional USAF facilities was expected to create problems for the RTG in providing suitable estate without due compression of RTAF activities. The solution to these problems appeared to be relocation of the RTAF Flying School. An A&E study of several sites were conducted by Lyons Associates during 1965. Site A-5(1) Northwest of Nakorn Pathom, was selected as the best location, with the proposed co-location of a USAF Squadron at the site.


Using an old RTAF study for relocating the Flying School at Phitsanulok, the Air Force Section presented a preliminary estimate of RTAF facilities requirements to the Air Force Regional Civil Engineer, Thailand.

On 16 September 1965, the RTAF and SAW operational requirements were presented at a meeting attended by representatives from 13 AF, AFRCF-Thailand, OICC/SEA, and AF Section JUSMAG. 13 AF refined the requirements list and returned it to MACHTAI to establish the in-country position.

#### R-1820 Engine Overhaul

The RTAF did not have overhaul capability for the R-1820 engine. These engines were being shipped to the CONUS for reconditioning. The establishment of R-1820 overhaul capability was highly desirable because it was the predominant reciprocating engine in the RTAF inventory. In addition, in-country overhaul capability would vastly curtail overhaul expenses and it would eliminate the extensive shipping time.

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
The RTAF was overhauling R-1340 and R-1830 engines in a large, well equipped shop which would accomodate the R-1820. A considerable amount of the required special tools for R-1820 overhaul were on hand. In-country assets were screened to determine additional tool requirements. The requirements were formulated and the listing requisitioned. It was expected that the RTAF would eventually become self-sufficient for R-1820 engine overhaul and other maintenance requirements.

Joint USAF/RTAF Supply Advisory Effort

On 15 June 1964, the AFAG recommended to the RTAF that a Joint USAF/RTAF Supply Advisory Team, consisting of one officer and two airmen from the RTAF and one officer and two airmen from the USAF, be established to function within the general framework of the Supply Division, Office of the RTAF Directorate of Materiel (DM). The team would perform the following functions: (1) develop RTAF supply regulations and manual standardized supply procedures; (2) make studies of RTAF supply and functional command channels and appropriate recommendations for improvement; (3) provide joint assistance and guidance on supply matters to both the RTAF DM and the AFAG DM; and (4) train a segment of the Headquarters RTAF staff supply personnel to operate along lines more compatible with USAF staff supply functions.

During the period 15 June 1964 - 28 May 1965, an exchange of several letters on the proposal was made between the RTAF and the AFAG. On 28 May 1965, the RTAF formally accepted the proposal with minor reservations and it was agreed that every effort be made by

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the RTAF and the ATAG to have personnel required in place and functional by 1 September 1965. In addition it was agreed that the proposed team begin to function immediately, utilizing one officer each from the RTAF and the USAF on a part-time basis. Due to the lack of sufficient supply advisors assigned to the ATAG and no clerical help, progress was slow.

#### Inventory of MAP Assets in RTAF

To provide a basis on which to build a justifiable military assistance program, it was necessary to possess knowledge of equipment assets used within the RTAF. Accordingly, the RTAF was requested to provide this data as a medium for improved equipment management by both services. The RTAF cooperated fully by implementing an inventory program in August 1965.

The inventory was completed by 30 September. Consolidation of data reported by RTAF Tactical Air Command was during November 1965. All other RTAF reporting agency reports were received and translated into IBM card formats to facilitate creation of inventory listings for management study by staff agencies.

#### F-86L Program

The first delivery of the F-86L all-weather fighter-interceptor, consisting of 17 aircraft took place in December 1962, and one additional aircraft was delivered in November 1963. The aerospace ground equipment (AGE) and concurrent spare parts (CSP), however were not provided prior to aircraft delivery. Adequate test equipment was not received to erect, test and/or maintain the E-4 Radar Fire Control

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
System. These factors, coupled with the initial lack of productive RTAF work schedule, seriously delayed final erection of the aircraft. The F-86L flight simulator building was not constructed as scheduled and, thus, delayed erection and operation of the simulator. The flight simulator arrived in late December 1962, but without minimum essential spares or necessary schematics. The simulator was temporarily erected in an inadequate building to provide some transition training.

\* RTAF personnel had never shown any enthusiasm for the F-86L, and by December 1963, were ready to scrap the entire program. The AFAG continued to request assistance from USAF, and support problems were partially resolved.

In January 1964, the RTAF was provided direct assistance by AFAG maintenance and supply advisors. These personnel performed tasks normally assigned to the RTAF. Subsequent improvements were readily apparent in supply, maintenance and administrative procedures. The quality control, in-commission, and operationally ready rates for the F-86L aircraft steadily improved. With the advent of SEATO Exercise "Air Boon Choo" in which the squadron participated late in April 1964, in-commission and operationally ready rates improved to the point where the squadron was able to provide eight aircraft per day on alert status. During the exercise only one ground abort was experienced out of 58 ordered scrambles. The unit finished the exercise with slightly higher in-commission and operationally ready rates than at the start of the exercise.

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Following "Boon Choo", direct involvement in maintenance work by U.S. advisors was halted, and a return to a normal advisory status was established. In-commission and operationally ready rates dropped sharply due to a shortage of available maintenance personnel and an increasingly apathetic attitude on the part of RTAF, until the program almost came to a standstill.

In 1965, the RTAF conducted five small scale air defense exercises which brought about definite improvement in flightline procedures. The flight simulator was made operational; however, reliability was low, preventing full utilization. Spare components for the simulator were obtained from a salvaged simulator. The four-stall alert shelter was completed in May 1965. In June the squadron initiated manual firing of 2.75mm rockets and the AIM-9B (Sidewinder).

Of the 18 F-86Ls provided RTAF, one was salvaged due to gear-up landing, two were destroyed in a mid-air collision, and in July 1965, one was destroyed after the pilot ejected. There remained 14 aircraft assigned to the 12th Fighter Interceptor Squadron.

The problem remained that there were not sufficient operationally ready aircraft (i.e., with a functioning E-4 Fire Control System) to provide the radar training needed to qualify any pilot as operationally ready.

A lack of interest on the part of RTAF higher echelons was considered the primary reason for the low aircraft operationally ready rates. Primarily for the purpose of inspiring some RTAF interest in the possibilities of the F-86L weapons system, two live rocket firing

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
demonstrations were performed for a group of RTAF observers on 1 September 1965. These were firings against a Del Mar tow target utilizing the E-4 Automatic Fire Control System. All operational phases of this demonstration were performed by USAF advisory personnel. All RTAF observers expressed enthusiasm and a definite increase of interest in the F-86L was noted. Although night and instrument training increased in the last half of FY65, night flying operations ceased during the rainy season.

### T-28 Program

The authorized number of T-28 aircraft varied in the force objectives from 45 to 72. The most recent change in T-28 UE authorization for composite squadrons lowered the UE from 18 to 15 aircraft per squadron. Four squadrons were authorized, with 48 aircraft delivered, 11 destroyed in crashes, and five on loan to DEPCJUSMAG.

Technical Order No. 526 specified wing spar modification for all T-28s. As of 31 December 1965, 29 of the aircraft had the modification. Twenty-one of these modifications were performed by RTAF. Eight aircraft had the modification before delivery. Man-hours per modification was reduced from 160 to 50. RTAF modified about five aircraft per month. The entire fleet was expected to be modified by 15 February 1966. In mid-1965 a program was initiated to convert all T-28's in-country from the R-1820-56S to the R-1820-86 engine, which was a higher performance engine propeller combination. This conversion was completed on 25 aircraft; four were converted prior

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to delivery and three aircraft remained to be converted.

The formation of the fourth composite squadron, authorized in FY67, would increase the immediate T-28 requirement to a total of 60 aircraft. Information furnished by CINCPAC indicated that, except for possible attrition aircraft for FY67 and this additional squadron, no additional T-28's could be expected due to the shortage of T-28's. Therefore, a substitute aircraft for the T-28's was under consideration by AFAG. These problems and mission requirements brought about the need for an overall revision to the RTAF force structure by the AFAG for future changes.

#### F-5 Aircraft Program

In 1965 the F-5 was programmed for MAP supported country air forces to provide a more modern tactical fighter aircraft, in SEA. The F-5 was capable of conducting conventional tactical operations with rockets, bombs, machine guns, and fire bombs, and utilized the AIM-9B for visual air defense. It did not have an operational all-weather air defense capability. However, an all-weather air defense system was in the experimental stages. A photo-reconnaissance package was also under development.

The force objectives for the RTAF contained in the CINCPAC Supplement to the MAP included two squadrons of tactical fighters: one 25 UE F-86F and one 18 UE F-5, during the FY68-71 time period. After considerable publicity concerning approved programs for providing F-5's to other countries, the Thai expressed interest in F-5's for the RTAF under an accelerated program. The U.S. responded to

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the Thai by programming an accelerated delivery of two F-5F aircraft; this was to serve as an indication of U.S. intent to support Thailand with modern equipment. The DOD guidance which accompanied the early delivery of two F-5Fs was limited to the two aircraft with no indication of accelerated delivery for the remainder of the program.

The DOD directed that the two F-5F aircraft be delivered in April 1966. If the force objectives as outlined in the CINCPAC Supplement to the MAP remained firm, follow-on deliveries would be: FY68 - five "A" models; FY69 eight "A" models; and FY70 three "A" models. AFAG/MACTHAI recommended that since the first two F-5s were accelerated, the remaining 16 be delivered: eight in FY67 and eight in FY68. If approved, this would eliminate a stretch-out program which would create logistical support and training problems as well as disruption of the combat readiness status.

#### Navy Advisory Group

Although the smaller of the three JUSMAG Advisory groups, the mission and functions of the Navy Advisory Group (NAVAG) were no less important to the defense of Thailand than the Army and Air Force. The activities and responsibilities of the NAVAG increased gradually since the introduction of MAP to Thailand just as the RTN/RTMC increased in personnel, ships and training operations.

#### Mine Threat and Countermeasures Status

Thailand is bordered by 1,500 miles of a coastline extending on either side of the river entrance to Bangkok, the country's only major port. U.S. contingency plans relied heavily on suppling by sea

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through the Port of Bangkok as no other cargo pier existed in Thailand. This necessitated, in the event of armed conflict, a 450 mile transit of mineable waters. The mining threat originated from three possible sources. Submarines, which could attain the entire upper reaches of the Gulf and return to safe operating depths under the cover of darkness; surface ships, including small craft and fishing junks of all sizes; and aircraft.

Seagoing mine countermeasures in the RTN were extremely limited. They included one Mine Sweeper Fleet (MSF) ship which possessed only a minimum moored minesweeping capability; one Mine Sweeper Coastal (MSC) and nine Motor Launch/Mine Sweepers (ML/MS). Five of these ML/MS were aging rapidly and possessed a moored sweeping capability only. The four remaining ML/MS additionally possessed a magnetic and acoustic capability. Three additional MSC have been transferred to the RTN with one due to arrive in-country in early 1966. One ML/MS from the 1965 MAP is to be delivered in April 1966.

Additional mine forces include two Mine Layer Coastal (MMC) ships which were fitted to lay Danish Mines only. (RTN ships are not equipped to lay US service mines except by jury rig on LCUs).

Active advisory efforts have resulted in a RTN agreement to convert the two existing MMC to accommodate U.S. mines at a cost of about \$20,000 each.

#### Torpedo Boat Rehabilitation

Before World War II the RTG had nine large torpedo boats (TBL) constructed in Italy. Delivery of these ships took place during

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1935-1937. Two cruisers were also ordered and partially funded during this period, but Mussolini impounded them for the Italian Navy because of impending hostilities. Since World War II Thailand has had a credit with the Italian Government for the monies paid for the undelivered cruisers. Negotiations with the Italian Government to liquidate the debt were culminated in 1963. A naval committee went to Italy to spend the credit allotted the RTN, reportedly \$1,937,000. The committee arranged the purchase of materials and machinery from Italy. The majority of the purchase went for materials to rehabilitate the seven remaining TBLs (two of the nine were sunk by the French in January 1941) and early in 1965 the materials began to arrive in-country.

At the end of 1965 the seven TBLs were still not in an operational status. The RTN was performing extensive overhauls and machinery replacements with the first two ships scheduled to be completed during FY67. However, due to the marginal condition of the propulsion machinery in some ships, it was not expected that all seven could be rehabilitated without the expenditure of considerable funds not yet programmed.

#### MAP Submarine Services

In FY63 the U.S. initiated a program to provide one submarine on station in the Western Pacific to be used exclusively for MAP country training. The cost of operating the submarine was funded through MAP, pro-rated among user countries.

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The MAP submarine visits were the only reliable source of submarine services to the RTN and the RTMC. During the typical ten day visit to Thailand, the submarine was utilized as follows:

- a. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Exercises - five days.
- b. Port Visit to Bangkok - two days.
- c. RTMC and RTA infiltration and counterinfiltration exercises - three days.

The ability, interest and desire to maintain proficiency in ASW were present in the RTN. The training afforded through the MAP Submarine ASW exercises had enabled the RTN to attain and maintain a reasonable ASW capability.

#### Jungle Drum III Operation

Exercise Jungle Drum III was a combined U.S./Thailand amphibious exercise conducted on the Southeast coast of Peninsula Thailand during the period 10-26 March 1965. The purpose of the exercise was to provide training in planning and executing an amphibious operation including quick reaction and restricted waterway operations, and to develop close working relationships and mutual understanding between U.S. and Thai forces.

During the course of the exercise, coordination between RTMC forces and Landing Force Headquarters was affected through the exchange of liaison officers. This exchange of liaison personnel proved to be most worthwhile for both forces. In the planning phase of the exercise the USMC provided two Marine Liaison Officers to Sattahip to render detailed planning assistance to the RTMC. Two additional

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U.S. Marine officers were sent to Bangkok, one to JUSMAG and one to the combined U.S./Thai Public Information Team. The availability of these liaison officers was invaluable to the success of the operation. The combined U.S./Thai Exercise Jungle Drum III provided valuable training for all forces concerned and demonstrated the ability of U.S./Thai forces to cooperate and conduct a major exercise in complete harmony.

MTT Management Team

During an orientation trip to Thailand in November of 1963 RAdm E.A. Wright, USN, Commanding Officer, Bureau of Ships Management Office, Western Pacific Area, was invited to address the Engineering Corps of the RTN. In the presentation RAdm Wright mentioned one of the services offered by Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard was MTT's to assist shipyards of other countries to improve their facilities. Shortly after the visit of RAdm Wright, Chief Navy Section was requested to obtain managerial organizational assistance for the RTN Dockyard.

Two MTT's were scheduled for the RTN Dockyard. Phase I, MTT 3-65 (Thailand), consisting of four managerial specialists from Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, arrived 17 October 1964, and spent two months studying and analyzing the Thai Navy Dockyard Organization, developing a workable organization for the RTN Dockyard, and determining additional technical assistance required.

7. Navy Section FACTUAL/JUSMAG Historical Report for period 1 Jan 64, to 30 Jun 65, dated 24 Sept 1965.

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Phase II of MTT 3-65 (Thailand), consisting of four management and production specialists, arrived 25 February 1965 and proceeded to implement the proposals of Phase I. The HTMS SAMUI (YOG-1) (ex U.S. YOG 60) was used as a training aid to demonstrate the effectiveness of the recommended system developed by Phase I. During the overhaul period, the team members trained a group of RTN engineering specialists in all phases of shipyard procedures. The pilot overhaul of the HTMS SAMUI was very successful and accomplished all the intended objectives. Prior to leaving on 25 June 1965, the team members presented a two week training course in managerial principals, methods, and techniques for approximately 100 RTN engineering officers in lower and middle management levels.

Training Requirements for RTN Air Squadron

Joint Staff Operation (JSO) Force Objectives previously listed one squadron of eight ASW aircraft (HU-16B) as the planned air arm of the RTN. In early 1965, CHJUSMAG/CINCPACFLT proposed substituting the more suitable S2A in lieu of the HU-16B as the basic ASW aircraft for the RTN Air Squadron.


Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) approval of the S2A program was expressed in a MAP order for aircraft and associated equipment dated 30 Aug 1965.

In September, a CINCPACFLT ASW Advisory Team was subsequently sent to Thailand to survey the RTN air organization, operational and training facilities, and requirements for transition to the S2A

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8. Ibid

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
aircraft. The team recommended a minimum acceptable CONUS flight crew plus in-country MTT Training Package. The training program was submitted to and approved by CINCPACFLT/CINCPAC and submitted to CNO for scheduling. As part of the overall training program, the advisory team recommended an MTT for the RTN to help establish an in-country training program and assist the RTN in reorganizing their air squadron for S2A aircraft. On 15 December 1965, six RTN officer pilots and six air crewmen, along with 12 enlisted maintenance technicians commenced CONUS training for the S2A aircraft.

### RTN Involvement in Third Country Assistance in Vietnam

Over the past several years many ideas have been advanced to obtain third country participation in assistance to the U.S./South Vietnamese struggle against the Communists. In March 1965, 105mm howitzer ammunition shortages up-country in Vietnam, revealed an urgent need for additional shallow draft shipping for transportation of supplies from Saigon to up-country ports. At that time MAAGs in China, Philippines and Thailand were asked to estimate the number of LSTs or similar vessels which those countries might temporarily loan to meet the emergency.

The RTG had agreed in principle for Thai manning of two LSTs from U.S. sources for use in Vietnam, but indicated that it would not be possible to make RTN's LSTs or LSMs available in the interim. The Ambassador was authorized to ask the RTG to provide a crew for a

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Patrol Gun Boat (PGM) for use in lieu of a crew for the second LST.

RTMC Operational Readiness

The overall operational readiness capability of the RTMC to carry out its assigned missions was considered good. Personnel were judged ready, willing and able to fight if the need arose. The most serious problems hampering the operational readiness were over-aged equipment and the lack of trained personnel. In September 1965, NAVAG gave the following evaluation of the RTMC:

Planning. Experience with exercise Jungle Drum III indicates that the RTMC staff is capable of planning only one major operation at a time; however, they do have their own contingency plans for the internal security of Thailand and are capable of rapid execution including any minor modifications necessary as dictated by the situation.

Personnel. Personnel have the knowledge, but personnel initiative was generally frustrated due to cultural factors, the lack of established performance standards, plus centralized authority and budget control. A severe shortage of technicians will continue for the foreseeable future, and will require changes in military pay and allowances to curb the high loss rate of technicians to civilian industry. The RTMC is sending more qualified personnel to in-country and CONUS training resources with particular emphasis on technical skills.

Training. RTMC units follow a standard progressive training cycle from individual training to a field exercise by a regimental combat team. Training continues to reflect the basic and realistic attitude of the RTMC toward counter-insurgency and seaborne threats. The RTMC training cycle has been less affected by the "per diem" problems than the other services, because of the nearness of suitable operation areas, and had continued its emphasis on field work. Night counter-guerrilla and anti-infiltration operations have been stressed.

RTN/RTMC combined training in amphibious warfare is considered good. Progress was made during the past year in combined operations as evidenced in Exercise Jungle Drum III. The training deficiencies based on assigned missions is a lack of adequate training in preventative maintenance which limits the capability of the RTMC to effectively respond to emergency deployments.

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Logistics. The lack of sufficiently trained supply personnel and a cumbersome imposed requisitioning system has contributed many problems. The RTMC has been burdened by the lack of adequate funding from the RTN for procurement of non-MAP supplied material. Senior RTMC staff officers are continually attempting to solve this problem with the RTN. The use of the U.S. Army Logistics Depot, Japan, to rebuild major assemblies of motor transport equipment has greatly improved the vehicle deadline rate in the RTMC. Command attention which had been lacking to logistics areas has improved considerably. The last year the RTMC has received an adequate supply of spare parts in ordance, communications and motor transport to maintain MAP equipment and help reduce deadline rates in the RTMC.<sup>9</sup>

LVTs for Royal Thai Marine Corps


RTMC was authorized 36 Landing Vehicles Tracked (LVT). They provide transport for the landing of assault elements. It was imperative that the RTMC have and maintain an amphibious assault capability, and LVTs are essential to this capability.

Prior to FY66, funds were programmed each year to pay for and bring into Thailand four rebuilt LVTs. This program provided for normal attrition of vehicles.

A total of four LVTs were due from FY63 and FY64 programs.

<sup>9.</sup> See Footnote # 7.

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
Assisting the RTG Armed Forces in their fight against Communist-inspired subversion and insurgency created heavy commitments on U.S. support operations. A considerable amount of time, money, and manpower were contributed by the U.S. in an effort to maintain an effective MAP; a buildup of AC&W systems, communications expansion, and improved logistics were some of the most important contributions made by the U.S. during this reporting period. This chapter deals with these operations, how they were organized and the progress achieved.

Thailand AC&W Radar System

The buildup of an aircraft control and warning (AC&W) radar system in Thailand began during 1959. Sufficient equipment was provided through the MAP to activate four short-range (AN/TPS-1D search and AN/TPS-10D height finder) radar sites at Don Muang, Korat, Udorn, and Phitsanulok. A communications network for these radar sites and major air bases was also provided under MAP.

During 1961 and early 1962 the situation in Laos deteriorated, resulting in the deployment of a large number of U.S. military forces to Thailand. During this same period, a joint JUSMAG-RTAF re-evaluation of the then existing Thai AC&W system resulted in the development of plans for expanding and improving Thailand's air space defense and for employment of tactical fighter,

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counterinsurgency, and airlift forces. The planning was "double-hatted" in that the proposed system would benefit all of SEA as well as Thailand, and would be a valuable extension of the PACAF AC&W Net.

On 3 May 1962, JUSMAG submitted a communication-electronics plan to CINCPAC for the RTAF containing recommendations for four long-range and five short-range (gap-filler) radar sites considered essential to provide the necessary coverage. The plan was developed jointly by JUSMAG-RTAF with tacit understanding that the U.S. would construct the sites, provide the equipment, install it, and furnish technical training and assistance. The RTAF would provide personnel and funds to operate and maintain the AC&W sites. Locations and estimated operational dates were determined to be as follows:

Long-range sites:	Green Hill - July 1963
	Udon - January 1964
	Ubon - January 1965
	Chieng Mai - July 1965
Gap-filler sites:	Phitsanulok - Operational
	Bangsung - January 1964
	Loei - March 1964
	Mukdahan - January 1965
	Lampang - July 1965 <sup>1</sup>

On 8 July 1962, CINCPAC approved the above plan as a guide for development of subsequent programs, subject to JUSMAG ability to fit the requirements into country dollar ceilings. Equipment for the system was requested in fiscal years 1962, 1963 and 1964 program

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1. Fact Sheet, 15 Jun 65, Subj: Thailand AC&W System.

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submissions. The RTAF agreed to defray the cost of construction of the gap-filler sites and to utilize the AN/TPS-1D radar sets already in-country, with MAP providing spare parts support. MAP support of personnel training, both in the U.S. and in the Pacific theater, was programmed and provided in consonance with the planned system.

Several revisions to the plan were made during 1962. One additional site near Korat was left in operation to provide low altitude coverage toward the Cambodian border. It was agreed that the site at Phitsanulok would remain operational but the other four sites would not be selected until after the long-range sites were operational, had been evaluated, and actual coverage gaps plotted.

In the interim, the following USAF mobile radars were placed in operation primarily to support U.S. military forces in Thailand: Ubon site containing MPS-11/14 radars, installed May 1962, and the Nakhon Phanom site containing MPS-11/40 radars, installed September 1964.

The issue of RTG support of the four long-range sites was originally presented to Air Marshal Dawee by JUSMAG on 9 July 1963. A reply to this subject indicated the matter of finances was causing indecision by the RTG. General Easterbrook's conclusion from RTG action was that the AC&W program was too ambitious for Thailand and should be reduced in scope. Also, that the AC&W program was being pushed too fast, and might require extending from one to three years. The Thai were "probing" to see if the U.S. would set up, maintain,

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and operate the complete AC&W system.

On 4 February 1964, JUSMAG recommended that CINCPAC halt the funds for Ubon and Chieng Mai until RTG gave assurance of support. CINCPAC concurred 29 February 1964 on withholding the funds as a test for ascertaining the RTG position on the radar sites. The U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, reluctant to make it an issue with RTG, asked CINCPAC on 9 March 1964, what the precise extent of U.S. interest in AC&W sites were. CINCPAC, on 11 March, stated the sites were important to the U.S., but that it was also desirable that the Thai operated them as agreed, and recommended application of pressure on the RTG as planned. In a meeting with the Ambassador on 16 March 1964, Air Marshal Dawee urged that the U.S. proceed with all four sites, but would not commit RTG support in writing.

On 20 March 1964, DEPCOMUSMACTHAI recommended weakening of the U.S. stand by going ahead with the sites at Udorn, Ubon, and Green Hill, but to still hold out on Chieng Mai (delaying it one year). The Ambassador concurred and CINCPAC indorsed it to the Secretary of Defense.<sup>3</sup> However, on 6 May 1964, the Thai cabinet turned down a military request for FY64 supplemental funding, and CINCPAC told JUSMAG to harden the U.S. position on Ubon and Chieng Mai sites. (Ubon site was delayed until March 1966).


On 3 July 1964, the AD Commander requested the 35th Tactical

2. MSG, JUSMAG to CINCPAC, 14 Jan 64.

3. Ltr, MACTHAI to CINCPAC, Subj: AC&W Sites, 20 Nov 64.

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Control Group undertake negotiations to secure Thai approval on the Radar Transfer and Use Agreement. He expressed hope that the Laotian crisis would make the task "less difficult," and indicated the AF Section JUSMAG and DEPCOMUSMACTHAI could act as coordinating agencies for approach to RTG. A letter for the 35th Tac Group stated that the AF Section was working on this problem but that nothing much could be done until a determination was made as to who, RTAF or USAF, was going to man and operate the sites on a full time basis.<sup>4</sup>

Although planning for the AC&W system was accomplished by a joint JUSMAG/RTAF effort, JUSMAG possessed no documentary evidence of the RTG's intent to support the four heavy radar and six gap-filler complex in its entirety. Lacking this assurance, CHJUSMAGTHAI could no longer justify continuation of plans to complete the AC&W complex as a MAP supported item and referred the problem to CINCPAC. CINCPAC cited a contingency requirement for the two fixed heavy radars at Chiang Mai and Ubon and for the four additional gap-filler radars as programmed. Their requirement was established in a concept for SEA TACS which was submitted to the JCS on 5 March 1965. This plan, among other things, provided for the USAF to fully man the radars at Chiang Mai and Ubon and to place augmenting forces into all other MAP radar sites in Thailand. On 20 May 1965, the JCS approved the CINCPAC ITACS (Integrated) concept for detailed planning and granted authority to initiate preplanning with military elements of the host country

<sup>4</sup>. Ltr, 2AD to 35th Tac Gp, Subj: Radar Transfer and Use Agreement.

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relative to implementation of the ITACS, subject to the approval of the U.S. Ambassador. This was to consist of discussions on military concepts with a view towards obtaining concurrence in principle of the ITACS. No commitments on the part of the U.S. were to be made at that time.

Separate guidance from CINCPAC, in May 1965, directed that CHJUSMACHTHAI and CINCPACAF arrive at an agreed funding position on unprogrammed facilities required to round out the AC&W system in Thailand, to ITACS standards. Accordingly, a meeting was held at JUSMAG during the period 1-4 June 1965, (13AF represented CINCPACAF) in which details regarding funding responsibilities, equipment configurations, and other items were tentatively agreed upon.

Final agreement concerning the radar sites was reached during October 1965. Agreements between COMUSMACTHAI and CINCPACAF called for PACAF to provide all support for Ubon and Chiang Mai AC&W sites, and that the Ubon BOD was 25 February 1966. COMUSMACTHAI recommended that "action be initiated immediately to prevent delay in accomplishment of PACAF responsibilities associated with meeting Ubon AC&W site BOD and operational date."<sup>5</sup>

JCS directed deployment of approximately 1,356 tactical control personnel on 27 October 1965, to augment the Thailand portion of SEATACS and the 6250th Air Support Group.<sup>6</sup>

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5. MSG, MACTHAI to CINCPAC, JTFC 65403, Oct 65

6. MSG, JCS 2705, DTG 272158Z, Oct 65

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A 2AD message to PACAF in October 1965, described the nature and cause of Thai concern over the introduction of additional U.S. military personnel into Thailand:

...In discussions with representatives of both 2AD and DEPCOMUSTHAI on introduction of SEATACS personnel into Thailand, all have emphasized the critical need for prior clearance and agreements with Thai Government. Concern is not so much for total personnel to be introduced but specific agreement and complete understanding by Thai as to the utilization of USAF personnel at each location...<sup>7</sup>

On 7 October 1965, in a message to CINCPACAF, COMUSMACTHAI summed up the following capability of radar sites in Thailand to accept SEATACS augmentation:

Green Hill: Control and Reporting Center (CRC) was operational and manned by 250 Thai personnel, 30 U.S. Army and 31 USAF. USAF was to add 107. Comment: "RTAF wishes to remain at this site and though amenable to buildup is at same time sensitive to such a large U.S. group."

Korat: Proposed location; 185 USAF personnel programmed.

Ubon: Control and Reporting Post (CRP) operational, manned by 69 USAF and 43 RTAF. Another 50 USAF to be added.

Mukdahan: Proposed location; 139 USAF personnel programmed.

Nakhon Phanom: CRP operational; 181 USAF personnel in place and 45 additional expected.

Bangsung: Proposed location; 56 USAF personnel needed.

Udon: CRP operational. Manned by 95 USAF and 150 RTAF. An additional 216 USAF personnel needed.

7. MSG, 2AD to PACAF, DPO0582, Oct 65.

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Phitsanuloke: RTAF site operational with 43 RTAF personnel in place. Proposed location of new USAF CRP and Direct Air Support Center (DASC). An additional 110 USAF personnel slated.

Chieng Mai: Proposed CRP with 160 USAF personnel manning planned.

Takhli: Proposed CRP to be manned by 70 USAF TACS personnel.

Sattahip: Proposed 21-man USAF communications detachment programmed.

Bang Sue: A seven man USAF maintenance detachment augmentation planned.

Phu Mu: Radio relay site operation. Four USAF personnel to be added.

Don Muang: Proposed communication detachment and additional seven USAF personnel planned.

Problem areas anticipated related mainly to construction of cantonment facilities for augmentation personnel.

In an evaluation report of MAP by CINCPAC on 26 November 1965, the following comments were made concerning the RTAF AC&W capability:

The ability of the RTAF to conduct AC&W and ground controlled interception (GCI) operations with USAF is considered at a high level. Observations at Green Hill and Udorn AC&W locations are solid evidence of this ability. The training of RTAF Forward Air Controllers and a revision and modernization of the Air Ground Operations School will improve compatibility between the two forces. No exercises were observed during the visit. Individual unit V-12 reports must be considered the basis for individual unit operational capability.<sup>8</sup>

8. Draft Rpt to CINCPAC Evaluation of MAP in Thailand, 26 Nov 65.

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Another, but altogether different, assessment of the RTAF AC&W net was sent to the Chief, AF Section JUSMAG from DEPCOMUSMACTHAI on 6 December 1965:

In general, the RTAF AC&W net is set up to operate in an air defense posture. In actual practice there is very little air defense capability in this system. There are several reasons for this including marginal individual training, primary emphasis on USAF offensive operations at the joint-manned sites (this goes so far at Green Hill as using the weapons assignment and surveillance scopes for control purposes), vagueness on the part of personnel about identification, scramble and intercept procedures and authority, less than minimum training participation by RTAF aircraft, and, in general, what appears to be a complete lack of systems training awareness.

We need to get going on establishing some semblance of an air defense system as soon as possible in Thailand and until SEATACS is fully implemented, the Thai portion of the in-country AC&W base plus Thai weapons resources seem to afford the most logical place to begin. The first step is to develop without delay an air defense systems training program for the RTAF if one does not already exist...<sup>9</sup>

#### Communications-Electronics

The Communications-Electronics (C&E) Base was established to provide a reliable "backbone" communications system in Thailand. This system would provide primary communications for COMUSMACTHAI in periods of normal operations. During contingencies, the C-E Base would satisfy the initial need of forces coming into the country.

The following major C-E programs were in effect during 1965:

1. Modifications for the TRC-90 were being designed to permit using the teletype multiplex equipment in tandem.

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<sup>9</sup> Memo to AF Section JUSMAG, From DEPCOMUSMACTHAI, 6 Dec 65. (S)

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2. CINCPAC directed Joint Circuit Allocation and Requirements Group (JOCARG) meetings to be held periodically to keep all agencies abreast of developments in C-E Base.

3. Technical control facilities were installed at Udorn, Warin, Korat, Takhli, Don Muang, and Bangkok.

4. Construction of cable plants were partially complete to provide interconnects at Ubon, Udorn, and Korat to eliminate the need for TRC-24 equipment.

5. The Philco Tropo was extended from Korat to Green Hill, Green Hill to Vung Tau (RVN), plus a microwave shot from Green Hill to Bangkok (MACTHAI Compound).

6. An AN/MRC-80 link was established between Sakol Nakhorn and Udorn to increase the reliability of communications service in Northeast Thailand.

7. An AN/MRC-98 link between Don Muang and Takhli; Takhli and Korat was fully operational with a 60-channel capability. The MRC-80 equipment which initially provided service between Don Muang-Takhli-Korat had been deactivated.


8. Formal site surveys were being conducted at site designated for installation of fixed plant Integrated Wideband Communications System equipment which would eventually replace the C-E Base.

Communication Facilities at Bang Ping and Bang Pla

On 9 August 1962, CHJUSMAG and the Thai Director of Civil Aviation Administration (CAA), Ministry of Communications (MOC),

10. Fact Sheet 15 Jan 66, Subj: C-E Base Thailand.

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
signed an agreement providing for joint U.S.-Thai construction and utilization of facilities to be located at Bang Ping and Bang Pla. The agreement spelled out the responsibilities in regard to items necessary for an operational transmitter and receiver site to support STRATCOM and Thai CAA communications operations.

Progress on the Bang Pla transmitter was held up due to the Thai CAA contractor's inability to complete the access road on time. This road was finally completed in April 1964, but the delay greatly reduced the amount of transmitter building construction the contractor was able to accomplish during the dry season. The Thai CAA completed contract negotiations for construction of the transmitter building. The estimate for completion of the transmitter building was 17 months after completion of the access road.

The terms of the Joint Usage Agreement charged the Thai MOC with the responsibility of providing an adequate filtered water supply at Bang Pla. The water was tested and found unfit for use. After considering several alternatives, it was determined that a pipeline from Bang Ping (where fresh water wells existed) to Bang Pla was the best method of supplying water to Bang Pla. The estimated cost of this project was \$225,000. JUSMAG funded for one third of the initial installation cost of the pipeline which was completed during November 1965.

STRATCOM was almost fully operational in the new receiver building at Bang Ping at the end of the year. However, the Bang Pla transmitter building occupancy was held in abeyance as a result of uneven settling of the first floor.

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As of the end of 1965, negotiations were being conducted between the United Kingdom and STRATCOM to formulate a joint use agreement for UK/U.S. joint utilization of those portions of the Bang Ping/Bang Pla complex which were designated as the U.S. portion in agreements with the Thai Department of Aviation.

11

MARK IV SYNCOM Terminal

The deteriorating military situation in SEA, coupled with communications support problems in connection with the rapid buildup of U.S. forces, resulted in the redeployment by CINCPAC of one MARK IV (satellite tracking station) terminal from Saigon.

The MARK IV (X), an easily transportable tactical communications terminal designed for communications via SYNCOM Satellite, consisted of a transmitter, receiver, manual tracking antenna, and associated terminating and power generating equipment. Site preparation consisted of land clearance and leveling. Once the site was prepared, the terminal could be installed and operational in less than 24 hours.


Necessary operating personnel and equipment for the terminal were airlifted to Korat on 26 April 1965. Associated equipment necessary for operations was airlifted to the site on 29 April 1965. The terminal was set up near the Philco Tropo site. It became operational on 3 May 1965.

On 23 August 1965, the Defense Communication Agency (DCA) directed redeployment of the MARK IV (X) from Korat to Asmara, Ethiopia. In turn the An/MS-44 SYNCOM terminal at Asmara was redeployed to

11. Fact Sheet, 15 Jan 66, Subj: Bang Ping Receiver Site and Bang Pla Transmitter Site.

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Saigon. Relocation of the AN/TSC-55 SYNCOM terminal from Saigon was  
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 made to Bang Ping. The TSC-55 was essentially the same as the MARK  
 IV (X) except that it had the capability of transmitting and re-  
 ceiving one voice channel and up to 16 teletype channels simultane-  
 ously. Cabling to connect the AN/TSC-55 at Bang Ping into the C-E  
 Base was underway at year's end. When finished, it would provide alternate  
 communications via satellite to such places as Saigon, Clark Air Base,  
 and Hawaii.

The redeployment was expected to result in increased satellite  
 13  
 communications service for USMACV and USMACTHAI.

Project "Red Marble"

The code word "Red Marble" was given for a project to provide  
 operational support for the RTAF AN/TRC-24 system (VHF Radio Com-  
 munications Trunk Service). Most of the funds, which were provided  
 by the USAF, were slated to provide service cost and per diem, to  
 insure continuous 24 hour operation of the system from Don Muang to  
 Udorn and Ubon, in return for service rendered to U.S. military units  
 in-country.

The system was installed by GEEIA during the latter part of 1961.  
 During this period, JUSMAG advised CINCPAC that the RTAF did not have  
 funds available to support this operation, and further added that the  
 system supported USAF requirements, not solely RTAF. As a result  
 CINCPAC continued MAP support on a quarterly basis, with JUSMAG having  
 funding responsibilities.

12. DCA MSG, DTG 232018Z Aug 65.

13. Fact Sheet, 15 Jan 66, Subj: Mark IV SYNCOM Terminal.

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
In April 1962, CINCPAC questioned the validity of JUSMAG use of MAP training funds for this requirement. JUSMAG replied to CINCPAC that the system was being used primarily in support of USAF requirements and MAP training was a secondary requirement. In May 1962, CINCPAC directed CINCPACAF to assume funding of the system at which time Project "Red Marble" was established.

During 1965, the RTAF AN/TRC-24 was still supporting the USAF in certain operations. In addition, the RTAF had provided circuits for U.S. Army use, and was providing back-up channels to certain USAF equipment in-country where the system was not supported by "Red Marble."

The continued USAF support of this system was considered mandatory to maintain sufficient back-up to U.S. system in-country. In view of the expansion of U.S. activities in SEA, it was considered by J-6 USMACTHAI, to be extremely unwise to withdraw MACTHAI support from the RTAF AN/TRC-24 system until assurance could be made that the U.S. military systems in-country could support all possible U.S. requirement.

However, a study conducted by J-6 in May 65 of U.S. communications in Thailand revealed that the U.S. would not be required to rely on the RTAF AN/TRC-24 system for communications support after FY66. Consequently, the RTAF was advised on 19 May 1965 that USAF funding of project "Red Marble" would terminate as of 30 June 1966. All circuits in the RTAF system which existed solely for the support of the U.S. installation or operation would be rerouted over U.S.

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communication systems on or before 30 June 1966.<sup>14</sup>

Thai Toll Telephone Network

A project to provide an adequate communications system for Thailand had been considered since 1951. Until 1961, numerous discussions took place and fundamental plans developed for establishing such a system adequate to meet requirements. During the planning it was established that the total dollar and local currency project requirements for the Thai system would be \$17 million, of which the Thai Government was to provide \$7 million. The U.S. was to make a grant of \$10 million, which included \$3 million in MAP funds.

In July 1961, USOM directed Television Associates of Indiana to prepare detailed specifications which would be satisfactory to all concerned. These were completed in October 1961, and the entire system was estimated to cost \$25 million.

On 19 October 1962, a \$13,337,000 contract was signed for toll zones one, two, and three. The contract specified that express circuits between Bangkok-Udon and Bangkok-Ubon would be completed within 350 days and the complete system operational within 500 days.

The system was completed, operationally tested, and turned over to the Thai Government in the early part of 1964. These facilities only provided limited service because of lack of central office terminating equipment at toll switching center, but the RTG was installing central office equipment during 1965. Upon completion of these facilities, toll service would become available. The U.S. military leased

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<sup>14</sup>. Fact Sheet, 15 Jan 66 Subj: Project "Red Marble".

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a small number of circuits in this system to monitor its overall  
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performance.

Military Assistance Program

The Thailand Military Assistance Program was under the staff supervision of the ACoFS, Logistics until October 1965. During the remainder of the year this responsibility was vested in the Military Assistance Directorate, a new activity in MACTHAI/JUSMAG organization.

The MA Program FY1965 began with a ceiling of 30.0 million dollars. During August 1964 a reduction of 1.3 million was ordered by CINCPAC thereby lowering the level to 28.7 million. Subsequently, during the period 1 January 1965 to 30 June 1965, three additions to the FY 65 program were approved by OSD raising the ceiling at the end of the fiscal year to 38.4 million dollars.

The MA Program FY1966 began with a ceiling of 27.0 million dollars. During October 1965 an addition of 12.5 million raised the level to 39.5. Additional increases to the FY1966 MA Program were under consideration but not yet approved by 31 December 1965. The additional funds approved included authority for construction, POL, major equipment, supplies, and training.

The FY1965 and 1966 MA Program additions were designed to increase the readiness posture of Royal Thai Armed Forces committed to the US/Thai Bi-Lateral Contingency Plan (Project 22). This and other associated plans provide a response to the steadily mounting subversion/insurgency activity in Northeast Thailand. Justification and

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15. Fact Sheet, 15 Jan 66 Subj: Thai Toll Telephone Net (AID).

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subsequent approval of the program additions were based on an increasing awareness of the Royal Thai Government of the insurgency threat and their agreement and positive actions to improve the maintenance and utilization of MAP equipment and raise the manning level of RTARF units. <sup>16</sup>

Construction Projects at Sattahip

The CHJUSMAG had long recognized the need for developing the logistical complex at the Sattahip Naval Base as an alternate for the vulnerable and inadequate port of Bangkok, and had encouraged the movement of the RTN fleet from Bangkok to Sattahip. Communist activities in SEA had emphasized the urgency of Sattahip development as a naval base/logistical complex especially in connection with U.S. contingency plans.

From 1957 through 1964, the following supporting facilities were programmed and completed through MAP for Sattahip:

- 1957 - RTMC facilities.
- 1958 - Dredging Sattahip harbor to average depth of 21 feet.
- 1959 - Water distribution system  
 Construction of naval station pier.
- 1960 - Rehabilitation of ship repair workshops.  
 Construction of Recruit Training Center.  
 Electrical distribution system.
- 1962 - Rehabilitation fuel pier.
- 1964 - Surgical wing addition to hospital.

The following MAP construction projects were active during this reporting period: Ammo/Cargo Pier (one-ship), five LST ramps, and a

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16. Interview with LtCol J.E. Padgett, MAP DIV, by Historian, 7 Apr 66.

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water supply/distribution project.

The design portion of an ammo/cargo pier at Toong Prong was completed on 15 May 1964. The construction contract for a one ship pier, 426 feet in length with mooring dolphins off either end, and access road to the main (Sukumvit) highway was awarded by OICC, Thailand to the ItalThai Corporation on 9 October 1964, with a scheduled completion date of October 1965. Actual bottom condition varied from that indicated in the preliminary surveys necessitating a design change and extension of the time frame until February 1966. Funding (U.S. contingency), in the amount of \$1,200,000 to expand the project to a two ship pier, was requested in the U.S. fiscal year 1966 budget. The extension contract would be written to inhibit any further delay of completion of the original one ship pier contract.

Two LST ramps at the Sattahip Naval Base were completed in January 1965. The site for the remaining three ramps was under study. A probable site was adjacent to the ramps already completed.

At the end of this reporting period, the contract for water exploration in the Toong Prong Valley was on schedule. OICC Thailand awarded a contract in June 1965, to tie four newly drilled productive wells with a total capacity of 300 gallons per minute into the then existing water supply. CINCPAC granted approval to CHJUSMAG request to deviate \$50,000, of the total \$152,600 A&E funds available, for this project to help alleviate the acute water shortage at Sattahip. This project was scheduled for completion during March 1966.

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Additional funds to support construction of the following facilities were contained in a MACTHAI request for a FY66 add-on:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Requested</u>	<u>Approved by CINCPAC</u>
Power supply	\$152,300	\$110,200
Fleet logistic facilities	1,568,100	356,000
Marine railway	500,000	No
Ammunition depot	502,700	502,700

Sattahip base workshop, with few exceptions, had the repair facilities similar to those of a large U.S. Navy repair ship or tender; it did not have the capabilities to undertake major hull repairs or repairs to ordnance, gyro compass, and instruments. The workshop complex consisted of an administration building and five shop buildings. The work force, as of December 1965, consisted of about 100 men and ten supervisory officers. The work force was to be steadily increased consistent with the public work projects then being undertaken and the increased use by the RTN fleet.

Continued emphasis was being placed on maximum utilization of the repair facilities at Sattahip for voyage repairs, upkeep periods, and complete overhauls of patrol, mine and landing craft. In this connection, it was expected that a minimum of 50 percent of all RTN fleet maintenance and repairs could eventually be performed at Sattahip, while the primary mission of the Royal Shipyard would become major overhauls, docking, and modernization of the larger ships. Culmination of these plans would be realized upon finalization of the shift of the Fleet Headquarters and base from Bangkok to Sattahip.

17. Fact Sheet, 16 Jan 66, Subj: Map Funding Construction Projects at Sattahip.

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Army Military Construction in Thailand

Prior to FY65 there was no Military Construction, Army, (MCA) program in Thailand. The 9th Logistical Command submitted their first projects on 15 May 1965, after Congress had approved supplemental appropriations for SEA. These projects were developed in coordination with the MACTHAI Exercises and Plans (E&P) Division, IX Corps Headquarters, and USARPAC. The purpose of this program was to improve the capability of the U.S. Army to support possible contingency operations in Thailand. SEATO plans, bi-lateral plans (Project 22) and U.S. contingency programs were used as the basis for developing projects.

Generally, the following projects submitted were slanted toward the improvement of the Army Logistics Base in Thailand:

<u>Project</u>	<u>Cost</u>
POL Pipeline	\$1,765,000
Korat Logistics Complex	12,406,000
Expansion Camp USARTHAI	2,268,000
Sattahip Logistics Complex	20,300,000
By-Pass Road Extension	6,650,000
Controlled Humidity Storage	960,000
Khon Kaen Airfield	2,085,032
LOC Improvements	26,400,000
Troop Cantonment	10,659,000
POL Operations (Troop Camps)	543,500
Total	\$84,036,532

A USARPAC message on 4 June 1965, approved and funded the following projects for Thailand:

18. Fact Sheet, 15 Jun 65, Subj: U.S. Army MCA Program Thailand.
19. USARPAC MSG 040457Z Jun 65 to COMUSMACTHAI.

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<u>Project</u>	<u>Funded</u>
Kabinburi-Korat Road Extension	\$6,000,000
Sattahip Port Development	800,000
Korat Tank Farm	500,000
Siracha-Don Muang POL Storage & Terminal	600,000
Thailand Troop Construction Base Camp	600,000
Total	\$8,500,000

On 16 June 1965, an additional FY66 project for construction of consolidated field maintenance facilities at Korat (cost: \$2,300,000) was approved by DEPCOMUSMACTHAI and forwarded to USARPAC.

The total cost for Army FY66 projects for Thailand was \$87.5 million.

On 18 June 1965, DEPCOMUSMACTHAI approved and forwarded the FY67 MCA for Thailand, consisting of projects totaling \$56,600,000.<sup>20</sup>

Facilities Development Program

The U.S. Facilities Development Program was established in Thailand to improve U.S. capability to support possible contingency operations. The objectives of the program were to provide living quarters, working facilities, and lines of communication for U.S. troops in Thailand.

The FY65 program provided for the following:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Service</u>	<u>Project</u>	<u>Cost(\$000)</u>
Kabin Buri-Korat	A	New road (1st inc)	6,000
Sattahip	A	Ammo Storage	800
Korat	A	POL storage	540
Siracha	A	POL storage (1st inc)	600
Thailand	A	Troop camps	800
Don Muang	AF	Base Facilities	2,524
Korat	AF	Base facilities	4,427
Nakhon Phanom	AF	Base facilities	16
Takhli	AF	Base facilities	5,611
Ubon	AF	Base facilities	5,609
Udorn	AF	Base facilities	2,797
Total:			29,724

20. See Footnote # 18.

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The FY66 funded program consisted of the following projects:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Service</u>	<u>Project</u>	<u>Cost (\$000)</u>
Korat	A	Logistics Complex, Ph I	7,300
Don Muang	AF	Electric Power	200
Sattahip	AF	Runway, Apron, Taxiway	11,965
Takhli	AF	Support Facilities	1,627
Udon	AF	Electric Power	140
		Total:	21,232

Future plans envision development of the Sattahip area as the major U.S. Army and Air Force logistic base in Thailand, to include a deep water port. An A&E study disclosed that a deep water port to accomodate ten vessels was economically feasible in the area of the RTN base at Sattahip. CINCPAC had proposed to JCS that a permanent pipeline be constructed from Siracha to Don Muang. The RTG approved this in principle and JCS had authorized design of the project; design contract was to be awarded in Jan 1966.

In March 1965, an updated priority listing of required contingency construction projects in SEA was received from CINCPAC. This list was sent to JCS for Congressional consideration of contingency construction requirements in FY66 military construction or preferably a supplemental FY65 appropriation.

On 25 Mar 1965, DEPCOMUSMACTHAI sent a message to CINCPAC giving construction requirements for Thailand in support of current and planned operations.

21. Fact Sheet, 13 Jan 66 Subj: U.S. Facilities Development Program Thailand.

22. CINCPAC MSG 120017Z, MAR 65.

23. DEPCOMUSMACTHAI MSG 250415Z, Mar 65.

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DA provided instructions to PACOM Component Commanders, on 8 April 1965, to the effect that CINCPAC construction priorities were to be reviewed and essential projects submitted by line items with complete justification in accordance with normal programming procedures. <sup>24</sup>

On 13 April 1965, CINCPAC advised Component Commanders that an integrated priority list had been established in accordance with JCS instructions and that projects should be submitted to DEPCOMUSMACTHAI before forwarding through CINCPAC to the various service headquarters. <sup>25</sup>

Throughout 1965, the priority listing was constantly revised and reviewed, adding and deleting certain projects and priorities. Eventually, the listing was streamlined until the following major projects evolved giving the bulk of the required projects to support contingency requirements: <sup>26</sup>

1. Sattahip airfield, port, and logistics complex.
2. Extension of the Bangkok by-pass road.
3. Rehabilitation of the Northeast road network.
4. POL Pipeline, Siracha - Don Muang.
5. Major airfield construction at Udorn, Ubon, Takhli, Korat, and Nakhon Phanom.
6. Relocation of the RTAF Flying School from Korat to Nakhon Pathom.
7. Construction of an additional jet-capable airfield.

24. DA MSG 082033Z, APR 65.

25. CINCPAC MSG 130214Z, APR 65.

26. See Footnote # 21.

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The RTN was expending a significant portion of their own budget in improving the operational and logistical capability of the Sattahip Naval complex. RTN/RTMC expenditures were in the general areas of barracks, BOQs, housing, utilities, roads, water development, construction of an air strip at Ban U Taphao, and improvements to Fleet Headquarters, Fleet Training Center and the workshop repair capability. These projects were compatible with and complementary to U.S. construction efforts in the area.

## \* Airfield Construction Plans (Sattahip)

On 28 April 1965, CSAF requested CINCPACAF perform a survey of suitable airfields in Thailand for ultimate development as an aerial port and a review of the feasibility of developing Sattahip into a combined air-land-sea logistic point for Thailand. The latter was to be conducted by USARPAC. The CINCPACAF reply on 23 May stated that Ban U Taphao, Naval Air Station (Sattahip) appeared to be the most suitable area for ultimate development as an aerial port. The site was subsequently selected and approval granted for construction, for a runway, associated operation, and living facilities.

CINCPACAF planning guidance for the airfield was:

1. Aircraft base loading: 25-30 KC-135s Main Operating Base (MOB), three Tactical Fighter Squadrons (F-4C) MOB, six air defense aircraft (F-4C), two PACAF C-130 squadrons, and 16 MATS transient aircraft

27. See Footnote # 19.

28. CSAF MSG 282154, APR 64 to CINCPACAF.

29. CINCPACAF MSG 230354Z MAY 64 to CSAF.

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(C-130, C-124 and C-141).

2. Estimated base population of 4,000 personnel.
  3. Dual concrete runways with one 11,500' x 200', plus overruns, and taxiways wide enough to accomodate B-52 operations.
  4. Support facilities to accommodate the full base mission.
- Planned USAF operational by July 1966.

Special Logistics Actions

A Special Logistics Action Thailand (SLAT) agreement to strengthen logistics facilities within Thailand was signed on 19 March 1963, by the U.S. and Thai governments. It provided for the following reciprocal actions:

1. The U.S. was to furnish ten locomotives and 100 POL cars to the RTG. In the event of a contingency requiring commitment of U.S. or other SEATO Forces, the RTG was to allocate this equipment to support committed forces.
2. The U.S. was to construct an airfield 12 kilometers west of Nakhon Phanom. Upon completion, this facility would become property of the RTG. The RTG agreed to make necessary land available at no cost to the U.S., maintain the field during peacetime and permit U.S. and other SEATO forces to use it for training and to support contingency operations.
3. To reduce reaction time of U.S. and other SEATO Forces the U.S. proposed to construct two depots, one located at Korat and another in Udorn and to preposition U.S. Engineer and ordnance

30. CINCPACAF MSG DPL54331, DTG 160122Z SEP 65.

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equipment. At these locations RTG agreed to make necessary land available and insure continued availability of these depots at no cost to the U.S.

As of 31 December 1965, the status of these agreements was as follows:

1. All ten locomotives were issued to the RTG but subsequent operational tests determined them unacceptable. They were to be replaced by the General Electric Company during 1966.

2. A forward logistics airfield with a 6000' by 100' runway, plus taxiway and parking area, was constructed twelve kilometers west of Nakhon Phanom by USN Mobile Construction Bn Number Three. The airfield was turned over to the RTAF in mid-December 1963, in accordance with the SIAT agreement.


3. The depots at Korat and Udorn were constructed by the USA 561st Engineer Co. Ordnance materiel amounting to 43,600 tons, with a value of \$27 million, was stored at the two depots by the 9th<sup>31</sup> Logistical Command.

### POL Pipeline and Storage Programs

Under the provisions of SIAT, a Victaulic (coupled) type pipeline was prepositioned in Thailand for installation in support of CINCPAC OPlans. This pipeline was stored at the 9th Logistical Command, Korat. The original planned length of the entire pipeline was 238 miles and estimated cost was \$6,500,000.

<sup>31</sup>. Fact Sheet, 13 Jan 66, Subj: SIAT.

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Justification for the POL pipeline was that it would:

1. Provide a pipeline from Siracha to Don Muang.
2. The requirement for pre-positioned tactical line assets remained valid for potential augmentation of up-country support under conditions of full deployment of U.S. forces.
3. The route of the line from Siracha to Don Muang via Chachoengsao would permit off-take of a tactical line paralleling the by-pass road to Korat.
4. Further extensions either by tactical or permanent pipe could be made to Saraburi, Takhli, Korat, etc.

An A&E study would determine the pipe size and adequate throughput capacity for U.S. and Thai military requirements. The Siracha Terminal would have welded steel tanks with T-5 tanker discharge capability and tank capacity for reserve and operating stocks. Tankage at the up-country line terminals should be welded steel construction and be adequate for efficient multi-product operations. Operation and maintenance would be controlled by a joint U.S./Thai Military agency.

Included in the pipeline system were 36 10,000 barrel (bbl) bolted steel tanks, pumping stations, manifolds, and related ancillary equipment. Early in 1965, CINCPAC directed that the system be installed in part.

The following actions were accomplished during this reporting period:

32. Fact Sheet, 13 Jan 66 Subj: POL Pipeline.

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1. Five 10,000 bbl tanks which were being constructed by a civilian contractor at Udorn, were approximately 92 percent completed with BOD of 15 February 1966.
2. Four 10,000 bbl tanks also being constructed by a civilian contractor at Ubon, were approximately 67 percent completed with BOD of 15 February 1966.
3. Nine 10,000 bbl tanks were being constructed by the 697th Engr Co (Pipeline) at Korat and was approximately 35 percent complete with BOD of 28 February 1966.

JCS/OSD approval and funds were requested in the fall of 1965 for earliest possible construction, with the latest estimated cost being \$9,300,000. Funds and a contract were expected to be finalized in early 1966 to build a permanent pipeline from Siracha to Chachoengsao to Don Muang, to include submarine pipeline and tankage at Siracha, stub off at Chachoengsao, and tankage approximately seven kilometers north of Don Muang.

The FY66 Emergency Military Construction Program included a program for installing pump station bases and drainage for a tactical pipeline from Chachoengsao to Korat, generally following the trace of the Bangkok by-pass road and extension. The actual pipeline construction still required approval of RTG.

## Bangkok By-Pass Road

Contingency planning and requirements dictated the necessity of having alternate port facilities and clear lines of communications (LOC's) from an area other than the Bangkok Port. The restricted

33. Fact Sheet, 13 Jan 66 Subj: Tankage Erection Program Thailand.

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width and channel clearance, common to the Bangkok Port, could easily be blocked by sabotage or aerial attack.

The port chosen at Sattahip had some undesirable LOC's to Korat, by-passing the Bangkok area. A proposed by-pass road extension would materially assist in providing a better, more direct route to increase the daily tonnage movement capabilities from Sattahip via Kabinburi to Korat.

The 809th Engineer Battalion (Bn) arrived in Thailand during February 1962. With augmentation by the 561st Thai Engr Co., this Bn was to be actively engaged in completing the Bangkok by-pass road from Chachoengsao to Kabinburi.

In late 1965, L&A Division and 9th Log Command coordinated to determine costs for material and labor for the by-pass road. Three types of road ranging from a severe military type to a commercially built paved road were considered. Ultimately a road with civilian standards was constructed by the 809th Engr Bn. Necessary augmentation of military units and equipment, in addition to those already in-country, had to be programmed. Troop unit change request was submitted to allow augmentation of the 9th Log Command to absorb these incoming troops. The 538th Engr Bn arrived in August 1965 to begin construction of this extension to Korat.

At the end of 1965, the Bangkok by-pass road was 93 percent completed with approximately 86 percent of the asphalt surfacing completed. The road was 22 feet wide and 94.5 kilometers in length. Upon completion, the total cost would be in excess of \$12 million

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(MAP), with a total overall cost of over \$28 million (funded and unfunded).

The estimated completion date of the Bangkok by-pass road was February 1966. The BOD for the extension, military road concept, was September 1966.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>34</sup>. Fact Sheet 13 Jan 66, Subj: Bangkok By-Pass Road and Proposed Extension.

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Part IV

SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS

...U.S. success or failure in Laos and South Vietnam will ultimately answer the question of insurgency in Thailand.<sup>1</sup>

The increased aggressiveness of the Communists in Thailand during 1965 suggested that the pattern of subversive activity had intensified and would continue to grow unless it could be suppressed. Although the stability of the government was not in imminent danger, the switch of Communist activities from a defensive to an offensive campaign threatened the credibility and efficacy of the RTG security commitment in certain isolated sections of the country and presented a potential threat to U.S. personnel and installations in Thailand.

The Communist Threat

Chinese Communist designs on Thailand have been evident since the early 1950s when the "Sibsong Panna Autonomous Region" of Thai people was established in Southern Yunnan, China. Since that time, there have been sporadic, but recurring reports of subversive elements operating in Thailand, especially in the Northeast. Their efforts in the past appeared to have met with a marked lack of success. However, in late 1964, evidence began to accumulate which suggested some successful limited subversive organizational efforts in Nakhon Phanom Province, with the

1. Weekly Intelligence Digest (WID) #17-65, 23 Apr 65.

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formation of the Thailand Independence Movement (TIM).<sup>2</sup>

Communist subversion within Northeast Thailand appeared to have significant links outside the country: Communist China, and perhaps North Vietnam, and Communist areas in Laos. During the early part of 1965, in the peninsula area along the Malaysian border, a potentially significant subversive threat was presented by the existence of 400-600 well trained terrorists, the remnants of the Malay Races Liberation Army driven from Malaya in 1959-60. In addition, the separatist tendencies of the Thai Muslim population was reportedly being exploited by Indonesian elements.<sup>3</sup>


The known centers and types of subversive activity in Thailand were: (1) Northeast Thailand (mostly reports of arms caches, guerrilla warfare training, and propaganda), in provinces of Nakhon Phanom, Sakol Nakhon and Kalasin; (2) Communist indoctrination, apparently North Vietnamese Government, carried out among the 35,000 Vietnamese refugees concentrated in the Thai provinces along the Mekong River, but especially in Nakhon Phanom, Nongkhai and Udorn; (3) Communist terrorist activity in the four southernmost provinces, bordering Malaysia; (4) Intermittent reports of occasional Communist organizational and propaganda activity in the Bangkok area and in some villages of the central plains.<sup>4</sup>

2. JTJ2 Weekly Intelligence Summary, 22 Feb 66.

3. Chronology of Subversive Actions in Thailand, 1 Jan-31 May 1965.

4. Ibid.

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In a report to the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand on 11 June 1965, General Easterbrook stated, "the increasing tempo of Communist activity in the Northeast gives just reason to re-examine the counterinsurgency machinery in Thailand".<sup>5</sup>

On 1 January 1965, the Thailand Patriotic Front (TPF), a Communist-front organization ostensibly organized among the people of Thailand, was formed. In fact, circumstances indicated that it was organized in Communist China "probably among the coterie of Thai Communists who have resided there for many years". Besides utilization of radio broadcasts to the Thai nation, propaganda activities of the Front were carried on within Thailand, via the clandestine periodical "Independence" and by occasional leaflets. The Front called for unified action in support of its program. "It will cooperate with other groups and political parties who approve of the program, so that the battle can be waged against the Americans and the Thai Government."

The TPF openly declared its objectives in a radio broadcast over the "Voice of the People of Thailand" (clandestine), on 23 January 1965. It was reported that the broadcast was in the Thai language and apparently emanated from Peking.<sup>6</sup>

Nakhon Phanom Security Operation

During 1964, nine government officials and police informers were assassinated in the area of Nakhon Phanom. A number of

5. Memo for the Ambassador, 11 Jun 65, Subj: Counterinsurgency Leadership in Thailand.

6. Memo for the Ambassador, 11 Jun 65, Incl 1.

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others, including local school teachers and MDU officials, had been threatened. All available evidence indicated that the organization behind this terrorism was a band of Communist insurgents operating in the nearby Phu Phan Mountain range. It was believed that this operation was receiving substantial materiel and moral support from Laos, where some of the cadre reportedly had been trained.

A plan calling for the following counteractions was developed by the National Security Command (NSC) on 22 December 1964:

1. Increased intelligence effort by Border Patrol Police, (BPP), Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC).
2. Increased police and military presence in the region.
3. A termination of precipitant arrests.
4. Development of more effective civic action programs through MDU's.
5. The institution of an inter-agency coordination committee and activation of National Security Northeast Command as a regional headquarters to direct the operation.

A security sweep of the Nakhon Phanom region was scheduled to begin on 2 February 1965.

Twelve Provisional Police (PP)/BPP teams were to set up 12 blocking positions on the perimeter of the "sweep" area. At first light on 3 February, 12 additional teams were to commence clearing operations of 12 designated zones for seven days. Upon

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the completion of this initial sweep, two more sweeps were to be conducted successively for the same period of time. The entire sweep operation was to last 21 days.

The operation began with some confusion. Some of the participating elements arrived in position one day late; troops were delivered to the wrong areas; helicopters to be used were discovered at the last moment to be non-operational. A supporting police detachment arrived minus its commanding officer. Field gear for the participating troops did not arrive until 5 February. Until its arrival, patrols were limited to short reconnaissance missions, returning each day to their base camp.

By the conclusion of the operation, 38 persons had been arrested. Five of these were known Communists whose names had appeared on RTG lists. Most, however, were apprehended for failing to produce an identity card.<sup>7</sup>

General Easterbrook reported on 11 June 1965, "The ostentatious government action in Nakhon Phanom Province this past February was pitifully inadequate and probably served only to further darken the government image in that area. Since this futile attempt, moreover, there appears to have been little done to revamp the national security apparatus or policies. Unless some readjustment is done with the existing system, however, it appears that future operations will be doomed with the same political meddling, confusion and lack of coordination

7. Ibid.

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which accompanied the Nakhon Phanom failure."<sup>8</sup>

Increased Communist Activity

It was reported in July 1965, that sabotage of U.S. installations in Thailand was planned, partly in reprisal for U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and Communist positions in Laos, and partly as stepped-up opposition to the U.S. presence in Thailand. "It has been reported by Thai sources that Chinese and Vietnamese Communists who are resident in Thailand have been directed to carry out acts of sabotage and terror against U.S. installations and personnel in Thailand."<sup>9</sup>

August witnessed a slow rise in attempted assassinations in the Northeast; a drop in these attempts in September was followed by another rise in October.

Security developments during November signified a change in the pattern of subversive activity in Thailand. A noteworthy chain of events began on 1 November, the first anniversary of the TIM. A communique, issued by TIM, stated that the Central Committee of TIM had unanimously agreed to become a member of the TPF and to follow their political guidance. "...The merger of these two organizations is the third step in current Communist moves to establish a united front which appears to be the apparatus that will be used for achievement of

<sup>8</sup>. See Footnote # 4

<sup>9</sup>. WID # 30-65, 23 Jul 65

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Communist objectives in that country. Steps one and two were the announcements of the formation of the TIM and TPF on 1 November 1964 and 1 January 1965.<sup>10</sup>

In mid-November 1965, the Communist Party of Thailand reportedly informed party members that a decision had been reached to take up arms. Members were informed that the switch from a defensive to an offensive campaign was made possible by acquisition of sufficient arms, availability of additional arms and troops from Laos if required, and establishment of a system of coordination among provinces in the Northeast, North and South.<sup>11</sup>

The rising intensity of subversive activity during November paralleled the Communist announcements. During the course of the month there were 16 attempted assassinations, all in the Northeast. In addition, an encounter with an armed subversive band on 27 November, resulted in two PP being wounded and a VDC member killed.<sup>12</sup>

The rapid pace of events continued into December which witnessed an attack on a Border Information Center (BIC). An additional nine assassination attempts were recorded during the month.

Second Nakhon Phanom Province "Sweep"

Following the attack on the BIC on 21 December, Governor

10. WID # 50-65, 10 Dec 65.

11. Ibid.

12. WID # 3-66.

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Sawat of Nakhon Phanom Province directed a suppression operation against Communists believed to be camped in the Phu Phan Mountain complex. Two hundred and fifty policemen were assembled to sweep the Lub I Loet Valley to apprehend or eliminate a band of 50 to 100 subversives. As the police moved into position for the sweep on 27 December, they encountered an unknown number of Communists. A policeman was killed and the Communists withdrew into the jungle. Air support was requested and the RTAF flew 12 sorties against Communist positions. By noon on the 29th, police had clashed seven times with the Communists. No Communists were killed. One band reportedly sighted by the police was estimated at 100 men. The Commissioner of Provincial Police inspected police positions on 29 December and decided that they were incapable of conducting the operation effectively and recommended  
13  
RTA support.

General Prapass agreed that drastic action was required and ordered elements of the RTA into the Phu Phan Mountain complex. On 31 December the Army started their sweep, preceded by air strikes. Several minor fire fights were reported, but no significant encounters were forthcoming. Unconfirmed reports gave the Communist casualties as eight killed by air strikes, two killed by booby traps and five food porters captured. Government casualties included the policeman killed the first day and three policemen wounded by one of their own booby traps.

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13. Ibid.

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The RTG, alarmed with the seriousness of the Communist threat, overcame their previous reluctance to use the Army in suppressive operations. Additionally, they recognized the need for better cooperation and coordination among various government agencies involved in suppressive actions. However, the officials appeared determined to employ a force sufficient only to scatter Communist bands, inflict casualties, and capture prisoners to acquire more intelligence on the insurgent threat.<sup>14</sup>

#### Installation Security

The primary security threat to Thailand in 1965 was subversion. During the year it was characterized by bolder ventures in the Northeast and increased agitation by the separatists in the South. The overall situation did not become critical until the end of 1965. The U.S. Ambassador to Thailand characterized this situation by saying "...we are moving into a new and more serious phase of insurgency in Thailand... It is obvious that the time to check and reverse these developments is now..."<sup>15</sup> These developments caused a great deal of concern, by U.S. and Thai officials, over the security of installations in Thailand.

U.S. installations and activities requiring security were located at Don Muang, Takhli, Udorn, Korat, Nakhon Phanom, Ubon,

14. Ibid.

15. AMEMB BKK MSG, DTG 311025Z, DEC 65.

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Sarachi, Sattahip, Bangkok port facilities, and 13 small signal detachments.

The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 17 October 1950, did not provide for the arming of U.S. military personnel in Thailand, nor did U.S. policy in Thailand support the arming of personnel.

Thailand, as a sovereign nation, was responsible for the basic security of all installations within the country. Through special arrangements, authority existed for continued arming of special U.S. persons to include top secret couriers, agent finance officers, and personnel inside radar vans and other rooms containing classified material. Security guards were<sup>16</sup> precluded from carrying arms.

The reason U.S. hesitated to "press Thai for any different arrangement on the carrying of fire arms" was that it might "immediately result in intensive Thai pressure over the status<sup>17</sup> of forces agreement."

For normal conditions the installation security arrangement envisaged maximum reliance on physical security devices such as fences, lights, warning signs, alarm systems, and installation layout; however, a growing number of sabotage alerts and minor incidents necessitated a general review of the security potential situation.

16. DEPCOMUSMACTHAI MSG to CINCPAC, 4 Mar 65.

17. AMEMB BKK MSG to CINCPAC DTG 041210Z, Mar 65.

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The then existing policy permitted only Thai military guards to carry firearms, but these guards were considered insufficient in number to provide adequate coverage of vital areas and resources.

On 31 March 1965, General Easterbrook wrote the Chief of Staff, Thai Supreme Command, proposing that Thai civilian guards be employed to provide security to U.S. installations and be allowed to carry firearms. In reply, the Chief of Staff ruled out the proposal as being "impracticable as well as illegitimate" and offered instead "that reserves be called out to active duty on a voluntary basis and form a guard force for ...U.S. installations requiring the services of armed guards." He reasoned that by making the guard force military or para-military there would be no problem of arming them. All that needed to be done was change the status of the civilian guards to military status to permit their carrying arms. The U.S. would, of course, continue "to allocate funds for pay and other administration" of these guards.<sup>18</sup> The plan was mutually acceptable, but once started, negotiations bogged down mainly on the issues of cost and operational control.

On 6 August 1965, a conference was convened by General Kriangsak at Supreme Command Headquarters and subsequent meetings resulted in a draft agreement containing the following provisions:

<sup>18</sup>. Ltr, Air Marshal Dawee to General Easterbrook, 22 Apr 65.

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1. Approximately 2,000 Thai reservists would be called to active duty to constitute a two battalion regiment with headquarters at Korat. One battalion would be designated as an RTA unit and the other an RTAF unit. Key command and staff personnel for the organization would come from regular RTA and RTAF units.

2. Arms for this force, consisting of riot type shotguns and M1 carbines, would be provided by the U.S. service whose installation was secured. Total arms to be furnished was estimated at 315 from U.S. Army and 500 from the USAF.

Training for reservists would include a one-week refresher of basic training followed by on-site OJT supervised by an active service commander and assisted by U.S. training cadre as required.

4. Uniforms, equipment, billeting, and administrative facilities would be provided by the U.S. Costs involving pay, emergency hospitalization, accidental disability for guards, per diem, official travel, and staffing the organization were to be borne by CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, and DEPCHJUSMAG on a pro-rate basis.

It was calculated that all guards could be on-site 47 days after the agreement was signed.

On 25 September 1965, CINCPAC concurred in the terms of the proposed agreement and requested approval from JCS.

With regard to the funding procedures for this program, it was proposed that the MACTHAI Comptroller would receive

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obligation authority from component commands and make a consolidated payment to SCHQ. One-time investment costs were estimated at \$165,000, with annual operating costs estimated at \$2.5 million. Approximate shares were pro-rated as follows: U.S. Army \$900,000; U.S. Air Force \$1.25 million; and DEPCHJUSMAG \$250,000. 19

As of the end of this reporting period, the MACTHAI/MOD draft agreement was approved by DOD, which in turn appointed the Department of the Air Force as executive agent for the program. 20  
Final negotiation with the Thai Supreme Command was to be completed during January 1966.

#### Counterinsurgency Field Training

In December 1962, the first counterinsurgency field training exercise was held in Thailand. This exercise, named Adisorn I, was a modest scale maneuver involving approximately 1000 troops under the guidance of a U.S. Special Forces MPT. Adisorn I provided the impetus for further counterinsurgency training in Thailand.

In March 1963, JUSMAG presented a recommendation to the RTA for another counterinsurgency exercise to be held early in the following year. This exercise, named Kitti Q7, was conducted during February 1964. It was designated as a follow-up to Exercise Adisorn I to continue the training of troop units in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare operations and to

19. Fact Sheet, 15 Jan 66, Subj: Base Security.

20. Msg, AFCA181036, DTG 301632Z Dec 65.

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insure the continuation of emphasis upon joint counterinsurgency training. Although the 1964 exercise was criticized severely on many counts, the fact remained that it provided a more lively springboard for future exercises than did its predecessor. Twelve battalion combat teams (BCT's) forming the counterinsurgent forces, were opposed by 800 aggressors. The latter included Thai and 116 U.S. Special Forces troops.

JUSMAG planning for Kitti 08 started immediately after the completion of Kitti 07. A joint-combined meeting of U.S. and Thai personnel was held in April 1964, wherein a general agreement was reached as to the degree of participation by both nations. It was agreed that another counterinsurgency exercise would be conducted in 1965, and that U.S. and Thai Special Forces troops would participate as aggressor elements against the RCT's. The U.S. Navy and RTN requested a separate exercise called Jungle Drum III which would run concurrently with Kitti 08. The contemplated maneuvers received official approval from Prime Minister Thanom and CINCPAC.

In October 1964, key personnel were replaced at Army Field Forces (AFF). Consequently, the basic concept of the exercise was altered. On 3 November 1964, the exercise was officially decentralized. At that time, representatives from the four military areas were summoned to AFF Headquarters, given guidance on previous joint planning, and informed that the exercise was their responsibility. AFF Headquarters followed up the

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decentralization with a letter to CINCRTA requesting the Maneuver Director Headquarters be dissolved due to the expense involved. The request was granted and the exercise was subsequently conducted as four separate training exercises without a central command and control headquarters.


Exercise Kitti 08 was conducted during the period 13 February 30 March 1965. The exercise involved RTA, RTAF, BPP and VDC forces in four guerrilla warfare operational areas established in Northern, Northeastern, Southern, and Central Thailand, one guerrilla warfare operational area in each military area.

The primary objectives of Exercise Kitti 08 were:

1. To increase proficiency in planning and conducting counterinsurgency operations at Army, Military Circle, Regimental Combat Team, and Battalion Combat Team levels.
2. To provide additional experience in joint planning and conduct of counterinsurgency operations by all the RTAF in conjunction with designated elements of U.S. Forces.
3. To increase proficiency in planning and conducting civic actions and psychological operations as a coordinated part of the overall counterinsurgency effort.
4. To provide additional training for RTA Special Forces in the planning, organization, and conduct of unconventional warfare operations.

The evaluation of Exercise Kitti 08 concluded that it was

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a successful counterinsurgency field training exercise.

As of the end of this reporting period, no counterinsurgency exercise was planned for 1966. Lack of money and personnel were cited as principal reasons.


### National Security Command

On 10 April 1962, the National Security Command (NSC) was organized by MOD and approved by the Council of Ministers to fulfill the need for a body capable of influencing positive national policy formulation and implementation. The NSC was organized within the Office of the Prime Minister and charged with the coordination and conduct of all countersubversive programs within Thailand. The Prime Minister headed a policy board and advisory group to assist him in the control and guidance of the agency.

The NSC provided a geographic command structure. The NSC headquarters directed and supported the three regional commands North, Northeast and South.

From its inception the NSC showed great promise and was beginning to gain acceptance by the RTG. Although the organization was heavily weighted with military personnel, there were enough civilian and police officials included to make it a truly representative organization. Consequently, the problems of acceptance were greatly reduced. Command control from the central command to the three regional commands was being effectively extended only in the Southern areas.

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The NSC had acted efficiently and expeditiously in support of the MDU's. By using the combined resources of the government, 13 MDU's have been established since August 1962. The Village Radio Program was also controlled by the NSC.

The NSC was given responsibility for the passive suppression of ex-communist terrorists and separatist movements in Southern  
21  
Thailand.

Communist Suppression Headquarters

On 14 December 1965, the RTG issued an order establishing the Communist Suppression Headquarters. General Prapass, in his capacity as Minister of the Interior, was placed in charge. This headquarters assumed overall direction of the communist suppression operation in Thailand and was empowered to take any action not prohibited by law.

Communist Suppression Headquarters was officially organized on 17 December 1965, having representation from the Royal Thai  
22  
Armed Forces, Police and various civil governmental agencies.

Mobile Development Unit


In 1962, Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat sought a means to eliminate the basic problem of lack of communications and low state of economic development then existing in the remote border regions of Thailand. The RTG's proposed solution to this problem was the institution of the NSC and its first major positive

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21. Fact Sheet, 15 Jun 65, Subj: National Security Command.

22. Fact Sheet, 11 Mar 66, Subj: Communist Suppression Hq.

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program, the MDU.

After establishing a suppression mechanism, the NSC announced its intention to emphasize positive countersubversion prevention programs. The extension of the NSC's action into critical security areas was provided in the form of the MDU.

Created by the NSC to execute a large scale positive countersubversion program in a designated target area in remote region areas, each MDU consisted of approximately 120 military and civilian officers. Each MDU was formed and trained for operations in a specific area, employing civic action and psychological activities as the base for accomplishing its mission.

From the beginning of the MDU program, \$1.5 million worth of equipment and supplies were procured under MAP. This included radios, heavy road building equipment, farm tractors, well drilling rigs, and medical supplies. In FY 64, USOM assumed funding assistance to the MDU program and provided \$1.7 million in AID funds to procure equipment for three road construction units and additional audio visual units. In FY 65, AID provided \$352,000 for additional equipment for road construction units.

USOM programmed \$433,000 in FY 66 to complete equipping of the road construction units and to provide them with POL.

As of 31 December 1965, the following MDU's were in operation:

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<u>Date Instituted</u>	<u>Location</u>
Aug 1962	Kalasin
Jan 1963	Sakhon Nakhon
May 1963	Nakhon Phanom
Sep 1963	Narathinat
Sep 1963	Yala
Jan 1964	Nong Khai
Apr 1964	Udorn
Nov 1964	Loei
Dec 1964	Ubol
May 1965	Uttaradit
May 1965	Nan
Oct 1965	Pattani
Oct 1965	Satun

The MDU program will be continued with more units being planned by the NSC. Efforts will also be made to eventually cover the entire border areas of Thailand.

#### Village Radio Program

The Village Radio Communications Project was directed by Secretary of Defense in 1962 to provide a communications system for passing warning of subversive activities from Border Tambols (Townships) and Amphurs (Districts) to a centralized command. The system would also be used for reporting unusual incidents and requesting assistance from BPP, PP and Thai Military Forces, if required.

During 1962, a pilot program was established in the North-east area of Thailand, utilizing 243 transceivers (TR-20s) to provide a six month evaluation of the communications system.

The evaluation test began on 1 January 1963. Transceivers were installed and operated in 37 Amphurs and 148 Tambols.

23. Fact Sheet, 15 Jan 66 Subj: Mobile Development Unit.

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After the evaluation, JUSMAG was convinced that the Thai Government, and the Minister of Interior in particular, had a valid requirement for the Village Radio Communications System and recommended 2,431 sets be programmed.

The MAP budget for FY64 had 783 sets programmed. CINCPAC cut the program to 384 sets, plus generators and test equipment, and directed JUSMAG to contact USOM relative to the program. USOM conducted a survey of the Radio Program and determined it did not support their Public Safety Program. This information was submitted to the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand who in turn requested JUSMAG's comments on the USOM position. JUSMAG recommended the Village Radio Program be continued as programmed with USOM funding.

At the request of the Ambassador, a survey of the system was performed and reported that the limited program was serving a useful purpose. They recommended it be continued and expanded. At the close of this reporting period the 384 sets authorized in FY64 MAP were being distributed to Amphurs and Tambols in the Northeast. USOM had received \$900,000 in FY66 funds to provide the approximately 1500 additional transceivers required to  
24  
complete the program.

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24. Fact Sheet, 15 Jan 66, Subj: Village Radio Program.

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GLOSSARY

ABAT	Air Base Advisory Team
ACofS	Assistant Chief of Staff
ADA	Air Defense Artillery
AFAG	Air Force Advisory Group
A&E	Architectural Engineering
AFF	Army Field Forces
AG	Adjutant General
AGE	Aerospace Ground Equipment
AID	Agency for International Development
ALO	Air Liaison Officer
AMEMB	American Embassy
AOC	Air Operations Center
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
ARAG	Army Advisory Group
ARD	Accelerated Rural Development
ARPA	Advance Research Projects Agency
AW	Automatic Weapon
BCT	Battalion Combat Team
BOD	Beneficial Occupancy Date
BPP	Border Patrol Police
C^A	Civil Aviation Administration
C-E	Communications - Electronics
CHJUSMAG	Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group
CID	Criminal Investigation Division
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
CINCPACAF	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Force
CINCPACFLT	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCUSARPAC	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific
COMUSMACTHAI	Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand
COMUSMACV	Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
CONUS	Continental United States
CRC	Control and Reporting Center
CSG	Combat Support Group
CRP	Control and Reporting Post
C/S	Chief of Staff
CTSP	Contract Technical Service Personnel
DA	Department of the Army
DASC	Direct Air Support Center
DCS	Deputy Chief of Staff
DSA	Defense Supply Agency
DTG	Date Time Group
E&P	Exercise and Plans
FAC	Forward Air Controller
GCA	Ground Control Approach
GCI	Ground Controlled Interception
GNP	Gross National Product

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GLOSSARY (Cont'd)

IO	Information Officer
IR	Intelligence Reporting
ITACS	Integrated Tactical Air Control System
J 1	Asst Chief of Staff, Personnel
J 2	Asst Chief of Staff, Intelligence
J 3	Asst Chief of Staff, Operations
J 4	Asst Chief of Staff, Logistics
J 5	Asst Chief of Staff, Plans
J 6	Asst Chief of Staff, Communications-Electronics
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSO	Joint Staff Operation
JTD	Joint Table of Distribution
JUSMAG	Joint United States Military Advisory Group
L&A	Logistics and Administration
LVT	Landing Vehicle, Tracked
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MACT(HAI)	Military Assistance Command, Thailand
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MATP	Military Assistance Training Program
MCA	Military Construction Army
MCP	Master Construction Plan
MDU	Mobile Development Unit
ML/MS	Motor Launch/Mine Sweeper
MSC	Mine Sweeper Coastal
MSF	Mine Sweeper Fleet
MMC	Mine Layer Coastal
MOC	Ministry of Communications
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOI	Ministry of Interior
MTT	Mobile Training Team
NAVAG	Naval Advisory Group
NAVAIDS	Navigational Aids
NSC	National Security Command
OICC	Officer-in-Charge, Construction
OJT	On-the-Job Training
OSD	Office Secretary of Defense
PACAF	Pacific Air Force
PACOM	Pacific Command
PFO	Preserved Food Organization
PGM	Patrol Gun Boat
PM	Provost Marshal
POL	Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants
PP	Provincial Police
RAPCON	Radar Approach Control
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
RLG	Royal Laotian Government



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GLOSSARY (Cont'd)

IO	Information Officer
IR	Intelligence Reporting
ITACS	Integrated Tactical Air Control System
J 1	Asst Chief of Staff, Personnel
J 2	Asst Chief of Staff, Intelligence
J 3	Asst Chief of Staff, Operations
J 4	Asst Chief of Staff, Logistics
J 5	Asst Chief of Staff, Plans
J 6	Asst Chief of Staff, Communications-Electronics
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSO	Joint Staff Operation
JTD	Joint Table of Distribution
JUSMAG	Joint United States Military Advisory Group
L&A	Logistics and Administration
LVT	Landing Vehicle, Tracked
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MACT(HAI)	Military Assistance Command, Thailand
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MATP	Military Assistance Training Program
MCA	Military Construction Army
MCP	Master Construction Plan
MDU	Mobile Development Unit
ML/MS	Motor Launch/Mine Sweeper
MSC	Mine Sweeper Coastal
MSF	Mine Sweeper Fleet
MMC	Mine Layer Coastal
MOC	Ministry of Communications
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOI	Ministry of Interior
MTT	Mobile Training Team
NAVAG	Naval Advisory Group
NAVAIDS	Navigational Aids
NSC	National Security Command
OICC	Officer-in-Charge, Construction
OJT	On-the-Job Training
OSD	Office Secretary of Defense
PACAF	Pacific Air Force
PACOM	Pacific Command
PFO	Preserved Food Organization
PGM	Patrol Gun Boat
PM	Provost Marshal
POL	Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants
PP	Provincial Police
RAPCON	Radar Approach Control
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
RLG	Royal Laotian Government

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GLOSSARY (cont'd)

RTA	Royal Thai Army
RTAF	Royal Thai Air Force
RTG	Royal Thai Government
RTMC	Royal Thai Marine Corps
RTN	Royal Thai Navy
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
SAPOTHAI	Sub-area Petroleum Office, Thailand
SAW	Special Air Warfare
SCHQ	Supreme Command Headquarters (Thailand)
SEA	Southeast Asia
SEATACS	Southeast Asia Tactical Air Control System
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SJS	Secretary, Joint Staff
SIAT	Special Logistics Actions, Thailand
SOC	Special Operations Center
SOT	Special Operations Team
SRT	State Railroad of Thailand
STRATCOM	(U.S. Army) Strategic Communications (Command)
TACAN	Tactical Air Navigation
TACC	Tactical Air Control Center
TACP	Tactical Air Control Party
TACS	Tactical Air Control System
TAMP	Thailand Ammunition Manufacturing Plant
TASS	Tactical Air Support System
TBL	Torpedo Boat
TFW	Tactical Fighter Wing
TIM	Thailand Independence Movement
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TPF	Thailand Patriotic Front
USARPAC	U.S. Army, Pacific
USARYIS	U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands
USMACTHAI	U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand
USOM	United States Overseas Mission
VDC	Volunteer Defense Corps
VOR	Visual Omni Range

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Appendix A

CHIEFS OF JUSMAG

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Appendix A

CHIEFS OF JUSMAG

Brig Gen John Tupper Cole	Jan 51	Dec 52
Col Charles Sheldon	Dec 52	Jun 53
Col John W. Davis	Jun 53	Sep 53
Maj Gen William N. Gillmore	22 Sep 53	29 Jul 55
Maj Gen Richard G. Prather	30 Jul 55	16 Oct 56
Maj Gen Richard C. Partridge	17 Oct 56	21 Nov 58
Maj Gen Peter C. Hains, 3rd	22 Nov 58	24 Jul 59
Maj Gen Briard P. Johnson	25 Jul 59	9 Aug 62
Maj Gen Theodore J. Conway	10 Aug 62	27 Mar 63
Maj Gen Ernest F. Easterbrook	28 Mar 63	15 Aug 65
Maj Gen Richard G. Stilwell	16 Aug 65	Present

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Appendix B

ECONOMIC INDICATORS

THAILAND 1964-65

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## Appendix B

ECONOMIC INDICATORS
THAILAND 1964-65

	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>
<u>General Indices.</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Nov</u>
a. Wholesale Price Index (1958=100)	96.0	101.2
b. Consumer Price Index (1962=100)	104.2	104.6
<u>Money Supply (Million of Baht)</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Oct</u>
a. Currency	6,988.6	7,539.8
b. Demand Deposit	5,374.1	5,953.5
c. Total	12,362.7	13,493.3
<u>Rate of Exchange. (Baht per US\$)</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Dec</u>
a. Buying rate at commerical banks	20.65	20.65
b. Selling rate at commerical banks	20.83	20.83
<u>Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserve</u> (Million of US \$)	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Dec</u>
a. Gold	104.2	96.5
b. Foreign exchange (Including net position of commerical banks)	494.1	575.1
c. Total	598.3	671.6
<u>Foreign Trade Data (Million Baht)</u>	<u>Jan-Nov</u>	<u>Jan-Nov</u>
a. Value of exports (f.o.b.)	11,271	11,637
b. Value of imports (c.i.f.)	12,664	13,753
c. Trade balance	-1,393	-2,116
<u>Exports</u>	<u>Jan-Nov</u>	<u>Jan-Nov</u>
	<u>Metric Ton</u> <u>Million B</u>	<u>Metric Ton</u> <u>Million B</u>
a. Rice	1,800,811 4,166	1,742,371 3,964
b. Rubber	199,460 1,888	195,165 1,849
c. Tin ore	20,206 858	16,349 834
d. Corn	941,686 1,111	628,206 764
<u>Cement Production</u> (1,000 Metric Tons)	1,060	1,194
<u>Tourists</u> (Approximate Figure)	212,000	240,000


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Appendix C

USAF UNITS IN THAILAND ASSIGNED TO 13AF

1965

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Appendix C

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Appendix D

ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION

1965


ACTUAL ORGANIZATION  
1 July 1965

JUSMAG

----- Dual Role

oooooooooooo Operational Control


USMACTHAI



Appendix D

JTD SUBMISSION  
30 July 1965

oooooooooooo Operational Control




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oooooooooooo Operational Control



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ooooooooo Operational Control

COMMANDER

DEPUTY COMMANDER

CHIEF OF STAFF

SECRETARY JOINT STAFF

# PROTOCOL

HISTORIAN

J1

J2

J3

J4

J5

J6

MAP  
DIRECTORATE

COMPT

AG

CHAPLAIN

SPEC SVC

**SURGEON**

AVIATION

SJA

INFO
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FINANCE

ARMY ADVISORY GROUP

NAVY ADVISORY GROUP

AF ADVISORY GROUP

SUPPORT ACTIVITY

9TH LOG COMD

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Appendix E


ROYAL THAI ARMED FORCES STRUCTURE

1965

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ROYAL THAI AIR FORCE

Appendix E




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
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Appendix F

USMACTHAI/JUSMAG

KEY PERSONNEL


1965

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## Appendix F

JUSMAGKEY PERSONNEL LIST - 1 Jan 65

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
M/Gen	ERNEST F. EASTERBROOK, USA	Chief
Col	JOHN S. CHALFANT, USAF	Chief of Staff
Lt Col	WALTER W. KASDORF, USA	ACofS, Pers
Col	BERNARD B. BECK, USA	ACofS, Intell
Col	GLENN P. ELLIOTT, USA	ACofS, Opns
Capt	JOSEPH A. BACHHUBER, USN	ACofS, Log
Col	FREDERICK O. RITTER, USAF	ACofS, Comm/Elec
Lt Col	HARRIS C. EICHEN, USA	ACofS, Compt
Col	EDWIN C. LEE, USA	Ch, ARSEC
Capt	GEORGE R. BRYAN, USN	Ch, NAVSEC
Lt Col	PAUL B. HAIGWOOD, USMC	Sr Marine Adv
Col	GEORGE L. ABEL, USAF	Ch, AFSEC
Lt Col	VAN C. WILKINS, USA	Asst to C/S



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JUSMAGKEY PERSONNEL LIST - 1 Jul 65

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
M/Gen	ERNEST F. EASTERBROOK, USA	Chief
Col	JOHN S. CHALFANT, USAF	Chief of Staff
Lt Col	WALTER W. KASDORF, USA	ACofS, Pers
Col	BERNARD B. BECK, USA	ACofS, Intell
Col	GLENN P. ELLIOTT, USA	ACofS, Opns
Capt	JOSEPH A. BACHHUBER, USN	ACofS, Log
Col	FREDERICK O. RITTER, USAF	ACofS, Comm/Elec
Col	MAYNARD C. MILLER, USA (Assumed position 22 Jun 65)	ACofS, Compt
Col	MARSHALL B. ALLEN, USA (Assumed position 10 Jun 65)	Ch, ARSEC
Capt	GEORGE R. BRYAN, USN	Ch, NAVSEC
Col	LOREN S. NICKELS, USAF (Assumed position 11 Jun 65)	Ch, AFSEC
Col	DAVID H. SIMMONS, USMC (Assumed position 24 Jun 65)	Sr Marine Adv
Lt Col	VAN C. WILKINS, USA	Asst to C/S

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USMACTHAI

KEY PERSONNEL LIST - 1 Jan 65

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
M/Gen	ERNEST F. EASTERBROOK, USA	Deputy Commander
Col	WALTER J. WOOLWINE, USA	Chief, Log/Admin
Col	GEORGE M. DAWES, USMC	Chief, Exer & Plans

USMACTHAI

KEY PERSONNEL LIST - 1 Jul 65

M/Gen	ERNEST F. EASTERBROOK, USA *	Deputy Commander
Col	WALTER J. WOOLWINE, USA	Chief, Log/Admin
Col	GEORGE M. DAWES, USMC	Chief, Exer & Plans

\*Designated Commander 10 Jul 65.

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USMACTHAI//JUSMAG(PROVISIONAL)KEY PERSONNEL LIST - 31 Dec 65

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
M/Gen	RICHARD G. STILWELL, USA (Assumed position 14 Aug 65)	Chief/Commander
M/Gen	THOMAS B. WHITEHOUSE, USAF (Assumed position 2 Sep 65)	Deputy Commander
Col	JOHN S. CHALFANT, USAF	Chief of Staff
Col	ROBERT L. GUNDLACH, USA (Assumed position 20 Sep 65)	ACofS, Pers
Col	JOHN P. REED, USA (Assumed position 22 Sep 65)	ACofS, Intell
Col	WILLIAM R. BOND, USA (Assumed position 29 Aug 65)	ACofS, Opns
Lt Col	WALTER J. EISLER, JR., USA (Assumed position 26 May 65)	ACofS, Log
Col	HENRY G. LAWRENCE, JR., USMC (Assumed Position 20 Jul 65)	ACofS, Plans
Col	FREDERICK O. RITTER, USAF	ACofS, Comm/Elec
Col	MAYNARD C. MILLER, USA	ACofS, Compt
Capt	JOHN MCLAUGHLIN, USN (Assumed position 8 Nov 65)	MAP Director
Col	JAMES M. MOORE, USA (Assumed position 10 Jul 65)	Ch, Army Adv Gp
Capt	GEORGE R. BRYAN, USN	Ch, Navy Adv Gp
Col	LOREN S. NICKELS, USAF	Ch, AF Adv Gp
Col	DAVID H. SIMMONS, USMC	Sr Marine Adv
Lt Col	VAN C. WILKINS, USA	Sec, Joint Staff

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Appendix F - 5

MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS B. WHITEHOUSE  
 DEPUTY COMMANDER  
 UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, THAILAND

Thomas Bernard Whitehouse was born in Rochester, N.Y., on 8 December 1914 to Leon Kulman and Irene Luehm Whitehouse. General Whitehouse was commissioned a second lieutenant of cavalry upon graduation from the United States Military Academy in 1939. He began flying training with the Air Corps and graduated at Kelly Field, Texas, as a pilot in June 1940.

During the next three years General Whitehouse served in the flying training programs of Air Training Command, and after a short tour with the 469th Fighter Group at Santa Maria, Calif., was assigned to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations where he served as deputy group commander and group commander of the 14th Fighter Group in Italy, flying 71 combat missions for a total of 358 hours in P-38 Lightnings. He was officially credited with destroying four enemy aircraft.


He returned to the United States in October 1945, and subsequently served three tours at the Pentagon, first with the War Department General Staff in 1946-1947, and the next two with Headquarters USAF in 1948-1951 and in 1958-1961. He was assigned to the Twelfth Air Force in Germany in 1951-1954, later serving as commander of the 36th Fighter-Bomber Wing. He was commander of Perrin AFB, an interceptor combat crew training wing in Texas, during 1954-1957, and commander of the Syracuse and Boston NORAD, CONAD and ADC Sectors at Hancock Field, N.Y., during 1963-1964. He was promoted to the rank of Major General in August 1965 after serving as vice-commander of the 26th Air Division, Stewart AFB, N.Y., for slightly over a year. He became Deputy Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand, on 2 September 1965.

General Whitehouse's military awards include the Silver Star, Legion of Merit, Distinguished Flying Cross with one oak leaf cluster, Air Medal with ten oak leaf clusters, French Croix de Guerre with Palm, and the Greek Military Cross. He is married to the former Eleanor Anne Adler of Rochester, N.Y., and has two children, Leon K., 25, and Wendy A., 22.

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Appendix F - 6

COLONEL JOHN S. CHALFANT  
CHIEF OF STAFF  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, THAILAND

Colonel John S. Chalfant, Chief of Staff, United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand, was born on 10 September 1917 in Bucklin, Kansas. He graduated from the University of Kansas in 1939 with a BA degree in History and Political Science and was commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant from the ROTC program. He then attended the University of Kansas Law School for 2 years. He completed flight training in 1942.

During World War II he served as a B-17 pilot in the European Theater logging 36 combat missions, serving successively as a Squadron Commander and Deputy Group Commander of the 306th Bomber Group.

Colonel Chalfant attended the Air War College graduating in 1953 and remained at Maxwell Air Force Base as a member of the faculty until 1956.

The Colonel, a Command Pilot, has received the Distinguished Flying Cross with two Oak Leaf Clusters; Air Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters; the Distinguished Unit Citation, Europe, with one Oak Leaf Cluster and the Air Force Commendation Medal.

From 1958 to 1961 Colonel Chalfant served as the Air Attache with the American Embassy in Turkey. His last assignment before arriving here was with Headquarters, Air Force Logistical Command, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. He assumed his present duties on 14 July, 1964.

Colonel Chalfant and his wife, Gladys, have two sons and one daughter.

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Appendix F - 7

COLONEL FREDERICK O. RITTER  
 ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF  
 COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS

Colonel Frederick O. Ritter was born on 13 July 1913 in New York City, N.Y., where he finished grammar and high school and attended courses at New York University. He completed four years at San Francisco State College, California graduating with a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Social Science. In pursuit of his technical interests he enrolled and graduated from RCA Technical Institute, National Radio Institute, and Institute for Municipal Training. While serving in the Armed Forces he took the opportunity to study in the Infantry Communications School in Fort Benning, Georgia in 1937 and the Air Communications-Electronics Staff Officers Course at Montgomery, Alabama in 1950. He attended the Advanced Officers Course at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey in 1944, the Air Command and Staff School in Montgomery, Alabama in 1950, and the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia in 1953.

Colonel Ritter's initial military experience consisted of service in the New York National Guard during 1930-1938. He was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Signal Corps Reserve in 1939. From 15 February 1941 through 12 August 1946 he served on active duty as Signal Platoon Leader and Signal Company Commander, as Chief of the Signal Section in the Air Force School of Applied Tactics, and as Instructor in the Logistics Division, Air University.

On 17 November 1947, Colonel Ritter was commissioned in the Regular Air Force. Subsequently he received the following assignments: Base Communications Officer, Ladd Field, Fairbanks, Alaska, 1948-1949; Executive Officer, 1801st AACS Group, 1951-1952; Commander, 607th AC&W Sq, Korea, 1953-1954; Director of Communications-Electronics, JUSMAG, Greece, 1958-1959; Assistant Chief of Staff, Communications-Electronics, Seventeenth Air Force, Wheelus AFB, Libya, 1959; Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Communications-Electronics, Hq USAFE, 1959-1960; Director of Plans and Programs, ACofS, C&E Hq USAFE, 1960-1961; and Assistant Chief of Staff, Communications-Electronics, 29th Air Division, Air Defense Command, 1961-1964. He became Assistant Chief of Staff, Communications-Electronics, MACHTAI/JUSMAG Thailand, in July 1964.

Colonel Ritter is a member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, the American Radio Relay League, and the Armed Forces Communications-Electronics Association.

Colonel Ritter holds the following awards and decorations: Air Force Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters; Army Commendation Medal; Korean Service Medal; American Defense Service Medal; American Campaign Medal; WW II Victory Medal; United Nations Medal; Armed Forces Reserve Medal, and the Air Force Longevity Medal with four oak leaf clusters. With Colonel Ritter in Thailand is his wife Katherine E. and two children, William A. and Deborah K.

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COLONEL HENRY G. LAWRENCE  
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF  
PLANS

Appendix F - 8

Colonel Henry G. Lawrence was born on 29 May 1915 in Milledgeville, Georgia. He was commissioned in April of 1939 after receiving his BA in Economics at Mercer University, Macon, Georgia.


In World War II Colonel Lawrence took part in combat operations on Tarawa, Saipan, Tinian and Iwo Jima, and after attending the Amphibious Warfare School in Quantico, Virginia in 1949, returned to combat in Korea. In July of 1953 he was assigned as Assistant to the Head, Ordnance Branch, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Headquarters USMC, Washington D.C. where he remained until July of 1956 when he enrolled at the Command Staff College, Quantico. In June, 1957, Colonel Lawrence served as Inspector-Instructor for the 1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion, USMC Reserve Training Center in Tampa, Florida. It was during this period when he was promoted to his present rank of Colonel. From August 1959 to August 1962 he was Base Provost Marshal at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; he then attended the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and George Washington University where he received his Master's Degree in International Affairs in 1963. Before his assignment as Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans, JUSMAG, in August of 1965, Colonel Lawrence served as Commanding Officer, 1st Force Service Regiment, Fleet Marine Force, Camp Pendleton, California.

Among his awards and decorations Colonel Lawrence has received the Navy Cross, Legion of Merit with "V" Device, Gold Star in lieu of Second Legion of Merit, Bronze Star with "V" Device, Gold Star in lieu of second Bronze Star, Navy Commendation Medal with "V" Device, Purple Heart, Presidential Unit Citation with Star, and the Distinguished Service Cross (British).

Colonel Lawrence is accompanied in Thailand by his wife, Jane G., and two daughters, Sidney A. and Julia J.

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COLONEL LOREN S. NICKELS  
CHIEF  
AIR FORCE ADVISORY GROUP

Colonel Loren S. Nickels was born in Monrovia, California, on 9 March 1914. He attended Santa Cruz High School at Santa Cruz, California, and graduated from Fresno State College, Fresno California with a B.A. Degree, majoring in Education. He attended Occidental College, Los Angeles, California, where he received his Master of Arts Degree in Education.

Colonel Nickels was commissioned from Aviation Cadets on 15 August 1941. He has completed the following service schools: Air Force Flying School, August 1941, Advanced T.T. Instruction Course, January 1945; Command and General Staff School, April 1946; Armed Forces Staff College, February 1955; BIS, April 1959; Space Systems Orientation Course, March 1961.

Colonel Nickels is a Command Pilot, having flown 54 combat missions with 248 combat hours in a B-25 in the India-Burma-China theater.

He has been awarded the following decorations: Air Medal, Distinguished Flying Cross, Purple Heart, American Campaign Medal, Asiatic Pacific Campaign Medal, WW II Victory Medal, National Defense Service Medal, Occupation of Germany Medal, Legion of Merit, and the Army Commendation Medal.


Colonel Nickels resides in Bangkok with his wife Linamae and daughter Laura.



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## Appendix F - 10

COLONEL WILLIAM ROSS BOND  
 ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF  
 OPERATIONS

Colonel William Ross Bond was born in Portland, Maine in December 1919. After graduation from college in 1940 and completion of a year of law school in 1941, he enlisted in the Army and later was commissioned a 2d Lt of Infantry from Officer Candidate School.

During World War II, he served as platoon leader, company commander and as a field grade officer with the First Ranger Battalion commanded by Colonel William O. Darby. At the end of WWII in Europe he served briefly as an instructor in tactics at the Infantry School, Fort Benning. In September 1945 he served with the 7th Infantry Division in Korea where he commanded three different battalions in two regiments---the 31st and 32d Infantry, and later he was G3 of the Division. In 1948 he returned to the U.S. as Asst Chief of Staff, Operations, for the Universal Military Training Unit at Fort Knox, as well as CO of the 86th Tank Battalion. Shortly thereafter, he went to the Middle East as a member of the United Nations Team involved in maintaining the truce between the state of Israel and the Arab states of Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan and Egypt.


With the advent of the Korean War in 1950, Colonel Bond returned to Fort Benning to assist in the establishment of the Airborne Ranger School (later the Ranger Department). Shortly thereafter he took some Ranger elements to Korea for a brief period. In 1951 he returned to Europe to command an Infantry Battalion for some two years in the 4th Infantry Division. During 1953-1954 he was assigned to the J3 Section, U.S. CINCEUR in both Germany and Paris. He attended the Regular Leavenworth Course in 1954, and during 1955-1956 was a member of both the White House Staff and the Staff of the Operations Coordinating Board. In 1956 he was assigned to the newly activated 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky as Deputy Chief of Staff, as G3, and as Deputy and CO of the 501st Airborne Battle Group. He attended the Army War College 1958-1959 and upon completion served in Vietnam as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, MAAG, through the fall of 1960. During the period 1960-1964 he served in the Office, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army and as a planner and Deputy Director in Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations. Prior to coming to Thailand in August 1965, he commanded the 2d Airborne Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

Colonel Bond has been awarded the Silver Star, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal (with cluster), Army Commendation Medal, Purple Heart, various campaign and service medals and the French Croix de Guerre.

He is married to the former Theodora Sedgwick of Boston and Beverley Mass.

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COLONEL JAMES MONTGOMERY MOORE  
CHIEF  
ARMY ADVISORY GROUP

Colonel James Montgomery Moore was born on 25 October 1917 in Columbus, Ohio. He was commissioned in the Coast Artillery Corps upon graduation from the US Military Academy at West Point in 1940, and served with various anti-aircraft artillery units in the United States. He was ordered to England in 1943 and participated in all Northern European Campaigns of World War II, from the Normandy Invasion to the reduction of the Ruhr pocket in Germany. Colonel Moore remained in Europe after the war, and, among other duties served with the Inter-Allied Kommandatura in Vienna, Austria in 1946.

Colonel Moore returned to the United States in 1947 and spent the next three years as advisor to a National Guard anti-aircraft artillery group in Southern California. In 1950-1951 he attended the Artillery Officers Advanced Course at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and Fort Bliss, Texas, and followed this with a short tour on the Staff and Faculty of the Anti-aircraft Artillery and Guided Missile Branch of the Artillery School at Fort Bliss. He went to Korea in September of 1951, where he served as artillery battalion commander for the 7th Infantry Division, Eighth US Army.

Returning to Fort Bliss in September 1952, Colonel Moore commanded the first Skysweeper Battalion to be activated in the United States Army (the 495th), later serving on the same post as Deputy G-3, Anti-aircraft Artillery and Guided Missile Center. He attended the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in 1953-1954, and served a three-year tour in the Pentagon with the Army General Staff of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations. In 1957 Colonel Moore was ordered to Orleans, France to serve as Deputy G-3, G-3, and Assistant Chief of Staff in Headquarters, United States Army Communications Zone Europe. He returned to the United States in 1960 to attend the 1960-1961 course at the Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. On 30 August 1961 he assumed command of the Minneapolis-St Paul Defense, US Army Air Defense Command. On 14 January 1963, Colonel Moore was assigned as Executive Officer, Joint Command and Control Requirements Group, Joint Chiefs of Staff Washington, D.C. Since 10 July 1965, he has served as Chief of the Army Advisory Group, USMACTHAI/JUSMAG, Thailand.

Colonel Moore holds an MA Degree in International Affairs from George Washington University in addition to a BS Degree from the US Military Academy. He has been awarded the Bronze Star Medal with two oak leaf clusters, the Army Commendation Medal with one oak leaf cluster, and the Korean Presidential Unit Citation. With Colonel Moore in Thailand is his wife Victoria; their two daughters, Ilona and Carla, are in CONUS.

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Appendix F - 12

CAPTAIN JOHN McLAUGHLIN  
 DIRECTOR  
 MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Captain John McLaughlin, USN, was born on 30 October 1917 in Baltimore, Maryland, where, after attending Loyola College he was employed by the Pan American Oil Company. In June 1941 he entered the Midshipmen School at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, and was commissioned an ensign on 12 September 1941. Captain McLaughlin's first assignment was as a first lieutenant aboard the USS KAWEAH. While aboard the KAWEAH he participated in convoy operations in the North Atlantic and took part in the North African invasion.

Following World War II, as a lieutenant commander, Captain McLaughlin studied for a year at the University of Rochester, and for another year at the Navy's General Line School, Newport, Rhode Island. In September 1948 he became executive officer of the destroyer USS BEATTY. He later served as personnel officer at the Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois, and in 1953 as navigator aboard the battleship USS IOWA. He was then named commanding officer of the radar picket ship USS WOOD. As commanding officer of the USS WOOD he assisted civil authorities in saving lives and rendering other assistance in Volos, Greece, during a series of earthquakes in 1956. Both the Prime Minister of Greece and the American Ambassador to Greece commended him and his ship for this assistance.

Captain McLaughlin next served in Paris on the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (NATO), which was followed in October 1959 with a tour on the staff of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, in Norfolk, Virginia. In 1960 he reported as surface operations officer on the staff of the Commander, Carrier Division FOUR aboard the USS FORRESTAL in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.

In April 1962 he reported to Brooklyn, New York, as chief inspector on the staff of the Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service, Atlantic area. He was assigned to the USS NANTAHALA in June 1964. During that assignment his ship participated in two NATO exercises in the North Atlantic and supported the U.S. Atlantic Fleet Forces in the Caribbean during the Dominican Republic revolution in the spring of 1965. During Captain McLaughlin's tour on the NANTAHALA, his ship was awarded the Battle Efficiency "E" for being the outstanding ship of her type in the U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

Captain McLaughlin reported to COMUSMACV in August 1965. He wears the following medals: American Defense, American Theater, European-African-Middle East Theater, Asiatic-Pacific Theater with six stars, Philippine Liberation, President Philippine Republic Unit Citation, Navy Occupation, World War II Victory, and National Defense.

Captain McLaughlin and his wife Marjorie reside in Bangkok with their four children, Patricia, Maureen, Shawn and Mary Ellen.

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CAPTAIN GEORGE R. BRYAN, JR.  
 CHIEF  
 NAVY ADVISORY GROUP

Following graduation as an ensign from the United States Naval Academy in 1942, Captain Bryan served on the USS CONYNGAM (DD-371) until May 1944. His next duty was as a member of the precommissioning detail on the USS VAN VALKENBURG (DD-656). When the VAN VALKENBURG was commissioned, Captain Bryan, by then a lieutenant, served as Navigator, then First Lieutenant and finally as Executive Officer. The ship participated in naval engagements in the South Pacific and was awarded the Navy Citation in the Battle of Okinawa.

From February 1946 until June 1949 he served as Executive Officer of the USS MACOMB (DMS-23) and Commanding Officer of the LST 644. Captain Bryan then went to the University of Illinois as associate professor of Naval Science; while there he was promoted to Lieutenant Commander.

Commencing in October 1951 he served for 18 months as Commanding Officer of the USS EVANSVILLE (PF-700) during the Korean police action. Upon detachment from the EVANSVILLE in March 1953 he was appointed Commanding Officer of the USS HAAS (DE-424) until relieved in October 1954. From December 1954 until September 1958 he served as executive assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policy and Operations on the staff of Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. From October 1958 until January 1961 he served as Commanding Officer of the USS CONWAY (DDE-507). During most of this tour, the CONWAY was a unit of Task Group ALFA.

Captain Bryan reported for duty in 1961 on the faculty of the Command Department of the U.S. Naval Academy to serve successively as an instructor of Leadership and Naval Operations, head of the Naval Operations course, and Executive Officer, from which assignment he came to the USS ALDEBARAN (AF-10) as Commanding Officer.

In addition to the Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal with eight stars and the World War II Victory Medal, Captain Bryan has various campaign medals including the Korean Presidential Unit Citation.


Captain Bryan is a native of Cleveland, Ohio where his parents still reside at 3361 Ridgeview Road. In addition to a BS degree from USNA he holds a MA degree in Personnel Administration from the George Washington University. He is married to the former Jeanne E. Millhoff of Clayton, New Mexico. They have three children: George R. III, 20, who is a Midshipman at the Naval Academy, William E. 18, and Kathleen A., 14.

Captain Bryan reported to JUSMAG Thailand to head the Navy Advisory Group on 5 December 1964.

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COLONEL ROBERT L. GUNDLACH  
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF  
PERSONNEL

Colonel Robert L. Gundlach was born on 24 September 1920 in Bremerton, Washington. He graduated from the New Mexico Military Institute in 1940 and from the University of California in 1941 with a BS Degree. He was commissioned a second lieutenant in the US Army Reserve on 18 November 1941 and commenced active duty on 4 December 1941 at Fort Lewis, Washington. He graduated from Iowa State University in 1949 with an MA Degree. His military education includes the Cavalry School (1943), Parachutist School (1943), the Infantry School (1944 and 1952), US Army Command and General Staff College (1958), 11th Airborne Division School (1951), 82nd Airborne Division School (1959), US Army Airborne School (1959), and the Military Assistance Institute (1960 and 1965).

Colonel Gundlach has served in the following overseas areas: European Theater Operations (Apr 44-Jul 45), Far East Command (Apr 51-Jul 51), United States Army Europe (Jul 55-Jun 58), Republic of Vietnam (May 60-May 61), and United States Assistance Command Thailand (Aug 65-Present).

Colonel Gundlach was promoted to Colonel on 16 October 1962. Prior to being assigned to USMACTHAI on 15 August 1965, he served as Professor of Military Science at the University of Nevada (XV Corps). His performance there earned him the third oak leaf cluster to the Army Commendation Medal. Colonel Gundlach also holds the following awards and decorations: American Defense Service Medal, European African and Middle East Campaign Medal, Army Occupation Medal (Germany), Korean Service Medal, National Defense Service Medal, United Nations Service Medal, Senior Parachutist Badge, Army Forces Expeditionary Medal with two overseas bars. His previous military assignments include Armored Reconnaissance Unit Commander, Parachute Infantry Unit Commander, Combat Liaison Officer, Operations and Training Staff Officer, Personnel Staff Officer, Infantry Unit Commander, Director of Training, Chief or Director of Major Dept Unit, and Professor of Military Science.

Colonel Gundlach married the former Patricia Fielder of Vancouver B.C., Canada on 8 March 1942 in Roseburg, Oregon. The Gundlachs have one son, Peter K., born on 2 December 1943, who is now on active duty with the United States Army, and a daughter, Carol A., born on 31 January 1951, who resides with her parents in Bangkok, Thailand.

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COLONEL MAYNARD C. MILLER  
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF  
COMPTROLLER

Colonel Maynard C. Miller completed his Bachelor's Degree in Science (AB) at the University of Nebraska in 1935. After attending the Infantry School in Fort Benning, Georgia, Colonel Miller served as a combat battalion executive officer during World War II. In 1953 during the Korean War, he was Commander, 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division. Further military schooling included the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Special Weapons Course, Fort Bliss, Texas, Army Management Engineering School, Rock Island Arsenal; and several courses at the Army Logistics Management Center, Fort Lee, Virginia.

In 1954-1957 Colonel Miller was Plans Officer in the Office of the Comptroller of the Army; during this period he received his Master's Degree in Comptrollership from George Washington University. For the following three years he served as Comptroller, Base Section, U.S. Army Communication Zone, Europe. In 1960-1962 he was assigned to the Combat Development Experimentation Center, Fort Ord, California. Before his assignment to JUSMAG in 1965 Colonel Miller was Course Director and Instructor at the U.S. Army Logistics Management Center, Fort Lee, Virginia.

Colonel Miller's awards and decorations include the Combat Infantryman's Badge, Bronze Star with Oak Leaf Cluster, Army Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster, Army General Staff Designation, Korean Presidential Citation, and the French Croix de Guerre with Palm.

Colonel Miller and his wife Jane have one son, and come from the state of Oklahoma.

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COLONEL JOHN P. REED  
 ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF  
 INTELLIGENCE

Born in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 18 January 1921, Col John P. Reed attended Oklahoma University, Oklahoma City University, University of Maryland (USAREUR), and received his BS degree from the University of Omaha in 1962.

Colonel Reed was married on 7 November 1942 to the former Helen F. Roemer of Norman, Oklahoma. They have three children: Geoffrey R. (September 1946), John Lance (September 1947), and Joan E. (September 1950). Their permanent home address is 1212 Camden Way, Norman, Oklahoma.

Colonel Reed entered the Enlisted Reserve Corps in October 1941. He was commissioned in the AUS in February of 1942 and called to active duty as a 2nd Lt in the Artillery on 15 April 1942. He served in reconnaissance units as platoon leader and company commander of the 814th Tank Destroyer Battalion in CONUS until February 1944 and the European Theater of Operations until December 1945. Further duties included tank destroyer battalion reconnaissance company commander and battalion S-3 in CONUS until January 1947. He commanded the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Mech) in Korea in 1947, then became G-2 of KMAC and Senior Advisor to the Korean Army G-2 and concurrently, Intelligence Advisor to the Korean Ministry of Defense until June 1950.

Colonel Reed transferred to the Armored Cavalry Branch in 1949 and attended the Advance Course, The Armor School in 1950-51, and served as instructor, Combat Intelligence, at The Armor School in 1951-1952. He attended the Regular Course at the Command and General Staff College in 1954-1955, and was afterwards assigned to Europe as Commander, Region XI, 66th CIC Group in 1955-1958. Colonel Reed commanded the 4th Tank Battalion, 37th Armor, Fort Knox, in 1958-1960, was Secretary of The Armor School, 1960-1962, and G-2 of The Armor Center in 1962. Prior to his assignment to MACV/JUSMAG as J-2 in August 1965, he was assigned as Chief, Plans and Policy, Executive for Career Planning, Officer Personnel Directorate, Department of the Army.

Colonel Reed's awards and decorations include the Bronze Star with "V" device, the Army Commendation Medal and the Purple Heart.

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL WALTER J. EISLER  
 ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF  
 LOGISTICS

WALTER J. EISLER, JR, was commissioned an Infantry Second Lieutenant at Fort Benning, Georgia, on 7 December 1942, after completing Officers Candidate School. He was assigned from Fort Benning to the 3rd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, 2nd Infantry Division, at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin.

Colonel Eisler remained in the 3rd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, throughout World War II, in the European Theater, and commanded Company L, 23rd Infantry through most of the war. He returned to the United States in 1945, and in 1946 was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 349th Infantry, 88th Division on the Morgan Line in Northern Italy. In 1947 he was transferred to the 3rd Battalion, 26th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, in Germany.

He returned to the United States in 1949, and served a three year tour as a National Guard instructor, and attended the Advanced Infantry Course at Fort Benning, Georgia. In 1953, he was assigned to the 25th Division in Korea where he served as Operations Officer in the G-3 Section, 35th Infantry. He graduated from the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1955, and was assigned to the National Guard Bureau in the Pentagon until 1958.

In 1958, Colonel Eisler was assigned to the 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry, 8th Infantry Division in Germany as the S-4. From 1959 until 1961, he was the Executive Officer, 8th Infantry Division Trains, stationed in Bad Kreuznach, Germany. In 1961, he returned to the United States and spent three years in DCSLOG, Department of the Army Staff in the Pentagon. Colonel Eisler was assigned to the Army Section, Logistics Division, JUSMAG-THAILAND in October 1964 and to J-4 MAOTHA in May 1965.

Colonel Eisler's decorations include the Silver Star, the Bronze Star, the Purple Heart and the French Croix de Guerre.

Colonel Eisler was born in Butler, Pennsylvania on 13 April 1922, and is accompanied in Thailand by his wife, Elizabeth M.

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COMMANDER GREGORY E. LAWRENCE  
CHIEF  
SUPPORT ACTIVITY

Born on 15 August 1928, in Pasadena, California, Commander Gregory E. Lawrence graduated from high school in South Pasadena, and in August of 1963 received his BS degree in math from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

In 1946, Commander Lawrence joined the Navy as an Apprentice Seaman at Occidental College, Los Angeles, and in 1948 entered flight training as a Midshipman at Pensacola, Florida, and Corpus Christi, Texas. He was designated a Naval Aviator and commissioned as an Ensign in June of 1950. During the period 1950-1953, he was assigned to Composite Squadron-35 (Night Attack) and participated in the Korean Campaign in 1951-52 and again in 1953 from the USS Essex (CV-9) and Atsugi, Japan, respectively.

In 1953-1956 he was assigned as Instructor, Advanced Propeller and Jet Aircraft, at Attack Training Units 801 and 202, Kingsville, Texas. In 1956, Commander Lawrence attended the General Line School, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, and in January 1957-January 1959 served as Assistant Navigator on the USS Leyte, out of Quonset Point, R.I. During the period April 1959 to June 1961, he was assigned as Jet Instrument Flight Instructor of Attack Squadron 44 in Jacksonville, Florida. Prior to his assignment at JUSMAG as Chief, Support Activity in February of 1965, he served as Executive Officer and Instructor, Jet Instrument Training Squadron, Attack Squadron 126 at the Miramar Naval Air Station, San Diego.

Commander Lawrence holds the following awards and decorations; Korean Campaign with Three Battle Stars, two Navy Unit Commendation Medals, World War II Victory Medal, United Nations Medal, and the Korean Presidential Medal.

Commander Lawrence was married to the former Phyllis Overholt on 27 August 1954. They have two sons, Gregory E., III (7 March 1958) and Miles Chandler (1 December 1960), and one daughter, Martha Clarice (16 February 1964).

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL VAN COURT WILKINS  
SECRETARY  
JOINT STAFF

Lieutenant Colonel Van Court Wilkins was born in Washington, D. C. on 23 April 1926. He entered the military service as an enlisted man on 1 February 1944, and was commissioned through OCS on 3 July 1945. He was appointed as a second lieutenant in the Regular Army on 24 November 1947, and transferred from Infantry to Armor on 31 December 1954.

Colonel Wilkins' military education includes, in addition to OCS: the Armor School Career Course, 1953-1954; U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1959-1960; and the Armed Forces Staff College in 1963.

He graduated with a BS degree from the University of Maryland in 1959, and in 1963 received his MBA from George Washington University.

Colonel Wilkins' overseas service consists of tours in: Japan, 1945-1948; Korea, 1950-1951; Germany, 1956-1959; and Thailand, 1964-1966. His principal assignments have been at company, battalion, and regimental levels in infantry and armor units. He has served as Assistant Secretary, General Staff, Headquarters, Seventh Army; and Instructor at the Air University before his assignment as Secretary, Joint Staff, USMACTHAI/JUSMAG.

Colonel Wilkins' awards and decorations include: Legion of Merit, Silver Star, Bronze Star, Army Commendation Medal, Air Force Commendation Medal, Purple Heart, and Combat Infantryman's Badge.

He is accompanied in Bangkok by his wife Mary D., and four children: Kristen, Sharon, Jennifer, and John.

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
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Appendix G

IN-COUNTRY / MA'CTHAI STRENGTH

1965

# IN-COUNTRY STRENGTH




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APPENDIX G

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MACTHAI/JUSMAG MANNING  
1965



		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
OFFICERS	TOTAL AUTHORIZED	268	269	272	272	280	280	282	293	296	299	301	301
	TOTAL ASSIGNED	262	266	271	279	278	272	272	282	282	282	285	297

		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
ENLISTED	TOTAL AUTHORIZED	249	253	256	256	263	263	267	276	275	286	295	295
	TOTAL ASSIGNED	249	253	250	258	260	270	270	267	267	284	283	278

CIVILIAN	US	TOTAL AUTHORIZED	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3
		TOTAL ASSIGNED	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3
	LWR	TOTAL AUTHORIZED	72	72	72	88	89	89	89	91	91	90	90	89
		TOTAL ASSIGNED	72	72	72	88	84	85	85	87	87	87	87	86

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Appendix H

GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICER VISITS

1965




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Appendix H

GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICER VISITS

1965

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Jan	2	0	3	0	5
Feb	4	0	7	0	11
Mar	6	2	8	1	17
Apr	4	1	13	0	18
May	5	3	2	1	11
June	4	0	6	1	11
Jul	6	3	13	0	22
Aug	3	1	6	0	10
Sep	2	1	17	0	20
Oct	9	4	21	1	35
Nov	5	3	17	0	25
Dec	<u>7</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>14</u>
Grand Total	57	19	119	4	199



Appendix H - 2

SELECTED LISTING  
GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICER VISTORS  
1965

Maj Gen Sam Maddux, USAF	Commander, 13th Air Force	11-13 Jan
Maj Gen Sam Maddux, USAF	Commander, 13th Air Force	5-6 Feb
General Mark E. Bradley, USAF	Commander, AFLC	16 Feb
Maj Gen Joseph H. Moore, USAF	Commander, 2d Air Div	16 Feb
General Hunter Harris, USAF	CINCPACAF	1-3 Mar
Lt Gen Bruce Palmer, USAF	Dep Chief of Staff Operations, USA	10-12 Mar
Maj Gen William F. Cassidy, USAF	Chief of Engineers, USA	18-20 Mar
Vice Admiral Paul P. Blackburn	COMSEVENTHFLT	22-26 Mar
Maj Gen Joseph H. Moore, USAF	Commander, 2d Air Div	29 Mar
General John K. Waters, USAF	CINCUSARPAC	9-14 Apr
Maj Gen Robert P. Taylor, USAF	Chief of Air Force Chaplains	10-12 Apr
Lt Gen Maurice A. Preston, USAF	Commander, 5th Air Force	15-19 Apr
Secretary Townsend Hoopes	Dep Asst Sec of Def	16-21 Apr
Senator Thomas J. Dodd	Mbr Sen Com on Judiciary	16-20 Apr
General Hunter Harris, USAF	CINCPACAF	16-18 Apr
Maj Gen Sam Maddux, USAF	Commander, 13th Air Force	23-25 Apr
Lt Gen Frank W. Moorman, USAF	Vice CINCPACAF	28-30 Apr
Maj Gen C.W. Clark, USAF	CG, USARJ	6 May
Maj Gen Sam Maddux, USAF	Commander, 13th Air Force	11-14 May
Maj Gen Charles E. Brown, USAF	Chief of Chaplains, USA	22-24 May
Maj Gen Richard G. Stilwell, USAF	Chief of Staff, MACV	28 May
Maj Gen Sam Maddux, USAF	Commander, 13th Air Force	8-9 Jun
General Hunter Harris, USAF	CINCPACAF	10-12 Jun
Rep Otis G. Pike (D-N.Y.)	House of Representatives	16-18 Jun
Lt Gen William S. Stone, USAF	DCS Personnel Hq USAF	17-18 Jun
General Hamilton H. Howze, USAF	CG, EUSA, CINC UNC/U.S. Forces Korea	17-19 Jun
Lt Gen Theodore J. Conway, USAF	Asst Chief of Staff Force Development, DA	1-8 Jul
Lt Gen Paul S. Emrick, USAF	C/S PACOM	10-13 Jul
Lt Gen Joseph F. Carroll, USAF	Director, DIA	16 Jul
Secretary E. J. Sheridan	Dep Asst Sec of Def (I&L)	15-19 Jul
Maj Gen R.H. Curtin, USAF	Dir Civ Engr, Hq USAF	15-19 Jul
Maj Gen John C. Meyer, USAF	Commander, 12th Air Force Waco, Texas	20-21 Jul
Lt Gen Edgar C. Doleman, USAF	Dep CINCUSARPAC (Designate)	21-25 Jul
Major General Richard P. Klocko USAF	Commander, USAF Security Svc Texas	24-26 Jul

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Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, USN  
 Gen W.C. Westmoreland, USA  
 Gen Hunter Harris, USAF  
 Maj Gen James W. Wilson, USAF  
 Maj Gen William J. Crumm, USAF  
 Maj Gen William J. Crumm, USAF  
 Maj Gen James W. Wilson, USAF  
 Maj Gen James W. Wilson, USAF  
 Maj Gen Charles E. Johnson, USA

RADM Robert B. Brown, USN  
 Maj Gen Richard J. Meyer, USA

Maj Gen James W. Wilson, USAF  
 RADM J.R. Reedy, USN  
 Lt Gen Joseph Moore, USAF  
 Lt Gen Thomas P. Gerrity, USAF

Maj Gen Harry E. Goldsworthy  
 USAF  
 Maj Gen James W. Wilson, USAF  
 General Hunter Harris, USAF  
 Maj Gen Robert R. Rowland,  
 USAF  
 Maj Gen James W. Wilson, USAF  
 General Howell M. Estes, USAF  
 Maj Gen Donald W. Graham, USAF  
 Lt Gen Lawrence J. Lincoln, USA

Maj Gen Thomas J. Hayes, III

Rep L. Mendel Rivers  
 (D-S.C.)  
 Rep Porter Hardy, Jr  
 (D-Va)  
 Rep Speedy O. Long (D-La)

General Mark W. Clark, USA

Sen Stephen M. Young  
 (D-Ohio)  
 Sen Howard W. Cannon,  
 (D-Nev)

Admiral U.S. G. Sharp, USN  
 Maj General James W. Wilson, USAF  
 General J.P. McConnell, USAF  
 General G.P. Disosway, USAF

Lt Gen Joseph Moore, USAF  
 Maj Gen E.B. LeBailly, USAF

CINCPAC	23-24 Jul
CG, MACV	23-24 Jul
CINCPACAF	28-30 Jul
Commander, 13th Air Force	28-30 Jul
Commander, 3d Air Div	30-31 Jul
Commander, 3d Air Div	1 Aug
Commander, 13 Air Force	10-11 Aug
Commander, 13 Air Force	19-20 Aug
Chief, United States Mil- itary Supply Mission, India	25-26 Aug
Navy Surgeon General	27-28 Aug
CG, USA Strategic Com- munications Command	1-5 Sep
Commander, 13th Air Force	5-7 Sep
CO, CTF 77	7-8 Sep
Commander, 2d Air Div	10-11 Sep
Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems & Logistics, CSAF	15-17 Sep
Director of Production & Programs, USAF	15-17 Sep
Commander, 13th Air Force	22-23 Sep
CINCPACAF	1-4 Oct
Chief of Staff, PACAF	1-4 Oct
Commander, 13th Air Force	1-5 Oct
Commander, MATS	2-7 Oct
Commander, EASTAF	2-7 Oct
Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, DA	3-5 Oct
Director of Topography & Military Engineering	3-5 Oct
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services	11-14 Oct
Mbr House Committee on Armed Services	11-14 Oct
Mbr House of Representa- tives	11-14 Oct
Special Consultant to L. Mendel Rivers	11-14 Oct
Mbr, Senate Committee on Armed Services	11-13 Oct
Mbr Senate Committee on Armed Services	11-13 Oct
CINCPAC	12-15 Oct
Commander, 13th Air Force	15-18 Oct
Chief of Staff, USAF	16-18 Oct
Commander, Tactical Air Command	16-18 Oct
Commander, 2d Air Div	16-17 Oct
Director of Information (OSAF)	16-18 Oct

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## Appendix H - 4

Maj Gen J.D. Lavelle, USAF  
RADM Herschel J. Goldberg, USN

RADM E.F. Metzger, USN  
RADM B.H. Bieri, USN

Maj Gen Charles J. Timmes,  
USA  
Maj Gen Howard A. Davis, USAF

General Kenneth B. Hobson,  
RADM E.B. Fluckey, USN

Maj Gen James W. Wilson, USAF  
Lt Gen Alfred D. Starbird, USA

Lt Gen Leonard D. Heaton, USA  
Dr Charles M. Herzfeld  
Rep John J. Duncan (R-Tenn)

Rep Tim Lee Carter (R-Ky)

Rep William J. Stanton,  
(R-Ohio)

RADM A.C. Husband, USN  
Rep John H. Dent

(D-Pa)  
Rep William D. Ford (D-Mich)

Rep Augustus F. Hawkins  
(D-Calif)

Rep Patsy T. Mink (D-Hawaii)

Rep William H. Ayres (R-Ohio)

Rep Olin E. Teague (D-Tex)

Rep Emilio Q Daddario (D-Conn)

Rep Bob Casey (D-Tex)

General William C. Westmoreland  
USA

Rep Otis G. Pike (D-NY)

Rep Clement J. Zablocki  
(D-Wiso)

Vice Admiral J.T. Hayward  
USN

Director of Aerospace 16-18 Oct  
Chief, Bureau of Supplies 16-18 Oct  
and Accounts, USN

CO, NSC Oakland 16-18 Oct  
Fleet Supply Officer, 16-18 Oct  
CINCPAC

Director Remote Area Con- 26-30 Oct  
flict, ARPA

Director, Studies & 4-5 Nov  
Analysis, DCS Plans

Commander, Air Force 6-8 Nov  
Logistics Command

Commander, Submarine 6-9 Nov  
Pacific

Commander, 13th Air Force 7-8 Nov  
Director Defense Comm 7-11 Nov  
Agency

Surgeon General, USA 10-12 Nov

Director, ARPA, Wash DC 11-19 Nov

Veteran's Affairs Com- 13-14 Nov  
mittee

Interstate & Foreign 13-14 Nov  
Commerce Committee

Banking and Currency 13-14 Nov  
Committee

Chief, BUDOCKS 15-17 Nov

Chairman, House Select 23-24 Nov  
Subcommittee on Education

Mbr House of Representa- 23-24 Nov  
tives

Mbr House of Representa- 23-24 Nov  
tives

Mbr House of Representa- 23-24 Nov  
tives

Mbr House of Representa- 23-24 Nov  
tives

House Committee on 23-24 Nov  
Science and Astronautics

Mbr House of Representa- 23-24 Nov  
tives

Mbr House of Representa- 23-24 Nov  
tives

COMUSMACV 23-24 Nov

House of Representa- 25-27 Nov  
tives

Chairman, Subcommittee 28 Nov-1 Dec  
House Foreign Affairs

Commander, Anti-Submarine 23-25 Nov  
Warfare Force Pacific

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General William C. Westmoreland, USA	COMUSMACV	3-4 Dec
Rep Abraham J. Multer (NY)	Chairman, Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency	4-6 Dec
Rep William E. Minshall (R-Ohio)	Mbr, Defense Subcommittee on Appropriations	5-7 Dec
Rep Glanard P. Lipscomb (R-Calif )	Mbr, Appropriations Subcommittees on State Department and Defense	5-9 Dec
Sen John G. Tower (R-Tex)	Senate Committee on Armed Services	7-9 Dec
Rep David S. King (D-Utah)	Mbr House Committee on Government Operations	9-10 Dec
RADM J.P. Monroe, USN	COMNAVPHIL	9-11 Dec
Lt Gen William S. Stone, USAF	Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Hq USAF	9-12 Dec
Rep Charles H. Wilson (D-Calif)	Mbr, House Committee on Armed Services	10-11 Dec
	Special Committee on Military Airlift	
Rep William G. Bray (R-Ind)	Mbr, House Committee on Armed Services	10-11 Dec
	Special Committee on Military Airlift	
Rep Robert L.F. Sikes (D-Fla)	Mbr, Congress of the United States	15-17 Dec
Rep Clarence D. Long (D-Md)	Mbr, Congress of the United States	15-17 Dec
Maj Gen James W. Wilson, USAF	Commander, 13th Air Force	19-21 Dec
General Earle G. Wheeler, USA	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff	25-29 Dec
General Harold K. Johnson, USA	Chief of Staff, United States Army	29-29 Dec

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Appendix I

CHRONOLOGY

1965

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Appendix I

CHRONOLOGY

1965

January

- 1 Thailand Patriotic Front was established.
- 1 JUSMAG Personnel Auth: 268 officers, 249 enlisted. Assigned: 262 officers, 249 enlisted.
- 13 Two LST ramps at Sattahip completed.
- 14 ARSEC Medical Branch transferred to MACTHAI Staff Surgeon.
- 23 TPF declared its objectives over the "Voice of the People of Thailand" (radio).

February

- 2 Security sweep of Nakhon Phanom region began by BPP.
- 10 CINCPAC returned to CHJUSMAG recommended changes to CINCUSTAFF Plan 1/65.
- 13 Counterinsurgency exercise "Kitti 08" began, involving RTA, RTAF, BPP, and VDC.
- 25 Four management and production specialists arrived to continue reorganization of the Thai Naval Dockyard.

March

- 5 Concept for SEAITACS submitted to JCS by CINCPAC.
- 10 Exercise Jungle Drum III, an amphibious exercise, began on the Southeast coast of Thai Peninsula; involved RTN and RTMC.
- 19 SIAT agreement signed to strengthen logistics facilities within Thailand.
- 25 DEPCOMUSMACTHAI gave CINCPAC construction requirements for Thailand in support of current and planned operations.
- 26 Exercise Jungle Drum III concluded.
- 30 Exercise "Kitti 08" concluded.

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Appendix I - 2

March

- 31 CHJUSMAG wrote C/S, SCHQ, proposing that Thai civilian guards be employed to secure U.S. installations.

April

- 5 The 6234th TFW(Prov) organized at Korat.
- 8 The 6235th TFW(Prov) organized at Takhli.
- 8 In-Country clearance granted for the 6234th TFW(Prov) to enter Thailand.
- 20 CHJUSMAG apprised U.S. Ambassador of lack of air defense in Thailand.
- 28 C/S USAF requested CINCPACAF to perform survey of suitable airfields in Thailand as an aerial port, and a review of feasibility of developing Sattahip into a land-sea-air logistical complex.

May

- 3 First draft of COMUSTAFF OPLAN published.
- 3 Mark IV (X) SYNCOM tracking station became operational at Korat.
- 8 The 6234th and 6235th CSG's were organized at Korat and Takhli, respectively, and assigned to 13AF.
- 13 CINCPACAF advised COMUSMACTHAI that there was no plan to establish a numbered air division in Thailand.
- 14 Procurement Branch, Support Activity, Transferred to 9th Log.
- 15 9th Log, coordinating with R&P Div, submitted first projects of MCA for Thailand.
- 19 RTAF was informed that USAF funding of "Project Red Marble" would terminate as of 30 June 1966.
- 20 JCS approved CINCPAC ITACS concept for detailed planning.
- 23 CINCPAC stated to C/S USAF that Sattahip Naval Air Station was best suited in Thailand as an aerial port.

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Appendix I - 3

May

- 28 RTAF accepted proposal of a Joint USAF/RTAF Supply Advisory Team being placed in the Supply Division of Director of Materiel, RTAF.

June

- 1-4 Meeting held between JUSMAG and CINCPACAF representatives regarding responsibilities in implementing the AC&W system in Thailand, to ITACS standards.
- 9 FY66 Military Assistance Training Program implemented.
- 11 CHJUSMAG reported to U.S. Ambassador that counterinsurgency machinery should be re-examined because of increasing tempo of Communist activity.
- 11 CHJUSMAG reported inadequacy of government security action in Nakhon Phanom area in February.
- 17 Cmdr 2AD informed CHJUSMAG of responsibilities of Dep Cmdr 2AD.
- 18 DEPCOMUSMACTHAI approved and forwarded the FY67 MCA for Thailand to USARPAC--totalled \$56.6 million.
- 30 MACTHAI/JUSMAG personnel authorized: 280 officers, 263 enlisted. Assigned: 272 officers, 270 enlisted.

July

- 1 Ad hoc committee established by ARAG to assist in developing a Tactical Air Support System for the RTA.
- 1 ARAG and RTA began studies on identity and strengths of RTA units to be deployed to Chonburi.
- 7 Major reorganization began when CHJUSMAG initiated action to combine the MACTHAI/JUSMAG JTD.
- 10 General Easterbrook became both COMUSMACTHAI and CHJUSMAG Thailand.
- 17 SOC 51 established at Pattani.
- 30 JTD submitted to CINCPAC with proposed reorganization.

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Appendix I - 4

## August

- 4 Commissary and PX placed under direct supervision of Support Activity.
- 6 Meeting held in which RTG proposed 2,000 Thai reservists be employed as guards for U.S. installations.
- 14 538th Engr Bn arrived in Thailand to begin Bangkok by-pass road extension.
- 16 U.S./Thai site surveys for SOC's completed.
- 23 DCA directed movement of SYNCOM tracking terminal from Korat to Asmara, Ethiopia. Terminal in Saigon was to be relocated in Bang Ping.
- 24 Prime Minister Thanom promulgated CINCUSTAF Plan 1/65.
- 30 MACTHAI/JUSMAG Organizational Survey Board appointed.

## September

- 1 F-86L demonstration performed for RTAF to promote enthusiasm and interest in the F-86L program.
- 2 General Prapass commented to the press on the presence of USAF in Thailand.
- 4 JCS requested air defense requirements for Thailand be reviewed.
- 12 First Draft of Organization and Functions Manual Published.
- 14 MACTHAI/JUSMAG Organizational Survey Board completed work.
- 16 RTAF and SAW requirements for relocation of the Flying School at Korat were presented at a meeting of representatives of 13AF, AFRCE, OICC and AFAG.
- 24 Revised draft agreement and cost estimate for SOC's was provided the RTA.
- 25 CINCPAC concurred and forwarded to JCS the proposed agreements for the use of Thai reservists as guards for U.S. installations.
- 27 SOC 61 established at Pong Nam Ron.
- 30 Inventory of MAP assets in RTAF completed.

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Appendix I - 5

## September

- 30 A Rand Corporation study on problems of security and assistance in Thailand was completed during September.

## October

- 1 USMACTHAI/JUSMAG Manning Survey Board appointed.
- 1 Gen Prapass confirmed the closure of the RTC at Pranburi.
- 6 CINCPAC directed CHJUSMAG to expedite air defense study.
- 7 COMUSMACTHAI evaluated the capability of radar sites in Thailand to accept SEATACS augmentation.
- 8 COMUSMACTHAI commented to the Ambassador concerning the use of Thai facilities by the USAF.
- 19 Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman commented on U.S./Thai Bi-lateral Mutual Defense Agreement.
- 21 Final major decisions made to use Lampang and Phitsanuloke as POL storage areas.
- 22 Final Draft of the Organization and Functions Manual published.
- 27 JCS directed deployment of 1,356 tactical control personnel to augment the Thailand portion of SEATACS and the 6250th Air Spt Gp.
- 29 Manning survey of USMACTHAI/JUSMAG completed.

## November

- 1 Thailand Independence Movement and Thailand Patriotic Front merged.
- 12 MACTHAI Air Defense Study completed and forwarded to CINCPAC.
- 19 Volumes I and II of the Draft COMUSTAFF OPLAN 1/65 published and furnished to MOD and JCS.
- 26 CINCPAC commented on RTAF AC&W capability.
- 27 One VDC killed and two PP wounded by subversive band.
- 30 During November the Communist Party of Thailand made decision to switch from a defensive to an offensive campaign.

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Appendix I - 6

November

30 Sixteen attempted assassinations in the Northeast during November.

December

6 Assessment of RTAF AC&W net made by DEPCOMUSMACTHAI.

10 CINCPAC approved MACTHAI Air Defense Study and forwarded air defense requirements for Thailand to JCS.

14 Communist Suppression Headquarters established by RTG.

15 Six RTN pilots and six crewmen commenced S2A Aircraft CONUS training.

21 BIC attacked by subversives.

27 Beginning of a five-day campaign by police and RTA elements against Communists in the Phu Phan Mountain Range.

31 U.S. Ambassador reported that a new and more serious phase of insurgency must be checked.

31 Nine attempted assassinations during December.

31 MACTHAI/JUSMAG Personnel authorized: 301 officers, 295 enlisted. Assigned: 297 officers, 278 enlisted.

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